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i
Abstract 
This thesis examines trends and issues in the policing of money laundering in Dubai 
focusing on the role of Dubai Police in money laundering control. It acknowledges 
that  money laundering is  a  global  phenomenon and Dubai  is  not  an exception.  It 
explores the existing governmental initiatives aimed at addressing money laundering 
and the financing of terrorism. Whilst the unit of analysis in this thesis is the Emirate 
of Dubai, the thesis also considered the impact of regional (GCC) and international 
legislations and regulations (UN and FATF) on the policing of money laundering in 
Dubai.  It  is  argued in  this  thesis  that  the  major  problem with  policing  of  money 
laundering in Dubai is the lack of accountability of the AMLSCU that plays a leading 
role  in  the  fight  against  money  laundering.  In  addition,  the  information  sharing 
amongst  various government  agencies  and financial  institutions  is  extremely poor. 
Where  information  pertaining  to  money  laundering  cases  is  shared,  they  are 
inconsistent  and  haphazard.  Consequently,  the  government  is  facing  problems  to 
effectively combat money laundering in the Emirate. Other factors identified as major 
impediments are the lack of national database of money laundering cases which can 
be shared amongst the Police, the Customs Authority and the AMLSCU of Central 
Bank of UAE. The thesis also argues that poor training and lack of multi-agency/ 
interagency working is making the work of Dubai police difficult. Finally, it is argued 
that an a formal, integrated and intelligence-led information sharing model such as the 
UK  National  Intelligence  Model  (that  draws  on  the  importance  of  multi-agency 
working,  information  sharing  and  accountability)  can  serve  as  a  more  effective 
approach to the policing of money laundering in Dubai.  
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Introduction
The problem of controlling money laundering is  a significant  issue confronting many 
nation states. The various attempts to address money laundering are often discombobulated 
by continuous changes in nature of the crime. This thesis presents a critical evaluation of the 
trends and issues in the policing of money laundering in Dubai.  It  examines the ways in 
which the law enforcement agencies and other governmental agencies in Dubai are tackling 
the problem of money laundering and the financing of terrorism. The study of the control of 
money laundering in Dubai is significant due to the position of Dubai in the United Arab 
Emirates  (UAE)  as  well  as  its  position  as  an  international  financial  centre.  This  thesis 
examines the following:
a) The nature  and extent  of  trans-national  organised crime  and money laundering  in 
Dubai;
b) The political, legal and inter-agency structures in Dubai and the UAE for the control 
of money laundering. Specifically, the thesis examines the roles that the Anti-Money 
Laundering and Suspicious Cases Unit (AMLSCU) of the UAE Central Bank and the 
Anti-Organized Crime Department (AOCD) of the Dubai Police play in this set-up; 
the legal set-up in place for the sharing of intelligence between these two key agencies 
and the nature of the partnership that exists between other agencies involved in money 
laundering control in Dubai. 
c) The  strength  and  weaknesses  of  the  AOCD  of  the  Dubai  Police  in  terms  of 
investigating money laundering cases and, in the light of the findings of the study, 
what  changes  are  necessary  in  order  to  have  a  more  effective  system of  money 
laundering control in Dubai.
1
Organized crime is considered as one of the most dangerous crimes, not only in terms of the 
harm it causes to individuals and governments, but to society as a whole. It has also been 
acknowledged that organised crime is the most difficult crime to control and this is largely 
due to  its  sophistication  and transnational  nature.  Money laundering  is  a unique form of 
organised crime because it thrives on other forms of organised crime such as drug trafficking, 
prostitution and human trafficking. Unlike other forms of organised crime, it can be disguised 
perfectly  through legitimate  business activities  such as  the running of luxury restaurants, 
jewellers  and  casinos  to  mention  but  a  few.  Indeed,  its  practice  often  opens  doors  for 
administrative, political and financial corruption, and increases the chances of other criminal 
activities  such  as  bribery,  profit  making  from  public  jobs,  forgery  and  counterfeiting. 
Consequently, it damages the economy of affected countries and lead to social and political 
decline.  Hence,  the  efforts  to  research  organized  crime  in  order  to  provide  a  better 
understanding  of  the  phenomenon,  including  a  critical  analysis  of  current  means  of 
preventing or controlling  the crime,  cannot be overestimated.  
The federal government of the UAE is very serious about tackling organized crime and 
money laundering in the Emirates. This is clear, not only in terms of the full support given by 
the government  to international  legal  and law enforcement  arrangements  to  combat  these 
crimes, but also in the passing of its own laws criminalising money laundering and many 
other sorts of financial crimes including the financing of terrorism.
However, the enactment of law, on its own, does not provide effective enforcement 
unless those who are required to enforce the law work together as equal partners in the law 
enforcement process. The money laundering laws in the UAE grant exclusive powers to the 
Anti-Money Laundering and Suspicious Cases Unit (AMLSCU) of the UAE Central Bank. 
This enables this unit to decide which transactions are possibly cases of money laundering 
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and  to  monitor  the  process  of  the  investigation  and  the  prosecution  of  suspected  cases. 
Nevertheless, the police and the other government agencies involved in money laundering 
control cannot question the decision of AMLSCU when the Unit decides not to declare a 
particular transaction as suspicious. In addition, the Dubai police do not have the power to 
compel AMLSCU to release intelligence/information on suspected cases when AMLSCU has 
decided not to do so. Thus, it appears that the existing structure is not transparent enough and 
this raises questions of accountability. 
What is the basis of the present structure of money laundering control in Dubai? What 
are the implications for those who work within the system, namely the police and AMLSCU 
officials?  What are the perceptions of these officials about the system within which they 
operate? How do the views of these officials point us in the direction for change?  These are 
the key questions that this thesis addresses.  
The need for change is imperative if Dubai is to be more effective in controlling money 
laundering. While the country can boast several successes in terms of sensational cases of 
arrests of money launderers, it is the position of this thesis that more could be done if there 
was  a  formal  structure  in  place  for  the  sharing  of  intelligence  between  the  police  and 
AMLSCU,  as  well  as  other  government  agencies  involved  in  the  control  of  money 
laundering, in order for them to work together as equal actors in a partnership arrangement 
backed by law.   
The use of intelligence is of strategic importance in crime control.  Experience in other 
jurisdictions  has  led  to  the  realisation  of  the  fact  that  it  is  problematic  when,  in  a  law 
enforcement context involving multiple agencies, one agency monopolises the intelligence 
without disclosing it to the others. A muti-agency or inter-agency approach to crime control 
requires  that  agencies  work  as  equal  partners  and  should  be  willing  to  share 
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information/intelligence in order to have a better and more realistic approach to the control of 
the crime in question. This is particularly true of drugs enforcement.  This thesis will explore 
the  practicalities  of  this  happening  with  regard  to  the  policing  and  control  of  money 
laundering in Dubai and will consider whether a model of intelligence-led policing approach 
is  feasible  in  the  UAE.   The  thesis  rests  on  the  theoretical  view that  the  police  have  a 
legitimate  mandate  to  enforce  the law,  and therefore  should  be at  the centre  of  any law 
enforcement arrangements to control crime. 
This  research  is  significant  as  it  looks  at  alternative  approaches  to  the  policing  of 
money laundering in Dubai. The study will help the government and policy makers in Dubai 
to identify areas for improvement in the existing laws and regulations aimed at combating 
money laundering in the country. 
My personal reasons and motivation for conducting this research
There were many reasons that motivated me to conduct my PhD study on the policing of 
money laundering in Dubai. As a serving police officer in the Dubai Police, I am familiar with 
the nature and extent of major crimes facing Dubai. Dubai is a multi-cultural society where 
people from different parts of the world engage in business and employment. Most of the 
crimes committed in Dubai are economic in nature. The financial system of Dubai is often 
blamed for  being  a  conduit  in  terms of  facilitating  and supporting the  process  of  money 
laundering. The tragic incident of September 11, 2001 on the twin towers in the USA brought 
Dubai into the international limelight in the debate about money laundering and the financing 
of terrorism. The financial institutions of the UAE, especially in Dubai, came under extreme 
pressure from the international community due to the allegations that its financial system was 
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being  used  by Al-Qaeda  to  finance  its  terrorist  activities  worldwide.  The  hijackers  were 
alleged to have used banks in Dubai to transfer money to the USA.  In fact, in 1998, Al-Qaeda 
used the Dubai Islamic Bank to transfer funds in order to finance the bombing of the US 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (Winer, 2002). In this respect, the Government of the UAE 
have been under immense international pressure to improve upon and tighten its financial 
regulatory systems against money launderers, especially those who intend to launder money 
in order to finance the cause of international terrorism. Although, the phenomenon of money 
laundering is not unique to Dubai but is a global issue, the said incident brought disrepute to 
the economy of the Emirates and to Emirati society.  Therefore, I decided to research money 
laundering in Dubai in the hope of coming up with recommendations that would enable the 
government of Dubai to improve its existing anti-money laundering control mechanisms.
Since  the  said  incident,  I  started  to  read  literature  about  the  problem  of  money 
laundering in general and in Dubai in particular. Being a police officer, I was interested in the 
role that the Dubai Police is playing in the process of controlling money laundering in the 
Emirates.  It  was depressing to know that the Dubai Police has a very limited role in the 
investigation of money laundering cases in the Emirates. In most developed part of the world, 
the police play an active role in the fight against money laundering, whereas in Dubai, the 
situation  is  completely  the  opposite,  with  the  UAE Central  Bank in  control  of  the  legal 
process. 
Before commencing on this research, I conducted a literature search to find out if any 
research had been conducted on money laundering in Dubai and the UAE.  It was found that 
a number of studies have been conducted in this respect. However, the focus of these studies 
has been mainly on the legal regulation of money laundering in the Emirates; the rules and 
regulations  and  the  infrastructure  established  for  the  control  of  money  laundering  in  the 
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country.  Accordingly,  most  of  the studies were generally  descriptive  and limited  in  their 
focus. None of these studies focused on the role of the Dubai Police in combating money 
laundering in the Emirates, or how the money laundering legal structures operate in practice. 
The acknowledgement of the lack of research on the role of the Dubai Police in controlling 
money laundering was the main reason why the Dubai government accepted my application 
to conduct my doctoral research into this topic. As far I know, this is the first study that 
focuses on the role of the police in controlling money laundering in Dubai.
Structure of the thesis
This thesis starts with an introductory chapter that explains the reason for conducting 
this  study.  It  also describes  the story of how and why I  choose the  research  topic.  This 
chapter also highlights the significance of the study, along with its limitations.  
Chapter  One entitled  Organized  Crime:  The  Problem of  Definition provides  the 
theoretical review of the concept of ‘organized crime’. This chapter highlights some of the 
major  debates  about  the  meaning  of  the  concept  and identified  the  fact  that  there  is  no 
consensus about the definition of organized crime. The history of organized crime is traced 
back to the USA from where the concept emerged. The chapter then highlights the early 
understandings  of  organized  crime  which,  for  most  of  the  Twentieth  Century,  has  been 
racially defined.  The chapter shows how the nature and extent of organized crime has been 
transformed globally, especially during the last few decades. Since the end of World War II, 
organized criminals have benefited from the fruits of globalization and have now expanded 
their  operations  to  different  parts  of  the  world.  In  this  respect,  the  chapter  shows  how 
advancements in technology have facilitated organized criminals to expand the scope of their 
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actions  globally.  Thus,  the  chapter  also  discusses  the  move  from  organized  crime  to 
transnational organized crime.    
Chapter Two discusses the phenomenon of money laundering in detail. The chapter 
starts by defining the meaning and purpose of money laundering.  It explains some of the 
main reasons for the continued existence of money laundering. How money laundering is 
affected/promoted and/or facilitated by global politics is also discussed in this chapter. The 
chapter then focuses on the money laundering problem in the UAE generally, and in Dubai in 
particular. In this regard, the chapter discusses the ‘Hawala’ - a traditional remittance system 
which is also one of the oldest forms of informal banking commonly practiced in Eastern and 
Middle-Eastern countries.  In recent years, the Hawala has come under pressure, accused of 
being a form of money laundering. Finally, the chapter describes how, in recent years, money 
laundering has been linked to the financing of international terrorism.        
Chapter Three focuses on the international legal and administrative arrangements in 
place to control money laundering, both globally and regionally, and the impact on Dubai. 
This  chapter  is  divided  into  two  sections.  Section  one  presents  the  international  efforts 
undertaken to combat money laundering at the global level. It includes UN initiatives such as 
the  Basle  Committee  on  Banking  Regulations  (1988),  the  UN Convention  against  Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988) and the UN Convention on 
Transnational Organized Crime (2000). The forty recommendations devised by the Financial 
Action  Task  Force  (FATF)  are  also  included  in  this  chapter.  The  second  section  of  the 
chapter highlights some of the regional efforts made for the eradication of money laundering. 
This section highlights the initiatives undertaken by the European Union and the GCC for the 
eradication  of  money  laundering  at  regional  level.  These  include  the  European  Union’s 
Council  of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation from the 
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Proceeds of Crime (1990). Similarly, the Arab countries have also taken steps to eradicate 
money  laundering  in  the  region.  These  measures  include  the  Arabic  Convention  on 
Countering  Terrorism  (1998),  the  Guiding  Arabic  Draft  Law  on  Countering  Money 
Laundering (Amended in August 2002) and the establishment of the Middle East and North 
Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF) in 2004
Chapter Four explains the research methodology adopted for conducting this study. 
It highlights how the study area was accessed, the type of data collection tools used, and the 
types of people interviewed. The chapter presents a detailed picture of the way fieldwork was 
conducted, the theoretical foundations of the research methodology adopted, the rationale for 
choosing the research approach, the ethical issues considered, and the limitations of the study. 
Chapter Five entitled The Legal, Political and Inter-Agency Arrangements for the Policing  
of Money Laundering in Dubai  is a critical assessment of the legislative and administrative 
arrangements in existence in Dubai for combating money laundering.  It presents a historical 
account  of the development  of anti-money laundering laws in the country.  In addition,  it 
explains  the key features of the three main pieces of legislation,  namely the Anti-Money 
Laundering  Regulations  2000,  the  Criminalization  of  Money  Laundering  2002  and  the 
Combating Terrorism Offences 2004. It also explains the legal roles and responsibilities of 
the  different  public  agencies  tasked  with  controlling  money  laundering  in  the  Emirates, 
namely  the  National  Anti-Money  Laundering  Committee  (NAMLC),  the  Financial 
Institutions, the Anti-Money Laundering and Suspicious Cases Unit (AMLSCU) of the UAE 
Central Bank and the Anti-Organized Crime Department of the Dubai Police. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of some of the key problems facing the anti-money laundering 
control system in Dubai.   Thus, the chapter sets the scene for the analysis of the empirical 
data in the following chapters. 
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Chapter Six  presents the analysis of the empirical data collected during the fieldwork 
for this research. This chapter is based on the views of the 10 bank managers, 15 officials of 
AMLSCU,  and  15  police  officers  from the  Anti-Organized  Crime  Department  of  Dubai 
Police  interviewed  during  the  fieldwork.  The  chapter  discusses  respondents’  views  with 
regard  to  key  issues  about  how  the  anti-money  laundering  system  works  in  practice. 
Specifically,  the  chapter  highlights  the  views  and  opinions  of  police  officers  about  the 
investigation of money laundering cases and the problems they are facing in  this  regard. 
Finally, the chapter discusses some of the main problems that all the parties claimed they 
were facing with regard to the sharing of information on suspected money laundering cases. 
Chapter Seven provides explanations in terms of the fact that the strategy for combating 
money  laundering  in  Dubai  is  old  fashioned  and  reactive  in  nature.  In  most  developed 
countries of the world, the policing of organized crime and money laundering is done in a 
proactive manner. In this respect, the law enforcement agencies collaborate in sharing and 
analysing intelligence/information so that they can take concerted action with regard to the 
control  of  this  crime.  This  chapter,  therefore,  describes  some  known  approaches  to 
intelligence  sharing  in  law enforcement  such  as  Intelligence-Led  Policing  (ILP)  and  the 
British National Intelligence Model (NIM). Unfortunately, such collaboration does not exist 
among the law enforcement agencies in Dubai. This is considered a major and significant 
flaw. Suggestions are made as to how Dubai could adopt a more proactive approach to money 
laundering control with the police at the centre of a structured intelligence-led approach to the 
control of money laundering in Dubai. 
Chapter Eight draws on the research findings and argues that the Dubai government 
must change its strategy by enforcing a change in the existing laws that will facilitate a more 
collaborative approach on the part of the different agencies responsible for addressing the 
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problem of money laundering. In addition, it also highlights the fact that important lessons 
should be learned from the experiences of other countries, especially the developed countries, 
in respect of their efforts in tackling money laundering, and that new initiatives should be 
introduced in the Emirates to effectively control money laundering. The chapter ends with 
recommendations to the Dubai government on how the current system could be improved, 
including legal changes necessary to allow for civil confiscation of proceeds derived from 
organized crime and for a mechanism to be put into place to ensure the accountability of 
AMLSCU and the sharing of intelligence between the Unit  and the AOCD of the Dubai 
Police. 
The Government of Dubai is committed to controlling money laundering on its soil. In 
this respect, it has introduced anti-money laundering laws and put administrative mechanisms 
in place aimed at ensuring that culprits/suspects are apprehended and prosecuted.  However, 
the fight against money laundering control in the country is far from over.
Limitations of the study
The  United  Arab  Emirates  consists  of  seven  states  and  the  problem  of  money 
laundering is common to all of them. However, keeping in view the time restrictions and the 
financial  constraints,  this  study is  limited  to  the  administrative  jurisdiction  of  the  Dubai 
Police Force. It would require more time and additional resources to be able to extend the 
scope of the study to the other six states of the United Arab Emirates. More importantly is the 
fact  that  every state  in  the United Arab Emirates  has  different  rules  and regulations  and 
institutional arrangements for dealing with the problem of money laundering.  Therefore it 
would be very difficult to extend the scope of the study to the other six Emirates as it would 
create practical problems and there is danger of losing the scope of the study.
10
Political Map of the United Arab Emirates, showing Dubai.
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Chapter One
Organized and Transnational Crime: A Review of the Literature
1.0 Introduction 
‘Organized’  crime  is  increasingly  becoming  one  of  the  world’s  greatest  problems.  This 
chapter addresses some of the ambiguities surrounding the definition of organised crime. It 
examines some of the major debates associated with defining the term ‘organized crime’. In 
addition, a brief history of organized crime is provided through a review of the development 
of ‘organised crime’ in the United States of America (USA) where it is generally believed 
that the concept of organized crime developed. This discussion includes some of the early 
debates on organized crime that are based on ethnicity. Finally, the global nature of the crime 
is discussed; how, since the end of the Second World War, and with the advancement of 
globalization and the globalization of the world economy, ‘organized’ criminal groups have 
taken full advantage of global technological and scientific innovations such as the Internet to 
expand their  operations internationally.  The advancement  of technology and globalization 
have  greatly  facilitated  the  illegal  operations  of  organized  criminal  groups  across 
international borders, boosted their effectiveness and made it easier for them to continue to 
expand their activities undetected. The result is the increase in the types of criminal activities 
that ‘organized’ criminals now engage in. 
Organized crime activities involve mainly the provision of illegal goods and services. The 
making of, and trafficking in, narcotics (illicit drugs), child pornography, sophisticated credit 
card  fraud,  kidnapping  for  profit,  extortion,  illegal  toxic  waste  dumping,  tax  and  VAT 
evasion,  intellectual  property  theft  (for  example,  video  and  audio  piracy  and  product 
counterfeiting), human trafficking and prostitution are some of the criminal activities now 
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believed to be commonly engaged in by ‘organized’ criminals (see Levi, 2007:777).  The 
organized  criminal  exploits  and  capitalises  on  ordinary  peoples’  needs  for  illegal  or 
proscribed goods and services  (Caiden,  1985).  A common denominator  is  the  pursuit  of 
financial gain and, in some cases, political power, where organised crime proceeds are used 
to support political causes, for example, through the financing of terrorism. Thus, this chapter 
sets  the  background  to  a  fuller  discussion  of  money  laundering,  a  form of  crime  often 
associated with organized crime, in later chapters.
1.1. Definition of Organised Crime
The term ‘organized’ crime is often used in two different senses. First, in terms of the 
criminal activity itself,  and second in terms of the organizational aspect of the crime (see 
Woodiwiss, 2000). Most definitions  focus on the organizational aspect rather than on the 
criminal act itself. Sometimes, the definition includes the means of commission of the crime. 
According to Maltz (1976:342) these include ‘…violence, theft, corruption, economic power, 
deception,  victim  collusion  or  participation’;  or  ‘…threat  of  violence’  (cited  in  Levi, 
2002:880).  Thus,  historically,  the  term has been used synonymously with,  or to refer  to, 
mafia-like criminals, gangsters, the mob and the like.  This view has significantly affected the 
perception of organized crime for a very long time. 
However, the perception that ‘organized’ crimes are gang-like, has been challenged by 
contemporary writers on organized crime. For example,  according to Cressey (1969:319), 
‘…an organized crime is  any crime committed  by a  person occupying,  in  an established 
division of labour,  a position designed for the commission of crime,  providing that  such 
division  of  labour  also  includes  at  least  one  position  for  a  corrupter,  one  position  for  a 
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corruptee, and one position for an enforcer’. According to Maltz (1976:342), ‘…an organized 
crime is a crime committed by two or more offenders who are or intend to remain associated 
for the purpose of committing crimes’. A common denominator of ‘organised’ crime is the 
desire to make profits. According to Cressey (op.cit: 72) the main aim of organised criminals 
is  to  “maximise  profits  by  performing  illegal  services  and  providing  legally  forbidden 
products demanded by the broader society within which it lives”
Official definitions of ‘organized’ crime have also focused on the ‘organizational’ aspect 
of the crime. In 1998, the European Union proposed a definition of organised crime in order 
to consolidate policy on the subject,  and to make it a criminal offence to participate in a 
criminal organisation in the member states of the European Union. According to Article 1 of 
Joint Action of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council of the EU:
A criminal organisation shall mean a lasting, structured association of two or 
more persons,  acting  in concert  with a  view to committing  crimes or other 
offences which are punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order of 
a  maximum of  at  least  four  years or  a more  serious  penalty,  whether  such 
crimes or offences are an end in themselves or a means of obtaining material 
benefits  and, if necessary, of improperly influencing the operation of public 
authorities (European Union, 1998: cited in Wright, 2006).
In Britain,  the National Criminal  Intelligence Service (NCIS) - the main government  UK 
agency concerned with the gathering of information on organised crime – defined organised 
criminals as:
Those  involved  on  a  continuing  basis,  normally  working  with  others,  in 
committing crimes for substantial profit or gain, for which a person aged 12 
or over on first conviction could expect to be imprisoned for three or more 
years.  (NCIS UK Threat Assessment Report, Para 1.1 cited in Lea, 2005)
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Describing the form of the criminal organisation, the NCIS has this to say:
The  term  ‘organised  crime  group’  is  often  used  when  referring  to  the 
activities  of serious and organised criminals  and in some instances  it  best 
describes  the  way  those  concerned  have  organised  and  see  themselves. 
However, the terms can also be misleading. While there are certainly some 
organised crime groups that resemble the traditional British ‘firm’ or Italian 
mafia,  with  permanent  members  each  with  a  distinct  role,  a  hierarchy  in 
which there are clear chains of command and communication, there are other 
groups that are, in practice, loose networks. The members of those networks 
coalesce around more prominent criminal(s) to undertake particular criminal 
ventures of varying complexity, structure and length. In the latter instance, 
the criminals may not think of themselves as being members of any group, 
and individuals  may be involved with a  number of sub-groups within the 
network, and therefore be involved in a number of separate criminal ventures 
at any one time (NCIS UK Threat Assessment Report, 2005. Para. 2.7 cited in 
Lea, 2005)
Article  2  of  the  United  Nations  Convention  against  Transnational  Organised  Crime, 
which serves as a reference point for all EU countries, also offers a similar definition with 
emphasis on the structural phenomenon of organised crime. The Convention proposed these 
operational definitions:
An Organised Criminal group shall mean a structured group of three or more persons, 
existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or 
more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in 
order to obtain directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit;
(a) ‘Serious crime’ shall mean conduct constituting an offence punishable by a maximum 
deprivation of liberty of at least four years or more serious penalty;
(b) ‘Structured group’ shall mean a group that is not randomly formed for the immediate 
commission of an offence or does not need to have formally defined roles for its 
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members, continuity of its membership or a developed structure ( United Nations, 
2004)
Furthermore,  the International  Police Information Exchange Agency defines  an organized 
criminal group as:
Any group having  a  corporate  structure  whose  primary  objective  is  to  obtain 
money through illegal activities, often surviving on fear and corruption (Interpol 
Conference, 1998, cited in Lea, 2005)
However, in spite of its ever-expanding boundaries, and the fact that it is a serious foreign 
policy matter, there is still no universal agreement on the definition of ‘organized’ crime and 
the approach that should be taken to control it.   According to Levi (2007) the tension is 
between: 
(a) ‘those who want  legislation to cover a wide set of circumstances to avoid the risk that 
any major criminal might ‘get away with it, and 
(b)  those who want the law to be quite tightly drawn to avoid the overreach of powers, 
which  might  otherwise  criminalise  groups  who  are  only  a  modest  threat’  (Levi, 
2007:780). 
There seems to be a universal agreement, however, that organized crime is constituted by 
both ‘full- time’ and ‘part-time’ criminals, many of whom may have multiple partners, and 
that the term ‘organized’ crime  denotes not just a set of criminal actors but also a set of 
criminal activities (Cohen, 1977).
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Organized crime is a complex phenomenon because ‘…organized crime groups operate in 
complex economic markets and are impacted by the legal system, politics and the community 
environment  where  they  do business’  (Mallory,  2007:33).  There  are  many factors  which 
undermine the efforts to combat organized criminal activities. These include corruption of 
state officials, weak financial structures, lack of effective security and surveillance at airports 
and  international  borders,  and  ineffective  law  enforcement,  all  of  which  have  allowed 
organized criminal groups to continue their illegal activities unchecked. As a result,  these 
organized  crime groups make fortunes  and gain power  and influence  in  many countries. 
Some are known to have even influenced state laws regulating the control of organized crime 
(Mallory, 2007).
The  success  of  organised  criminals  lies  in  their  ability  to  mimic  or  operate  within 
legitimate businesses.  According to Mallory (2007:2), organized criminals have incorporated 
into  their  operations  many of  the  successful  principles  or  features  of  legitimate  business 
organizations. These include:
• a unit of command: a superior to whom one is directly responsible
• the principle of definition: clearly defined authority and responsibility 
• the span of control: a limited number of people controlled by a supervisor
• the principle of objective: defining the purpose of the organization or what business is 
being undertaken (e.g. drugs, murder for hire, extortion, gambling, etc.)
• insulation  and  need-to-know  principles:  personnel  have  contact  only  with  their 
immediate boss and peers
• pyramidal structure: orders flow down the hierarchical chart and important decisions 
are made at the top
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• principle of specialization: members or organized crime are experts in a single job 
function
• rules:  omerta1 (vow  of  silence,  never  talking  to  the  police)  and  the  process  of 
becoming a member of an organized crime group (Mallory, 2007:2)
Organized criminal groups have also acquired the capability of adapting to the changing 
markets and new technology and, as a result, they have increased their level of sophistication 
and their ability to continue their criminal activities (Mallory, 2007). Globally, the number of 
what are often termed ‘safe havens’, where organized crime groups are protected by either 
lack of state control or official corruption, are growing (Johnson, 2001). In recent years, there 
has been an increasing tendency for alliances between organized criminal groups around the 
world, not only for their survival, but also for the continuity and expansion of their illegal 
activities. It is important to mention that global politics has played an important role in the 
continuity and expansion of organized criminal activities around the world. One of the well 
documented examples in this regard is the CIA’s assistance and support for anti-communist 
groups or movements during the Cold War. As a consequence, the international drug trade 
was not only tolerated, but even supported by America, provided that such criminal groups 
were deemed to be assisting in the ‘War on Communism’ (Levi,  2002:886).  Levi further 
argued  that  this  tolerance  and  support  is  expected  to  occur  in  the  context  of  ‘War  on 
Terrorism’ post-11 September 2001 (see Levi, 2002:886).    
1.2 Organized Crime: Its History and Development
Organized  crime  has  a  long  history.  However,  most  observers  locate  its  origin  in  the 
distinctly American style of organized crime that was a phenomenon of the late Nineteenth 
1 Omerta refers to rules which organized criminal groups keep to be able to maintain their enterprise structure. 
This ‘code of silence’ is associated with La Costra Nostra (the American Mafia) (see Mallory, 2007:34)
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and early Twentieth Centuries.  This model of organized crime is best known through the 
activities of the Corleone family, the central characters in the Hollywood blockbuster film 
The  Godfather, and  more  recently  in  the  television  portrayal  of  the  New  Jersey  based 
racketeering in The Sopranos (Rawlinson, 2005; Newburn, 2007).  Rawlinson (2005) argued 
that these characters bear little resemblance to the phenomenon of organized crime that we 
know today. However, the stereotypical picture of organized crime as Mafia-like continued to 
dominate popular and criminological discussions of organized crime during the Twentieth 
Century. 
Very few would dispute that it was the introduction of the famous Volstead Act of 1919, 
commonly known as the Prohibition Act, which provided the impetus for the emergence of 
organized criminal activity in America. As a consequence of the enactment of the 1919 Act, a 
black market for alcohol was created. According to Newburn (2007), the existence of urban 
areas in America has always created a demand for the illegal supply of alcohol, gambling and 
prostitution.  He  added  that  this  demand  for  any illegal  activity  has  always  been  met  in 
different  ways.  The  illicit  trade  in  alcohol  that  had  previously  been  run  by  small  scale 
operators was quickly transformed, after the Prohibition Act was passed, into an organized 
and sophisticated market dominated by Italian immigrants. It was a lucrative industry that 
ensured the generation of considerable illegal income for the Italian racketeers.  Thus, during 
the Prohibition years, the balance of power in the American underworld shifted, placing the 
immigrant Italians at the centre of organized criminal activities in the country (Catanzaro, 
1992: Rawlinson, 2005). 
In the 1920s and 1930s, efforts to understand organized crime were constrained by what 
Woodiwiss (2000) referred to as limited knowledge and the widely held assumption shared 
19
by middle  class  Americans  that  organized  crime  was  a  problem mainly  confined to  city 
slums. The first  official  effort  in America to define organized crime and elaborate  on its 
nature  and extent  was  that  of  the  Wickersham Commission  (1929-31).  The Commission 
looked at the different aspects of the problem and concluded that Organized Crime was an 
unfortunate  and  unavoidable  part  of  the  nation’s  political,  economic,  social  and  legal 
structure  rather  than  a  threat  to  these  structures.  The Commission  added that  politicians, 
public  officials,  professionals  and  other  representatives  of  the  ‘respectable’  classes  were 
clearly part of the problem of organized crime, not passive victims, and that organized crime 
was  not  simply  the  “  …tools  of  distinct  gangster-dominated  entities’  (see  Woodiwiss, 
2000:4). Accordingly, the Commission called for a comprehensive and nationwide inquiry 
into the problem of organized crime.
Since the 1960s, the debate about the meaning, nature and effects of organized crime 
gained momentum in America, partly due to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy 
in 1963 and the assassination of his brother Robert F. Kennedy in 1968. Robert F. Kennedy 
was the US Attorney-General who had successfully prosecuted a large number of mafia gang 
members in the mid-1960s (Lyman and Potter, 2004). Organized crime became  increasingly 
recognized  as  a  threat  to  the  smooth  functioning  of  government,  associated  with  the 
corruption of police officers, able to infiltrate legitimate businesses, and responsible for the 
decay and integrity of the free American society. In 1967, the US President’s Commission on 
Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice had defined ‘organized crime’ as: 
A society that seeks to operate outside the control of the American people and 
their governments. It involves thousands of criminals, working within structures 
as  complex  as  those  of  any  large  corporation,  subject  to  laws  more  rigidly 
enforced than those of legitimate governments. Its actions are not impulsive but 
rather the result of intricate conspiracies carried on over many years and aimed at 
gaining control over whole fields of activity in order to amass huge profits (see 
Woodiwiss, 2003:16)
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 Donald Cressey, a prominent criminologist headed the 1967 Commission.  He argued 
that  the  core  of  organized  crime  in  the  United  States  consisted  of  twenty  four  groups 
operating criminal cartels in large cities across the nation. Their membership was said to be 
exclusively Italian and gambling was the main source of revenue followed by loan sharking 
and the distribution of narcotics.  The Commission maintained that quite a number of the 
criminals engaged in organized crime were also involved in legitimate businesses and labour 
union activities (Woodiwiss, 2000). 
1.3. Early Understanding of Organized Crime: Ethnic-Based Conspiracy Theories 
Cressey’s definition of organized crime in terms of ‘criminal cartels’ led to the emergence 
of  ethnic-based conspiracy theories  of  organized crime.  The role  that  ethnicity  played in 
shaping American organized crime has long been at the centre of a heated debate among 
criminologists.  It was generally believed that it  was the ‘aliens’,  that is,  the foreigners, – 
people  outside the mainstream American society  – who were responsible  for organized 
criminal  activities  in the USA. Commonly known as the ‘Alien Conspiracy Theory’,  this 
theory assigns primary significance to the role played by Italian Americans and particularly 
immigrants from Sicily in organized criminal activities in the USA. It was widely believed 
that ‘…members of the Sicilian Mafia transplanted their criminal culture when they migrated 
to  the  United  States’  (Mallory,  2007:34).  This  theory  rests  upon  two  fundamental 
assumptions;  first,  that  organized  crime  in  the  USA  involved  an  ‘alien  other’  (Italian 
immigrants from Sicily) and, second, that the organizations they operated were characterized 
by a ‘formal, hierarchical structure’ (Newburn, 2007:407). According to Hughes and Langan 
(2001:262)  the  basic  idea  was that  of  an alien,  implanted  conspiracy  (of  Sicilian  origin) 
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which  was  centrally  organised  and  also  dominated  organised  crime,  both  nationally  and 
internationally. 
The  centrality  of  the  conspiracy  led  to  the  assumption  of  monolithic,  impenetrable, 
culturally  hermetic  groups  of  criminals.  As  far  back  as  the  early  1950s,  the  Kefauver 
Committee had defined organized crime as an ethnically-based phenomenon comprising of 
‘hierarchical, monolithic structures’ (Rawlinson, 2005:291). Thus, the problem of organized 
crime  in  America  was  oversimplified,  limited  to  the  apparently  predominantly  Italian 
‘Mafias’. The televised confession of a small-time gangster, Joseph Valacchi, in 1963, further 
provided  material  for  the  mafia  theory.  Valacchi  apparently  spoke  of  structured  crime 
families,  the  ‘La  Cosa  Nostra  (Our  Thing)’,  run  by  an  organization  known  as  the 
‘Commission’  (Rawlinson, 2005:294).  The mafia  theory continued to influence  the crime 
control strategies in America for decades. According to Hughes and Langan (2001:262) ‘…
historically, the concept of organised crime as an alien, dangerous and unified entity was as 
vital to the law enforcement community in the USA as the idea of communism as an alien, 
dangerous and united entity was for the intelligence and foreign policy making community’. 
Therefore  idea  gained  momentum and eventually  dominated  not  only  American  but  also 
international perceptions of organized crime. 
As  mentioned  earlier,  it  was  this  conspiracy  (mafia)  theory  that  was  the  focus  of 
criminological study of organized crimes in the Twentieth Century (Block, 1994). The theory 
was first endorsed by Donald Cressey in the report of the US President’s Commission on 
Law Enforcement  and the Administration  of Justice in  1967, and in his  book  Theft  of  a  
Nation published in 1969. In the former, he narrated that:
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Organized  crime  in  America  was  dominated  by  a  tightly-knit  network  of 
‘Mafia Families’, and that these groupings had a largely formal, hierarchical 
structure (see Newburn, 2007:411)
The ethnic  theory is  also supported by Mallory (2007) who argued that  many organized 
criminal  groups  are  coordinated  around  ethnic  groups.   More  recently,  ethnic  based 
conspiracy theories have been used to explain the formation and activities of the ‘Russian 
Mafia’ in the USA which apparently became intensified after the fall of the Soviet Union.  In 
fact, there is a sizeable body of literature which identifies organized crime with the different 
forms of gangsterism associated with particular ethnic groups like the Japanese Yakuza and 
the Chinese Triads (Newburn, 2007).
However, another perspective on ethnicity and organized crime  exists which argues 
that organized crime is not the exclusive domain of any one ethnic group, but is part of a 
much broader process of ‘ethnic succession’ in organized criminality. This thesis associates 
organized crime activities with marginal ethnic groups in society for whom upward social 
mobility  by  legitimate  means  is  blocked,  and  for  whom  organized  crime  provides  an 
alternative but illegal channel to attaining wealth, power and prestige (see Merton, 1968). 
According to Bell  (1960),  organized crime then functions as a ‘…queer ladder for social 
mobility’ (Bell, 1960:115).  In support of the claim that organized crime is not dominated by 
any one ethnic group, Ianni and Ianni (1972) referred to the process whereby minority ethnic 
groups enter  into organized  criminal  activities  and eventually  leave  after  gaining  upward 
social mobility. Referring to the USA, Ianni and Ianni (1972) described this process thus:
The Irish came first, and early Irish gangsters started to climb the  ladder.  As 
they came to control the machinery of the large cities, the Irish won wealth, 
power and respectability ... in organized crime, the Irish were succeeded by 
Jews ... the Jews quickly moved on up the ladder into the world of business, 
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and more legitimate means of economic and social mobility. The Italians came 
last and did not get a leg up on the rungs of crime until the late Thirties (Ianni 
and Ianni, 1972:49 cited in Newburn, 2007:413).  
The process did not stop with the Italians but has continued as the organized crime scene 
became dominated by other ethnic groups such as Cubans, Colombians, Mexicans and so on 
(Newborn, 2007). Mallory (2007) summed up the arguments in this perspective thus:
Every  new immigrant  population  in  the  United  States  encounters  blocked 
opportunities  and  obstacles  in  achieving  respect,  power,  and  wealth.  In 
response, many resort to organized crime activity to achieve their dreams or 
goals. This theory helps explain the ever-changing face of organized crime in 
America; with each new wave of immigrants, new organized crime groups 
emerge to present a challenge for law enforcement (see Mallory, 2007:34)
However, the ethnic based theories were soon discredited on various fronts by writers 
who emphasised  the  reasons  behind  the  participation  in  organized  crime  rather  than  the 
ethnicity of the criminals themselves.  It was believed that the ethnic-based theories were a 
myth  rather  than  a  historical  and  sociological  reality  (see  Hughes  and  Langan,  2001). 
Woodiwiss (2000) argued that the evidence does not seem to support the claim made through 
the alien conspiracy theory.  Woodiwiss (2000) used the American drugs trade as an example 
of an organized crime business that has never been monopolized by any one ethnic group but 
features  many thousands of  decentralized  distribution  and smuggling  networks  of  people 
from different ethnic groups operating simultaneously. According to Rawlinson (2005), “It is 
not ethnic origin or nationality which determines criminality” (Rawlinson, 2005:291).
In other  words,  organized  crime provides  an alternative  way of  acquiring  wealth, 
power and influence for those who are willing to take the risks.  Being marginalised or poor 
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is no longer the motivation for participating in organized crime. However, as Albini (1997) 
puts it:
Rather  than  blame themselves  for  their  desire  to  use  drugs  in  the  1960s, 
Americans found it easier and more exciting to blame those foreigners from 
Sicily who brought the Mafia to America and addicted a drug-virgin country 
(Albini, 1997:69)
For Albini, organised crime is a loose-knit system of patrons’ clients or networks of 
relationships, rather than a manifestation of a rigidly organised, bureaucratic one as opined by 
Cressey (1969). According to Albini:
Rather than being a criminal secret society, a criminal syndicate consists of 
a system of loosely structured relationships functioning primarily because 
each  participant  is  interested  in  furthering  his  own  welfare  (Albini, 
1971:288) 
So, Albini questions the notion of rationality in Cressey’s work and notes that the 
pattern of these networks is similar to that of social exchange networks in communities with a 
dynamic  operational  system,  rather  than  a  single  formal  structure.  The  loose  networks 
identified by Albini carry out a variety of activities to increase and maintain their power and 
wealth. In such networks, criminal entrepreneurs exchange information with their ‘clients’ in 
order  to obtain their  support.  The ‘clients’  include  members of gangs,  local  and national 
politicians,  government  officials,  and people engaged in legitimate  business activity.  The 
origin of the power of these networks lies in their  flexibility  and in the abilities of their 
operatives; and contacts between them may dissolve or they may reform over time (Albini, 
1971).  Albini  agrees  with  Cressey  that  Mafia  style  criminal  groups  have  family  like 
structures,  but  he strongly resists  Cressey’s claim that  the relationship between syndicate 
members  could  only  be  described  in  terms  of  a  hierarchy.  Criminal  syndicates  are  not 
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necessarily bureaucratic in character, and the people involved in the network may not directly 
be part of a core criminal organisation (see also Wright, 2006). 
Ianni and Ianni (1972) also question the rationality model offered by Cressey.  They 
found  that  the  activities  of  organisations  like  the  Mafia  do  not  reflect  any  particular 
institution, organisation or rationality as proposed by Cressey. Instead, Ianni and Ianni argued 
that the Mafia and the Camorra should be viewed as traditional social systems rather than as 
formal organisations. As they put it:
The  Mafia,  however,  are  not  really  formal  organisations…  they  are  not 
rationally  designed  and  consciously  constructed;  they  are  responsive  to 
culture  and  are  patterned  by  tradition.  They  are  not  hierarchies  of 
organisational  positions,  which  can  be  diagrammed  and  then  changed  by 
recasting  the organisational  chart;  they are patterns  of  relationship  among 
individuals, which have the force of kinship, and so they can only be changed 
by drastic often fatal action (Ianni and Ianni, 1972:153).
In a nutshell, research studies conducted in the United States and elsewhere have discredited 
the  ethnic-based  conspiracy  theories  of  organized  crime.  Evidence  from  these  studies 
suggests  that  organized  crime  is  essentially  the  ‘…coalitions  between  business  people, 
politicians, and crime groups in organizing and tolerating crime against the public interest’ 
(Levi, 2007:778).
1.4. Characteristics of Organized Crime
It is the perceived characteristics of organized crime that makes it a unique topic of study 
for  criminologists.  Different  scholars  and  organizations  have  enlisted  a  number  of 
characteristics in the process of explaining organized criminal activities. Some of these are 
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described  below.  Abadinsky  (1994)  identified  eight  characteristics  of  organized  crime, 
highlighting  the  importance  of  power,  profit  and  perpetuity.  These  characteristics  are 
described as follows:  
(a) Nonideological:  the  primary  motivating  force  is  profit.  Sometimes  the  organized 
criminal group may adopt a worldview or political agenda, but these are supportive 
of, and secondary to, the goal of making money; 
(b) Hierarchical:  Most organized criminal groups are organized in a pyramid structure 
with  a  few elites  at  the  top  and many operatives  at  the  bottom.  In  between,  the 
organisation is supported by mid-level gangsters who handle supply and security;
(c) Having  a  limited  or  exclusive  membership: This  is  essential as  the  group  must 
maintain secrecy and ensure the loyalty of its members;
(d) Perpetuating itself:   Most organized crime groups have a recruitment  process and 
policy; new members are often recruited as operatives; 
(e) Willingness to use illegal violence and bribery: For most organized crime groups, the 
use of violence is a meaningful resource and corruption and deceit an essential part of 
the business; 
(f) Having a specialized division of labour: Organized criminal groups can be thought of 
as task forces with members combining different talents and experiences essential to 
the realisation of the organizational goals; 
(g) Monopolistic: The primary goal is maximising profits by controlling the market;
(h) Having explicit rules and regulations: Most organized criminal groups have codes of 
honour that members are expected to adhere to (See Abadinsky, 1994:6).
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Similarly,  Maltz  (1994)  sets  out  eight  distinguishing  features  and  characteristics  of 
organized  criminal  groups.  The  features  include:  the  use  of  violence,  corruption, 
sophistication, continuity in operations, discipline, effective structures, the use of legitimate 
multiple  enterprises,  and the  use  of  rituals  for  bonding members  together.  Maltz  further 
emphasises  that  involvement  in  multiple  enterprises  is  characteristic  of  most  organized 
criminal groups; that all have, of necessity, some structure, although no particular structure 
characterises all groups; that most, if not all, are engaged in legitimate businesses as well as 
in  criminal  enterprises,  but  this  characteristic  may  not  be  essential;  and  that  although 
sophistication,  discipline,  ideology and bonding may be  characteristic  of  some organized 
criminal groups, they are neither necessary nor typical ( see Maltz, 1994:31)
Furthermore,  in  2001,  the  European  Commission  and  Europol   proposed  a  list  of 
characteristics  of organized crime in the context of the 1998 definition mentioned above, 
grouping them into ‘mandatory’ and ‘optional’ characteristics (Levi, 2002; Wright, 2006). 
The four mandatory characteristics are: 
                 (1) Collaboration of more than two people; 
                  (2) Extending over a prolonged or indefinite period (referring to stability and 
potential durability); 
                 (3) Committing serious criminal offences, punishable by imprisonment for at least 
four years or more serious penalty, and 
                 (4) the central goal is profit and/or power ( see Levi, 2002:882).
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 The optional characteristics may include a combination of the following:
(1) Specialized division of labour among participants; 
(2) Exercising measures of discipline and control; 
(3) Employing violence or other means of intimidation; 
(4) Employing a commercial or business-like structure; 
(5) Participating in money-laundering; 
(6) Operating across national borders; and
 (7) Exerting influence over legitimate social institutions (government, justice and the 
economy) (see Levi, 2002:882)
1.5. Globalisation, Global Markets and Transnational Organized Crime 
The discussion in Section 1.3. identified that the dominant myth about and stereotype of, the 
organised criminal in the second half of the Twentieth Century, was based on the notion of an 
alien  criminal  conspiracy  associated  with  tightly  knit  secret  societies  (see  Hughes  and 
Langan,  2001).  The  revisiting  of  the  old  alien  conspiracy  and  moral  panics  induced  by 
globalisation through the notion of “new mafia” have led to some questioning. As Hobbs 
(1997,  cited  in  Hughes  and  Langan,  2001:265)  noted  “…recent  influential  populist 
commentaries on and media reporting of, the threat of globalisation have also been associated 
with the claim that there is now a ‘transnational organised crime’ conspiracy, often linked to 
the so-called new ‘Mafias’ of post-communist societies and other ‘alien’ networks such as the 
Chinese Triads, Jamaican Yardies and Yakusi alongside the ‘old’ Italian-American Mafia. 
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Nevertheless, it can be noted that the multi-dimensional nature of globalisation has altered the 
dynamics of nation states and organised crime in the last quarter of the Twentieth Century. 
According to Findlay (1999), globalization has created a new and favourable environment for 
the  growth  and  expansion  of  organized  crime,  representing  a  shift  and  contemporary 
transition in the way crime occurs in the Twenty-First Century. The structural alterations 
experienced  by  the  market  place,  such  as  key  technological  innovations  in  the  field  of 
electronic communications, ‘…have enabled those of villainous intent to launch offensives 
upon information, or money... that are comparable to the way  the shotgun and thermic lance 
enabled and enhanced the practice of previous generations of thieves and robber’ ( Hobbs, 
1995:8).
Therefore,  it  can  be  said  that  organised  crime  has  become  a  salient  feature  of  the 
modernisation  process.  Current  global  economies  shape  new  patterns  of  transnational 
criminal  activity  (Ruggiero,  2009).  It  is  important  to  stress  that  most  organized  criminal 
activities are not constrained by geographical boundaries. Although the ‘base’ of operations 
may  reside  in  a  particular  country,  most  organized  criminal  activities  are  increasingly 
transnational.   Transnational  organised crime (TOC) is  one of the most  serious problems 
facing the world today.  It is considered as one of the most serious threats to state security, 
the rule of law and public welfare (Viano, 1999).  According to Woodiwiss (2003), since the 
end  of  the  Cold  War,  transnational  organized  crime  has  presented  an  increasing  global 
security threat, especially to the Western world. According to Raine and Cilluffo (1994: ix);
Worldwide  alliances  are  being  forged  in  every  criminal  field  from  money 
laundering  and  currency  counterfeiting  to  trafficking  in  drugs  and  nuclear 
materials. Global organized crime is the world’s fastest growing business, with 
profits estimated at $1 trillion (cited in Woodiwiss, 2003:20)
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Article 3(2) of the UN clearly states that an offence is transnational in nature if;
a) it is committed in more than one state;
b) it  is  committed  in  one  State  but  a  substantial  part  of  its  preparation,  planning, 
direction or control takes place in another State;
c) it is committed in one State but involves an organized criminal group that engages in 
criminal activities in more than one State; or
d) it is committed in one State but has substantial effects in another State (see United 
Nations, 2004 for details)
There  is  no  single  universal  definition  of  transnational  organized  crime.  According  to 
Rawlinson (2005:296), the term is often used to refer to ‘crimes without frontiers’.  It is 
usually used to refer to all criminal activities whose inception and effects (direct or indirect) 
involve  more  than  one  country.  In  an  attempt  to  define  transnational  crime  Ruggiero 
(2009:118-119) identified the following typology:
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Table 1.1: Definition of Transnational Crime 
Joint Ventures between members of organised crime, politicians and financial operators 
are necessary for money laundering operations to be successful: in such 
cases the official economy offers a service to criminal syndicates 
Entrepreneurs 
and Politicians 
are prime actors in the illegitimate transfer of money abroad. ‘Hot money, 
which  is  almost  automatically  associated  with  laundering  of  criminal 
proceeds, in reality includes money earned, legitimately or otherwise, by 
official actors’
Large and Small 
Companies 
employ unregistered immigrants.  These workers are normally  smuggled 
into developing countries by a variety of groups and actors. The companies 
employing such workers enjoy the smuggling services offered to them by 
these groups and actors
Corporations operating  in  developing  countries  have  often  been  charged  with  using 
quasi-slave, or forced, labour. In some cases they have been accused of 
human rights abuses in countries where trade unionism is criminalised and 
opposition groups violently repressed
Corporations have been found guilty of selling goods to criminal organisations, which 
then on-sell them untaxed (e.g. tobacco products, clothes). In such cases 
they  become  partners  of  criminal  groups,  sharing  with  them the  sums 
involved in the fiscal fraud. 
Drug 
Trafficking
Large international  drug trafficking is  often carried out  by,  or with the 
complicity  of,  import-export  firms  operating  in  the  official  domain. 
Concealing  drugs  with  legitimate  goods  is  a  well  developed  practice, 
particularly in cocaine trafficking.
Illegal arms A variety of organisations are involved. International criminal groups may 
form  business  partnerships  with  producers  and  the  political  lobbies 
supporting them
According  to  Ruggiero  (2009),  transnational  organised  crime  should  not  be  exclusively 
identified with the illegal activities of notorious large crime syndicates.  Rather, transnational 
crime  may  well  transcend  activities  and  mingle  with  entrepreneurial  and  at  times, 
governmental  deviance.  Thus  to  Ruggiero  (2009),  transnational  organised  crime  is  a 
partnership between illegitimate and legitimate actors. The notion of ‘partnership’ implies 
that organised criminal groups both teach and learn from their counterparts in the economic 
arena,  by  investing  illicit  proceeds  in  the  official  economy.  For  example  they  learn  the 
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techniques  and the rationalisations  adopted  by white  collar  and corporate  offenders,  thus 
being, in a sense, corrupted by the economy rather than corrupting it (Ruggiero, 2009).
The growing problem of transnational organized crime is often associated with two major 
developments in the international arena - the spread of globalisation after the end of the Cold 
War on the one hand, and the advancement in science and technology on the other (Newburn, 
2007). For instance Findlay (1999) notes:    
The  globalisation  of  capital  money  to  the  electronic  transfer  of  credit,  of 
transactions of wealth from the exchange of property to info-technology, and the 
seemingly limitless expanse of immediate and instantaneous global markets, have 
enabled the transformation of crime beyond people, place, and even identifiable 
victims. Crime is now as much a feature of the emergent globalised culture as is 
every other aspect of its consumerism (Findlay, 1999: 2).
Similarly,  Barak  (2001)  argues  that  the  expansion  in  the  means  of  communication  and 
transportation and computer networks has turned the world into a global village which has 
consequently provided excessive opportunities  for capitalist  and criminal  expansion – the 
exchange  of  both  licit  and  illicit  goods  and  services.  For  example,  the  revolution  in 
transportation  has  helped  in  the  mass  movement  of  goods  and people  across  the  world, 
whereas  the  revolution  in  the  internet  has  allowed  the  development  of  global  service 
infrastructure,  such  as  banking  and  financial  services  (Aguilar-Millan  et  al.,  2008). 
According to Adamoli et al. (1998):
Market globalization and the subsequent abolishing of borders, together with the 
advantages  offered by technological  innovations  have created opportunities  for 
new  profits  for  existing  and  emerging  criminal  groups  which  have  adapted 
themselves to the new needs of the market (Adamoli et al., 1998:9)    
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The internationalisation of trading and labour, as well as the growing coordination of tasks 
performed  by  groups  and  individuals  worldwide,  has  also  contributed  to  the  growth  of 
transnational crime. Thus the process of globalization is not limited to financial issues alone, 
but includes all  aspects of life such as social,  cultural  and political  features,  etc.  that has 
transcended  national  borders.  Globalization  is  fuelled  by  improvements  in  the  means  of 
communication and the movement of capital which has resulted in the shrinking of space and 
the  shortening  of  time  (Harvey,  2005).  According  to  Karofi  and  Mwanza  (2006), 
globalization has increased the speed of communication, the internationalisation of trade and 
labour  and  has  led  to  a  process  of  the  amalgamation  of  cultures.  Today,  we  live  in  a 
globalized  society  where  the  movement  of  capital,  information,  people  and  goods  is 
extremely fast all over the world (Aas, 2007). As a result, organized criminals have found a 
favourable environment in which they take full advantage of new means of communication 
and technology. Therefore, organized crime can be considered as the defining feature of the 
globalized society and culture (Findlay 1999). For example, global connectivity through the 
internet has provided the opportunity for criminal groups worldwide to share and coordinate 
their criminal activities and to continue their activities locally as well as on the global level. 
According to Hughes and Langan (2001), just as with legitimate industry in recent years, the 
organised crime industry has also seen a growth in the casualization and deskilling of its 
labour  force,  reflecting  pressures  from new  competitors  in  illegal  enterprises  across  the 
world. Based on his research in Europe, Ruggiero (1996 cited in Hughes and Langan, 2001: 
265) has noted the particularly striking growth in the hierarchical structure of illegal drugs 
production and distribution. He notes that as a result of this organisational development, there 
is evidence of a deskilling of much criminal activity at the bottom of the hierarchy.  At this 
level are street level ‘pushers’/ addicts or mules/carriers of narcotics across borders, who are 
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expendable  labourers serving the market,  whilst  at  the top there is  a drive towards more 
structured and professional operations. What this points to is the dissipation of traditional 
criminal communities, what Hobbs and Dunningham (1998, Hughes and Langan, 2001: 267) 
regarded  as  indigenous  renditions  of  global  markets,  or  what  has  been  termed  ‘global 
organised crime’.  Although Hobbs (1997 Hughes and Langan, 2001:267) insist  that  most 
criminal enterprises are still local phenomena grounded in specific historical practices and 
relationships, new forms of multinational partnerships involving illegal enterprises have been 
indentified worldwide. 
Aguilar-Millan  et  al.  (2008) argued that  organized crime no longer  operate  through tight 
hierarchal kin structures as was the case until the beginning of the Twentieth Century. Today 
a  large  number  of  loosely  connected  organised  crime  networks  operate  together. 
Consequently, organized crime has been globalized to the extent that an event in one nation 
can have serious implications for other nation states. Therefore organised crime has become a 
prominent  feature  of  globalized  society  and  should  be  accepted  as  a  key  aspect  of 
globalisation. 
The expansion of globalization has created an increase in criminal networks and a rise in 
illicit  trade such as fraudulent  and unfair  trade practices  in  commerce,  the laundering  of 
profits gained from the illegal drugs and arms trade, smuggling of illegal immigrants across 
borders, the dumping of toxic waste, the acts of terrorism and the conduct of multinational 
companies in moving technology and capital for the sake of exploiting cheap labour (Barak, 
2001; Winders and Sandler, 2006). The operation of these criminal activities is facilitated by 
organized criminal networks that operate at the local, regional and international levels. The 
trend is  fuelled  by globalization  which has led to  the creation  of  innovative  new crimes 
against individuals, property and nation states, and has changed our understanding of culture 
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and its significance as a context within which crime is constructed and played out (Travis, 
1998).  Similarly  globalization  has  opened  up  opportunities  for  greater  exploitation  of 
mankind by both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises, as well as the expansion of global 
criminal  networks and local  criminal  networks around the world who are able  to operate 
using forces of globalization such as technology, transportation etc. According to Karofi and 
Mwanzi (2006):
Globalization has evolved; money launders have been able to conduct their trade 
with greater ease, sophistication and profitability… new financial instruments and 
trading opportunities have been created and the liquidity of financial market has 
improved, it has also allowed money laundering systems to be set up and shut 
down with great ease (Karofi and Mwanzi, 2006:7)
As  the  global  market  develops  and  starts  to  become  more  and  more  competitive,  the 
increasing demand for goods and services  opened up new frontiers  for different  criminal 
activities such as human trafficking, piracy, money laundering, drugs sale, arms sales, etc. 
Furthermore, the opening of new opportunities leads to the emergence of different types of 
crimes in different societies (Reiner, 2007).  The changes in political economy has affected 
crime rates and patterns because it has created new ways and opportunities for new types of 
crime  to  occur  and  may  also  remove  old  ones.  Aas  (2007:122)  has  pointed  out  that 
globalization is seen as a breeding ground for ‘global anomie’ because it has created new 
needs and desires, and has opened up ways for fulfilling them through both legitimate as well 
as illegitimate means. In addition, the spread of global capitalism was not only accompanied 
by  the  criminal  activities  of  organized  crime  groups  (such  as  mafias),  it  also  helped 
respectable members of society to make huge profits through corruption and evading taxes. 
The global capital market economy has allowed respectable wealthy professionals to exploit 
the loopholes in the laws and evade the payment of huge amounts of tax (Wilson, 2009). The 
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opportunities for criminal activities has arisen because the capitalist market economy is not 
concerned with ‘…who is or who is not a criminal but only who does or does not fulfil their 
contracts, for without this that market cannot function’ (Wilson, 2009:99). Chambliss (2003) 
argued that crime in a society is the product of the economic and political system that is in 
operation. 
1.6 Globalization and the Problem of Controlling Organised Crime
 It  is  strongly  believed  that  the  introduction  of  a  global  capitalist  market  economy  has 
weakened the law enforcement apparatus across state jurisdictions and has created conditions 
favourable for continuing criminal  markets,  allowing criminal  networks to gain abnormal 
profits  from their  criminal  activities.  According to  Ruggiero  (2009),  criminal  businesses, 
particularly  transnational  crime,  responds to  this  new normative  corollary  by establishing 
networks that by-pass national regulation.  Wilson (2009) has argued that this relationship 
between crime and global capitalism and the governance of crime is problematic because ‘…
those who make super profits from transnational organised criminal activity may launder it 
through legitimate business, while otherwise perfectly respectable business people may, on 
occasion, may dint of temptation or pressure of circumstance, step outside the law’ (Wilson, 
2009:100). Wilson (2009) has suggested that we need to be very careful in discussing the 
relationship between transnational crime and capitalism in the era of rapid globalization. The 
increasing  growth  and  expansion  of  globalization  is  providing  opportunities  for  local, 
regional  and  international  underground  economies  to  infiltrate  into  the  global  financial 
system.
The process of globalization is increasingly transforming the structure of the state and its 
power,  the  economic  system and  our  basic  institutions  such  as  the  police,  for  example. 
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Findlay (2008) argued that globalization has weakened nation states and, as a result, they are 
more susceptible  to becoming victims of transnational  organized crime.  One of the main 
reasons for the weakness of state control is the massive flow of products and the networks 
built up, thereby disrupting the state concerned control system. Karofi and Kwanza (2006:6) 
have rightly said that globalization has had a great impact ‘…internationally and nationally 
on economics, politics, security and society’. As a consequence, this has tremendous effects 
on policing  problems in terms  of  controlling  organized crime.  The fact  is  that  organized 
crime is not only localised but is also transnational in nature. Therefore, it requires a local 
solution along with globalized measures in order to prevent and control crime both at the 
local  as  well  as  the  transnational  level.  Today,  no  single  county  can  effectively  control 
organized crime due to the fact that the very nature of the problem is changed, thus requiring 
a global, organized and collaborative strategy for its control. One of the most effective crime 
control strategies is formulating partnership between nation states for sharing information and 
for effectively controlling the operation of organized crime networks. Aas (2007) has argued 
that, because organized crime has crossed the borders of nation states, therefore, our approach 
to policing crime should also transcend national boundaries. 
Transnational  organized  crime has  been made much easier  by the existence  of weak 
governments, insecure borders and ineffective law enforcement institutions in certain parts of 
the world, for example, in the developing countries of the ‘Third World’ and the transitional 
countries of Eastern Europe and the Middle East, all of which have enabled transnational 
organized criminals to operate across borders with impunity.  In many such countries, limited 
economic  alternatives  makes  them vulnerable  to  the  offers  of  organized  criminals.   For 
example in countries like Afghanistan, where the law enforcement agencies are weak and the 
citizens are poor, farmers have found the cultivation of poppies a lucrative livelihood which, 
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in  turn,  has  boosted  international  organized  criminal  trafficking  in  heroin  (see  Asad and 
Harris, 2003). Similarly, many unemployed youths from developing countries seeking work 
in developed countries have fallen victim to human traffickers. Similarly, refugees from war-
torn or poor countries seeking asylum in Europe have been known to have been forced to 
work for organized criminals in order to make ends meet; for example, working as prostitutes 
or as drugs couriers (see Rawlinson, 2005; Goodey, 2005).  Many experts also believe that 
terrorist  organizations  are  funding  themselves  by  operating  with  transnational  organized 
criminals who are involved in transnational organized crimes. 
Despite the fact that transnational organized criminals operate internationally, the actual 
implementation of their activities is at the local level. Hobbs (1998) argued that, whereas 
organized crime activities involve international collaboration and operations, it is ‘local at all 
points’. All the aspects of organized crime such as the execution of the crime, the demand for 
goods and services, the victims, and the beneficiaries, all occur at local level and not in an 
international space. As Rawlinson (2005) puts it, these activities occur at a series of ‘…local 
points, albeit using virtual means’ (Rawlinson, 2005:296). By the 21st century, the nature of 
organised crime has evolved from a tight knit organisation (Mafia-type) to a looser network 
of criminal activities that are no longer hierarchical in structure but more diffuse. 
1.7 Conclusion
This chapter examines some of the literature on organized crime, especially the work of those 
who have attempted to define this type of crime. It is clear from the above that organized 
crime  is  a  concept  that  is  frequently  used,  but  difficult  to  define.  According  to,  Maltz 
(1976:338), this is because ‘…organized crime means different things to different people’. 
Similarly, Schelling (1984:180) argues that the term ‘organized crime’ does not automatically 
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mean  that  the  ‘the  crime  is  organised’.  Therefore  there  is  little  consensus  regarding  its 
meaning. Levi (2002, p879) argued that the concept is ‘hydra-headed’, a contested terrain and 
that due to definitional problem of organized crime, it is hard to estimate the exact intensity 
or  ‘scale  of  the problem’..  According to  Wright  (2006:3)  ‘…some definitions  are  highly 
emotive, expressing the attitudes of their authors in language that makes clear deep feeling 
about  the  subject;  whilst  some  definitions  are  legal  or  political’.  Others  (for  example, 
criminological  definitions)  are  conceptual  and  theoretical  in  nature.  For  criminologists, 
‘organized’ crime is, unlike other types of offences such as homicide or robbery, a conceptual 
rather than a legal category.  The issue of definition is an important one since how we define 
organized crime has very important implications for how we attempt to explain it and for the 
steps we take as a society to prevent or control it. despite the ‘definitional problems’ and 
‘competing accounts’ of its nature and extent, from the above there is some agreement on the 
goals of organized crime which are to obtain profit and to gain political or economic power. 
As  a  result,  organized  crime  continues  to  attract  attention  from  policy  makers,  law 
enforcement agencies, the media and criminologists alike. 
In addition, there is still much controversy over how organised crime is structured. While 
it could be argued that most crimes are ‘organized’ in the sense that they are pre-planned, it is 
the  sophistication  of  the  structure  and operations  (usually  in  networks)  that  distinguishes 
‘organized  crime’  from  other  types  of  crimes.  This  chapter  has  presented  some  of  the 
common features or characteristics of organized criminal networks 
It  has also been shown in this  chapter that  the study of organized crime began in the 
United States where, for decades, it was seen as synonymous with the criminal activities of 
immigrants in the late Nineteenth Century and the early Twentieth Century.  Initially, the 
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debates were heavily dominated by reference to mafia-type criminal activities on the part of 
Italian immigrants in the USA.  This type of understanding led to the development of an 
ethnic-based conspiracy theory of organized crime that dominated both academic and official 
debates on organized crime for decades.  However, the ethnic theory of organized crime soon 
came  under  attack  as  it  became  clear  that  the  Italians  did  not  dominate  the  American 
organized crime scene,  but  were part  of a network of organized criminals  from different 
backgrounds  who  operated  different  criminal  syndicates.   Thus,  more  recent  debates  on 
organized crime have focused on the diverse aspects of the crime as a business. Organized 
criminals  operate  through  a  network  of  individuals  and  institutions,  both  legitimate  and 
illegitimate. Most organized criminals operate through a network of corrupt people including 
police officers, politicians and those in legitimate business. 
Organized crime has also ‘benefited’ from the phenomenon of globalisation that took off 
after  the end of  the Second World War.  Organized criminal  groups have expanded their 
activities internationally and have been able to exploit inequalities and injustices globally in 
order to amass wealth. Globalisation has given organized criminal groups the opportunities to 
form  global  alliances  for  their  survival  and  for  the  expansion  of  their  illegal  activities. 
Globalization and the advancement of technology has made the job of money laundering a lot 
easier whereby criminals now launder illegal proceeds by using sophisticated technologies 
used  in  the  financial  sector.  Globalisation  has  led  to  the  expansion  of  organised  crime 
globally. The consequence is that the policing or control of organized crime has become more 
difficult. These are the issues that this thesis hopes to address in the context of Dubai.  In the 
next chapter,  the theme of organized criminality  is further pursued in the analysis  of the 
nature and extent of money laundering.
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Chapter Two
The Concept of Money Laundering
2.0 Introduction
This chapter  builds on the issues discussed in Chapter  One by examining the concept of 
money laundering  as  a  unique  type  of  organised  crime.   The chapter  examines  how the 
growth and the expansion of global trade have opened up new avenues for criminal groups to 
launder  money earned through criminal  activities.  In addition,  the chapter  focuses on the 
means by which money is laundered, the social, economic and political reasons why it has 
been difficult to control money laundering globally, the process of money laundering itself, 
the nature of the problem in Dubai, and the link between money laundering and the financing 
of international  terrorism.  This chapter  examines  the Hawala remittance system in Dubai 
which is alleged to have been used as a means of money laundering and the financing of 
terrorist activities. 
Money laundering has become a global phenomenon, with organised criminal groups at the 
centre of this activity. There is clearly no sign that money laundering is decreasing in spite of 
the numerous international efforts to counter the problem though the passing of multilateral 
treaties,  regional  agreements  and  the  establishment  of  cross-national  law  enforcement 
arrangements  (see  Chapter  Three).  The  belief  that  international  terrorist  groups  are 
increasingly using money laundering techniques learned from organised criminals to launder 
money used to finance their terrorist activities suggests that the problem of money laundering 
is, in fact, increasing, and in a constant state of flux.  
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2.1 Defining money laundering
However, whilst money laundering is not a new phenomenon, it was not defined as a specific 
crime until  1986 (Daley,  2000). The term money laundering was first used in the United 
States  to  label  the  Mafia’s  blending  of  illegal  income  with  legitimate  business  revenue 
(Daley, 2000).2 It is said that ‘money laundering’ entered popular usage during the Watergate 
scandal in America during the mid-1970s (Bauer and Ullmann, 2000). 
Buchanan defined money laundering as ‘…a financial  crime that  often involves  a 
series  of  transactions  and  numerous  financial  institutions  across  many  [international] 
financial jurisdictions’ (Buchanan, 2004:115). According to Al-Mrasheed (1999), the crime 
of  money  laundering  is  not  committed  unless  and  until  other  serious  crimes  have  been 
committed,  such as theft or extortion or drug trafficking, which has generated money that 
needs to be laundered. In addition, Al-Mrasheed identified two important reasons why money 
laundering is different from other kinds of criminal acts: first, money laundering does not 
involve any direct victim in society and second, there is no tangible or physical violence 
directed at individuals compared with other kinds of crimes such as theft, or crimes that that 
involve threats and violence directed against individuals.
Different definitions of money laundering have been offered by academics, national 
and international organisations as well as crime control agencies.  Sherman (1993:13) defined 
money laundering as ‘…the process of converting or cleansing property knowing that such 
property is derived from serious crime, for the purpose of disguising its origin’. To Savona 
(1997:3) laundering is ‘…an activity aimed at concealing the unlawful source of sums of 
2 It has been said that the term money laundering originated in a scam by Al Capone in Chicago in the 1920s in 
which he set up a Chinese laundry through which he passed the profits of criminal activities in order to disguise 
its origin (Lea, 2005).
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money’.  Daley  (2000:175)  considers  money  laundering  as  the  ‘...process  by  which  one 
conceals  the existence,  illegal  source,  or illegal  application of income,  and disguises that 
income to make it appear legitimate’.  
As discussed in Section 1.5. of Chapter One, the globalization of world economy has had a 
tremendous effect on organised crime in general, and consequently that of  money laundering 
in particular, as monies to be laundered have increased and the methods of laundering have 
become  more  sophisticated.  The  advancement  in  science  and  technology,  massive 
privatization,  the removal of exchange controls and the globalization of financial  markets 
have changed the character, form and the techniques of money laundering. For instance, in 
1998,  the  International  Monetary  Fund  estimated  that  illicit  funds  (including  laundered 
monies) worldwide amounted to between $800 billion and $2 trillion - 2 to 5 per cent of the 
world’s GDP (Fabre, 2009). In addition, Johnson (2002) argued that since the terrorist attack 
of September 11, 2001, money laundering is no longer seen as the laundering of criminal 
proceeds, but a means by which terrorists hide their revenue-generating processes and gain 
access to their funds. As such, the criminal purpose is included in the definition, in addition 
to the criminal origin of the money. In this regard, Johnson defined money laundering as ‘…
moving funds through financial institutions or accounts to disguise its origin and /or purpose’ 
(Johnson, 2002:10).
In  order  to  address  the  phenomenon  of  money  laundering,  various  international 
organisations  have  come  up  with  different  definitions.  For  example  the  United  Nations 
Convention against  Illicit  Traffic  in Narcotic  Drugs and Psychotropic Substances,  on 19th 
December  1988  in  Vienna  (the  Vienna  Convention)  adopted  the  following  definition  of 
money laundering:
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a) the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property [is derived from a 
drug offence]  for  the  purpose  of  concealing  or  disguising  the  illicit  origin  of  the 
property or of assisting any person who is involved in the commission of such an 
offence or offences to evade the legal consequences of his actions;
b) the  concealment  or  disguise  of  the  true  nature,  source,  location,  disposition, 
movements,  rights  with  respect  to,  or  ownership  of  property,  knowing  that  such 
property  is  derived  from  an  offence  or  offences  established  in  accordance  with 
subparagraph (a) of this paragraph or from an act of participation in such offence or 
offences (UN, 1988, Article 3.b).
This definition came at a time when a great deal of global attention was being given to the 
money earned through illicit drug business and the need for international cooperation to fight 
the drug cartels. Nevertheless, Rider (2003) considered the definition as narrow in the sense 
that it associates the money laundering activities purely with the money earned from drug 
trafficking, and ignores the wider use of money laundering generally. 
In March, 1990, the European Committee Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure, 
and  Confiscation  of  the  Proceeds  from  Crime  adopted  a  broader  definition  of  money 
laundering which involved money earned through all kinds of organized criminal activities as 
well as drug trafficking. It defined money laundering as:
a) The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is proceeds 
[derived from a serious crime], for the purpose of concealing or disguising the 
illicit  origin of the property or of assisting any person who is  involved in the 
commission  of  the  predicate  offence  to  evade  the  legal  consequences  of  his 
actions; and, 
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b) The  concealment  or  disguise  of  the  true  nature,  source,  location,  disposition, 
movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that such 
property is proceeds [derived from organized crime] (Council of Europe, 1990, 
Article 6)
The same year (1990), the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) – which was created 
in 1989 by the G7 countries to combat money laundering – defined the concept as:
Conversion or transfer of property, known to be of criminal origin, for the 
purpose of concealing or disguising that  origin,  or of helping criminals  to 
escape the legal consequences of their actions; the concealment or disguise of 
the true nature, location, movement, or ownership of property known to have 
been  gained  through  crime;  and  the  acquisition,  possession,  or  use  of 
property, in full knowledge of its derivation from criminal activity (cited in 
Alexander, 2001:233).
In 2000, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime expanded the 
definition of money laundering and started to include the proceeds of all serious crimes such 
as  participation  in  organized  criminal  groups  and  corruption  (see  UN,  2004).  What  the 
different definitions stated above highlight is the rather somewhat expanding and contentious 
nature  of  money  laundering.  Drawing  on  the  various  definitions,  the  section  below will 
attempt to address the main purposes of money laundering. 
2.2 The Purpose of Laundering Dirty Money
According to  Hinterseer  (2002:12)  the  money generated  from illegal  acts  is  often 
termed as ‘dirty money’ that needs to be laundered. Such money is often earned from illegal  
activities such as gambling, prostitution, narcotics, etc (Clarke and Tigue, 1975). One of the 
main purposes of money laundering is to obscure the link between the criminals and their 
crime,  as huge sums of money generated from organized crimes such as drug trafficking 
could be strong evidence for convicting the criminals involved. Thus, in order to be able to 
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conceal the profits gained from the crime, criminals often invest dirty money in legitimate 
businesses (Arrastina, 1986).
The  second  purpose  of  money  laundering  is  to  invest  the  money  earned  through 
illegal activities in the market place. In recent decades, there has been a strong tendency on 
the  part  of  organized  criminals,  especially  drug traffickers,  to  gain  power  and respect  in 
society. In order to achieve their goal, they have to launder the proceeds as well as erase their  
connection  with  underworld  crooks,  the  business  and  financial  world  (Taher,  2001). 
Therefore, it is necessary for criminals to take a great deal of care in introducing themselves 
into the marketplace and participating in legal enterprises. In this way, they not only mingle 
their dirty money in the circle of legitimate business, but also gain prestige and high position 
in the social and political world. Ultimately, it ensures that their criminal conduct is more 
covert than ever.
Finally, criminals seek to launder the proceeds gained from organized crime in order 
to  make it  difficult  for the law enforcement  agencies  to  prove that  certain  funds are  the 
product of criminal acts. For example, US laws allows for the proceeds traceable to certain 
criminal activities being forfeited to the government.  However, if the proceeds cannot be 
traced, the government can neither carry its burden of proof nor locate the funds in order to 
confiscate them (Arrastina, 1986).
2.3 Why Money Laundering Occurs
The first and foremost reason why money laundering occurs is the vast amount of money 
it involves and which is generated in such operations. The same money is re-channelled into a 
more useable form by means of investment and the development of legitimate businesses, 
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including the purchase of property of various kinds. Today, money laundering has become a 
global issue.  Hobbs (1998: 407) argued that the destruction of national boundaries, and in 
particular the redundancy of Cold War narratives, have resulted in an enormous growth in 
concern  regarding transnational  organised crime.  For  instance,  in  1995,  the  US Congress 
Office of Technology estimated that money generated annually by organised crime and other 
profit-motivated crime in the USA was around $300 billion (Lyman and Potter, 1997: cited in 
Wright, 2006:69). Indeed, money laundering has been classified as the third largest business 
in the world after foreign exchange and oil, with annual revenues ranging from $500 billion 
to $1 trillion (Wright, 2006). Similarly, the UN Development Report for 1999 estimates it at 
$1.5 trillion per year, equivalent to 17% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the United 
States (cited in Lea, 2005). The National Criminal Intelligence Service, UK notes that £25 
billion a year is being laundered (Lea, 2005). The amount of money laundered both within 
the  United  States  and  internationally  is  staggering.  Estimates  are  that  global  money 
laundering activities yield upwards of $500 billion annually.  
Although money laundering has gone on for years, Daley (2000) argued that it has been 
utilised to conceal cash income from a variety of criminal activities such as bank, securities, 
trade  and  insurance  fraud,  prostitution,  illegal  gambling,  extortion,  arms  smuggling  and 
terrorism. During the 1990s, the largest portion of illegally generated profits which found its 
way into legitimate streams of commerce, came from drug trafficking. Drug traffickers move 
an estimated $100-$300 billion dollars annually through the Western banking system (Daley, 
2000:176). Recent statistics from the United Nations reveal that organised and unorganised 
crime together generate annual sales in the order of 3 per cent of the world’s GDP - about $1 
trillion  -  half  of  which  comes from the sale  of  drugs,  which  have boomed over  the  last 
decade, stimulated by an abundant supply and diversification into synthetic narcotics. Other 
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profits from crime are drawn from multi-service activities such as the control of illegal and 
illicit gambling establishments, the arms trade, human smuggling, trafficking in body organs, 
car  theft,  prostitution  and racketeering  (Fabre,  2009:91).   Accordingly,  these profit  boost 
demand for money laundering, which favours offshore markets because of their secrecy and 
immunity  from illegal  activity  (see Fabre,  2009).   In response to  the demand for money 
laundering services, tax havens and offshore markets have developed into international hubs 
for three kinds of ‘illegal legality’:  (1) the ‘white’ economy of banks, investors and fund 
managers;  (2) the ‘grey’ economy of tax evasion and corruption;  and (3) the profits  that 
organised  crime  seeks  to  recycle  (Fabre,  2009).   It  is  important  to  highlight  that  the 
boundaries  between  these  three  domains  are  nebulous,  since  it  is  usually  impossible  to 
distinguish between tax evasion and profits from crime, because the recycling techniques are 
identical (Fabre, 2009) 
The second reason why money laundering occurs is that the growth in the globalisation of 
communications and commerce has made the job of organized criminals a lot easier (Daley, 
2000; Rider, 2004; Wright, 2006). Those improvements have permitted an enormous growth 
in international trade and modern banking (McDonald, 2001). According to Fabre (2009), 
globalisation has been accompanied, not only by the growth of grey markets, but by that of a 
black  economy  as  well.  There  is  no  doubt  that  criminal  organisations  have  taken  full 
advantage  of  developments  in  technology  and,  in  particular,  communications  technology. 
With this  development money laundering continues to stay one step ahead of anti-money 
laundering laws. The emergence of cyber banking and smart cards has made detecting money 
launderers even more difficult  (Daley,  2000). This has led to a new term - that of cyber 
laundering.   Cyber  laundering  means  the  crime  of  money laundering  through the  use  of 
electronic cash, the internet and smart or stored value cards, which provide several means by 
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which  the  technologically  advanced  launderer  may  bypass  many  of  the  reporting 
requirements  and other  systems in  place  for  detecting  their  activities.  Internet  and cyber 
banking methods are particularly threatening as there are currently no regulations that govern 
the establishment or operation of cyber banks, making transactions nearly untraceable. Thus, 
the  advent  of  cellular  telephones  with  the  capacity  to  reach  around  the  world,  the 
development  of  electronic  systems  that  facilitate  and  accelerate  transactions,  the  ever 
increasing  significance  of  the  Internet,  and  the  different  transactions  in  the  realm  of 
cyberspace, all serve to exacerbate the profound problem of money laundering.  As Rider 
(2004) notes: 
Development  in  technology,  communications,  travel  and  the  liberalisation  of 
movement, whether of persons, things or wealth, have all combined to give the 
criminal enterprise of today the same ability as any other business to move from 
one jurisdiction to another, or involve two or more different jurisdictions in a 
single act. In addition to these factors, which criminals have exploited no less 
imaginatively than legitimate businessmen, there is another and perhaps crucial 
consideration. This is the profitability of smuggling and, in particular, the illicit 
trade in drugs,  psychotropic substances  and other narcotics.  The enterprise  of 
smuggling  is  a  natural  and  predictable  consequence  of  the  imposition  of 
restrictions or other costs  on the supply of a commodity for which there is a 
greater market (Rider, 2004:64-5)
Thirdly, the lack of effective financial regulation in some countries has led to the creation of 
safe havens for money laundering (Daley, 2000). According to Johnson (2001)
Countries  without  anti-money  laundering  legislation  offer  the  launderer  the 
opportunity to operate  through either the financial  or the non-financial  sector. 
Such countries exert an almost gravitational pull on dirty money, only to send it 
on its way into the global financial system without a hint of the grubby stat in 
which it arrived (Johnson, 2001:16)
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In this regard, the bank secrecy laws in many European countries such as Switzerland, 
Luxembourg  and Liechtenstein,  have attracted  money launderers  and persuaded them to 
smuggle dirty money to such areas (Rider, 2003).
Finally, money launderers take advantage of the loopholes in the rules and regulations 
governing money laundering activities. Due to strong anti-money laundering legislation in 
many  countries,  especially  in  the  western  countries,  there  has  been  great  tendency  to 
smuggle currency offshore to those jurisdictions with extensive banking secrecy laws and 
fiscal laws that ignore money laundering, or to less well-regulated to totally unregulated 
jurisdictions (Rider, 2003). For example, during the 1990s, huge amounts of black money 
was transported to Russia due to the crackdown against the Mafia and drug traffickers in 
Italy,  Latin  America  and  other  European  countries,  and  was  invested  in  the  property 
business. However, the same dubious money was moved back from Russia into Western 
countries including Britain,  France, Belgium and the Netherlands through offshore banks 
and was invested in the real estate business in these countries. In this way, criminals evaded 
the law enforcement authorities in all these countries (Rider, 2003).
 2.4. The Processes of Money Laundering
The  process  of  money  laundering  involves  a  range  of  different  techniques  from 
relatively simple to highly complex, with the sole purpose of concealing and covering the 
source and ownership of the money generated from illegal activities. The money laundering 
process  involves  simple  acts  and  techniques  when  the  launderer  wishes  to  control  his 
laundering  activities.  Self-laundering  is  usually  done  by  those  criminals  who  are  in  the 
beginning of their criminal careers, when they cannot trust others to launder money for them. 
Other methods include storing cash at  home, purchasing properties  or opening fraudulent 
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companies (Bell, 2002). Dirty money can also be laundered by more sophisticated methods 
whereby organized criminal gangs hire the services of professional lawyers, accountants or 
financial advisers to launder their money. These people, through their expertise in financial 
and corporate matters, create a network of corporate and other entities in jurisdictions with 
limited transparency (Rider, 1999).
Experts working in the field of money laundering have described the process of money 
laundering in a stylized way. There are a variety of ways to launder dirty money. However, 
the stylized  model  represents  an effort  to  structure the process of money laundering  and 
provides each step with a logical  explanation.  The process of money laundering includes 
three - placement, layering and integration (Schott, 2006; Bosworth-Davies and Saltmarsh, 
1994; Lilley, 2006). The following section explains how each step of the money laundering 
function operates. 
1. Placement
The process of money laundering begins with the placement of the criminal proceeds into 
the  legitimate  financial  system.  Cash  from the  criminal  proceeds  are  broken  down  into 
multiple smaller deposits and placed in several different financial institutions (Savona and De 
Feo,  1997;  Thompson,  2004;  Lea,  2005).  Criminal  profits  can  also  be  mingled  with  the 
deposits of a legitimate business and represented as income from that business (Richards, 
1999). According to Bauer and Ullmann (2000), during the placement stage
The form of  the funds must  be converted to  hide their  illicit  origins.  For 
example, the proceeds of the illegal drug trade are mostly small denomination 
bills, bulkier and heavier than the drugs themselves. Converting these bills to 
larger  denominations,  cashier’s  checks,  or  other  negotiable  monetary 
instruments  is  often  accomplished  using  cash-intensive  businesses  (like 
restaurants, hotels, vending machine companies, casinos, and car washes) as 
fronts (Bauer and Ullmann, 2000:1).
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The criminal economy is largely composed of cash. There are three reasons for that. 
First, according to the FATF Report (2001; para 39, 16), ‘…cash remains the major if not the 
primary  form in which illegal  funds are  generated  today’.  Drug trafficking,  for  example, 
produces large amounts of cash which is needed for business expenses such as the purchase 
of  drugs,  payment  for  couriers,  bribing  corrupt  officials,  etc.  (Bosworth-Davies  and 
Saltmarsh,  1994).  Secondly,  it  is  not  only  easy  to  hide  cash  generated  from  organized 
criminal activities from the tax authorities, but also it helps to obscure the criminal source of 
the income. Finally, cash transactions provide anonymity for the criminals since they don’t 
want to leave a paper trail of cheques or credit card payments through financial institutions 
(Bell, 2003).
Carroll (2008) stated that cash earned from criminal proceedings are first smuggled to 
offshore destinations free from money laundering safeguards in the banking system, in order 
to facilitate easy placement. This offers a lot of practical advantages as it often places the 
funds beyond the legal reach of the authorities in the jurisdiction where the profit-generating 
activity occurred. Even if the relevant laws are capable of application on an extra-territorial 
basis, and very few are, involving another jurisdiction places significant practical barriers in 
the path of investigators  when it comes to obtaining and securing evidence admissible  in 
court. Certain jurisdictions are willing to offer banking and other facilities on the basis that 
secrecy will be assured. There are countries that have been prepared to facilitate the receipt of 
money, no matter what its source is. 
Once the  money has been taken offshore,  it  can then enter  into  the Conventional 
banking system, either directly, or more likely, indirectly. Obviously, the more discreet this 
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process  is  the  better  for  the  launderer.  Hence,  the  attraction  of  ensuring  effective  non-
cooperation with foreign agencies. Once the money has entered the Conventional banking 
system it can move through the usual channels. The launderer’s objective will be to create a 
web of transactions, often involving a multitude of parties, with various legal statuses in as 
many different jurisdictions as possible, through which the money will be washed on a wave 
of  spurious  or  misleading  transactions  (Rider,  2004).  To sum up,  the  placement  process 
involves money being transferred into a more flexible and legitimate form, and deposited in 
financial  institutions  (Daley,  2000).  Anti-money laundering  statutes  that  require  banks to 
report questionable transactions, increases the likelihood of detection. Thus, because of the 
existence of such reporting requirements, launderers will often route the cash through a front 
operation in order to provide a legitimate explanation for the money. Another option at the 
placement stage is to transform the cash into cashier’s checks, money orders or traveller’s 
checks,  which  are  much  easier  to  smuggle  and  which  may  be  deposited  in  financial 
institutions without staggering reporting requirements (Daley, 2000). 
Due to  strict  anti-money laundering measures  which mainly focus on the banking 
system, terrorist  organizations  use couriers  to  finance their  activities.  In this  regard,  it  is 
reported that Osama Bin Laden transferred $7,558 by courier to pay the bomb maker for the 
bombing  attack  on  the  Australian  Embassy  in  Jakarta  on  9th September,  2004  (Lilley, 
2006:134).  In  addition,  the  United  Nations  Analytical  Support  and Sanctions  Monitoring 
Team dealing with Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, came to the same conclusion in its second 
report in December 2004 when it stated:
There  is  little  doubt  that  Al-Qaeda  makes  use  of  cash  couriers  for  the 
purposes of financing its activities and supporting its operations (see Lilley, 
2006:134-5)
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Placement is the hardest and weakest step in the money laundering process because of the 
difficulties  of  covering  up  the  huge  amount  of  money  that  criminal  proceeds  generate 
(Richards, 1999). The main purpose of the money launderer at this stage is to remove or shift 
the cash as far as possible from its place of origin in order to avoid suspicion and attracting 
the attention of law enforcement authorities. Carroll (2008) argued that the placement stage is 
tough because of the increasing cooperation between the financial institutions and the law 
enforcement authorities, where the former are obliged to report any deposit or withdrawal 
beyond a certain currency level to the latter. 
2. Layering 
A series of financial transactions are carried out in the layering stage in order to distance 
the criminal proceeds from its original source, and to conceal or disguise the source of the 
ownership of the funds (Savona and Feo, 1997; Bosworth-Davies and Saltmarsh, 1994). Once 
the launderer has managed to enter criminal proceeds into the Conventional banking sector, it 
is easy to transfer that money electronically anywhere in the world. The main purpose, as has 
been explained before, is to obscure the link between the criminal proceeds and its origins. 
This is done so through setting up a complex trail and making use of bank secrecy laws to 
make it difficult for the law enforcement agencies to trace the money involved (Carroll, 2008; 
Bauer and Ullmann, 2000).
Layering involves the creation of false documents, the conversion of cash into monetary 
instruments  and  the  conversion  of  tangible  assets  obtained  by  means  of  cash  purchases 
(Wright, 2006).  In this case the money launderer manipulates the illegal money as though it 
was derived from a legitimate source.  This  is  done in order to  avoid a  trial  and is  done 
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basically  by  electronic  processes.  According  to  Daley  (2000),  the  layering  phase  is  the 
transfer of the funds through several different accounts. This is often accomplished by wire-
transfer through offshore accounts in the Cayman Islands, Panama and the Bahamas. Daley 
(2000)  noted  that  law  enforcement  efforts  to  combat  laundering  are  hindered  by  the 
following:
1. The bank secrecy laws of various offshore havens; 
2. Technological innovations; and
3. The globalization of the banking system (Daley, 2000:178).
Thus, it becomes extremely difficult to trace these processes when money launderers and the 
beneficiaries are anonymous. 
3. Integration 
In this stage, the criminal proceeds are integrated into the legitimate financial system and 
the criminal economic activity thus appears to be legal. According to Bauer and Ullmann 
(2000)
The integration stage is the big payoff for the criminal ... and he moves the 
funds into mainstream economic activities – typically business investments, 
real estate, or luxury goods purchases (Bauer and Ullmann, 2000: 1). 
Integration is the final stage and involves the integration of funds into the legitimate 
economy. What had once been bounties of illegally gained currency now appear as legitimate 
species of money such as letters of credit,  bonds, securities and prime bank notes (Daley, 
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2000). The original supplier of the money finally gets the change to get their hands on their 
ill-gotten gains (Thompson, 2004).  The launderer makes the money available earned from 
the  criminal  activities  with  its  occupational  and  geographical  origins  hidden  from view. 
Robinson (1996) refers to this as the ‘spin dry’ part of the laundry cycle:  repatriating the 
money in the form of clean, often taxable, income. The launderer hands over the ‘cleaned’ 
cash, invests in other assets or continues to invest in additional illegal activities on behalf of 
the client (Thompson, 2004).  Offshore banking plays an important role in the integration 
stage. According to Lea (2005) offshore refers to banks which act as private banks to wealthy 
non-resident  clients,  offering  low  or  non-existent  tax  rates  to  depositors,  and  ensuring 
complete confidentiality with regard to records. This includes a refusal to divulge details of 
bank accounts held by customers to investigators from other countries, and where there is a 
general absence of regulation and inspection of activities conducted internationally on the 
part of the country in which the bank is based. A case in point are Swiss banks. 
One of the integration techniques used by money launderers is to own their own shell 
banks in  offshore tax havens.  Such banks can easily be purchased in Caribbean offshore 
islands (Bosworth-Davies and Saltmarsh, 1994). In addition, there are financial institutions 
which  are  engaged  in  facilitating  the  work  of  money  launderers.  One  such  financial 
institution was the Bank of Credit and Commerce International. According to Morgenthau 
(1991); 
BCCI was operated as a corrupt, criminal organization throughout its entire 
nineteen year history. It systematically falsified records. It knowingly allowed 
itself  to  be  used  to  launder  the  illegal  income  of  drug  sellers  and  other 
criminals and it paid bribes and kickbacks to other public officials (cited in 
Bosworth-Davies and Saltmarsh, 1994:102).
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BCCI was chartered in Luxembourg in 1972 and, at the time of its enforced demise, it 
was operating 430 branches in 73 countries throughout the world. BCCI was an unregulated 
bank whose headquarters was in London (Bosworth-Davies and Saltmarsh, 1994).
To  sum  up,  the  modus  operandi of  money  laundering  ranges  from  relatively 
unsophisticated  efforts,  to  extremely  high-tech  schemes  employing global  businesses  and 
multi-national banks. One of the most popular strategies involves the smuggling of the illicit 
money out of the country. Another strategy is the exchange of currency for gambling chips, 
traveller’s checks, or money orders, which can then be mailed out of the country (Daley, 
2000).  The highly complex money laundering transactions and operations involve banks, 
multiple front companies, real estate purchases, and non-bank financial institutions such as 
currency  exchanges.  Professional  facilitators  such  as  lawyers,  accountants  and  financial 
advisors apply their talents to assist the process. Given the numerous complex and difficult-
to-trace methods by which illicitly acquire cash can be turned into legitimate funds through 
the  use  of  international  transfers,  the  scale  of  the  money  laundering  problem  becomes 
obvious (Daley, 2000: 179).
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Diagram 2.1: Processes of Money Laundering
2.5 The Politics of Money Laundering
There  is  a  general  consensus  that  money laundering  is  a  global  phenomenon that 
needs to be addressed. However, despite numerous treaties, Convention, statutes and other 
forms of regulatory programmes and mechanisms to combat money laundering, the number 
of illicit  funds being laundered does not seem to be decreasing.  According to Hinterseer 
(2002), money laundering has witnessed a sustained rapid growth over the years, and has 
become increasingly complex and difficult to combat. So far, the international community 
has  failed  to  combat  money  laundering  effectively  because  of  the  ‘…conflicting  and 
competing interests and agendas’ of the nation states that make it difficult to develop a ‘…
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rational,  coherent  and  comprehensive  strategy’  to  control  money  laundering  (Hinterseer, 
2002:39).
Experts  working in  the area of  the prevention of  money laundering  have given a 
number  of  reasons  which  are  hindering  the  efforts  to  combat  the  money  laundering 
phenomenon.  Hinterseer  (2002)  studied  the  phenomenon  of  money  laundering  from  a 
historical perspective and argued that governments at times deliberately ignore, overlook or 
even participate in money laundering activities in order to pursue their national interests. One 
example in this regard is the debt crisis during the 1980s which was the by-product of the 
policies  of  the  developed  countries  and  which  threatened  the  foundations  of  the  world 
economy. During the 1980s, capital flight was one of the major problems facing Central and 
South American countries which led to economic and political instability in these countries. 
Consequently,  investors  were  moving  their  investments  and  assets  to  the  more  stable 
economies  of  the  developed world.  During the  debt  crisis,  Hinterseer  (2002) argued that 
money laundering performed one if not two functions;
In countries where money borrowed through the international capital markets 
was  embezzled,  money  laundering  helped  to  ensure  that  these  embezzled 
proceeds were safely hidden. In countries where individuals sought to move 
their  assets  offshore,  but  adverse  government  regulations,  like  foreign 
exchange  controls,  were  encountered,  money  laundering  helped  to 
circumvent these obstacles (Hinterseer, 2002:41)
Secondly, there are occasions when government agencies tended to ‘…turn a blind 
eye  to  criminal  conduct  that  they  are  aware  of’  which  consequently  encouraged  money 
laundering activities  (Rider 2004:69). The case of Iraq under Saddam Hussain during the 
1980s  and  the  1990s  showed  how  certain  governments  allowed  trade  restrictions  to  be 
avoided, and how they overlooked or ignored money laundering activities where such activity 
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were deemed to further the national interest. Due to war, both Iran and Iraq were faced with 
various trade restrictions enforced by the United Nations. Rider (2004:66) stated that Saddam 
Hussain  ‘…employed  all  the  techniques  of  the  money  launderer’  during  the  UN  trade 
embargo against Iraq. The war between the two countries created a new demand for the sale 
of weapons with enormous potential profits. Both Iran and Iraq had significant oil reserves 
which were generating considerable revenues. However, neither country had a domestic arms 
industry. Hinterseer (2002) argued that officially many governments were neutral with regard 
to the war between Iran and Iraq and were complying with the trade embargo imposed by the 
UN.  However,  at  an  unofficial  level,  many  governments  continued  their  trade  relations, 
especially  with  regard  to  the  supply  of  weapons  to  one  or  both  countries.  According  to 
Hinterseer (2002);
Unofficially, many governments were willing to provide Iraq with economic, 
military, and other support and consequently these governments overlooked 
the commercial activities of companies and individuals that concealed their 
ongoing relations with the country (Hinterseer, 2002:51)
From the above example, it is clear that governments sometimes deliberately allow 
money laundering activities to take place, because such activities may help that government 
to avoid both its international and domestic legal obligations. Hinterseer (2002) stated that
The  ability  to  camouflage  trade  meant  that  economic  relations  could  be 
promoted with Iraq and other foreign and trade policy objectives with respect 
to  the  Middle  East  could  be  advanced  despite  the  existence  of  trade 
restrictions (Hinterseer, 2002:60)   
Thirdly, the government officials may themselves engage in the process of money laundering 
in order to hide money that they have embezzled from their country’s treasury. This is a 
common practice in regimes where ‘…bribery, extortion, and corruption come to characterise 
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the government’ (Hinterseer, 2002:61). For instance, money laundering played a significant 
role in the financial crises of nation-states after the Cold War (Fabre, 2009). According to 
Fabre (2009), the experience in Russia was recorded in abundant detail through a scandal 
closely tied to political backstabbing, suggesting that there are intricate links between capital 
flight,  embezzlement,  racketeering,  pillaging  of  public  assets,  corruption  and  organised 
crime.  Significant  profits  derived from organised crime and corruption were deposited in 
Swiss banks and re-invested in Russia to finance a growing national debt (Fabre, 2009). 
According to Fabre (2009:92)
  “Corruption and criminal activities played a major part in creating public debt and 
diverting funds to speculative overseas financial markets: the Russian Central Bank 
estimated,  for  example,  the  $74  billion  was  transferred  from  Russian  banks  to 
offshore accounts in 1998, the year of the devaluation. A predatory, kleptocratic and 
in  the  end,  mafia-style  pattern  of  abuse  created  substantial  demand  for  money 
laundering  on  international  capital  markets,  including  the  demand  for  Russian 
Treasury bonds and thus was important in the Russian financial crisis of 1998” 
Fourthly, the processes involved in money laundering may be used for activities that 
are not criminal. There is a vital need for ‘secret money’ (Rider, 2004:66), not only in the 
criminal world of organized crime, but also to service and facilitate intelligence and security 
networks. Such money needs to go through the financial system secretly, although they are 
not abusive in nature. According to Rider (2004); 
There  are  needs  for  ‘unaccountable  funds’  in  many  situations,  and  the 
processes involved in laundering money can be, and are, efficiently employed 
to create hidden reserves or secret money and are then utilised to service and 
transmit the funds in accordance with the requirements of those who desire 
them (Rider, 2004:66) 
The activities of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) only serves 
to prove the variety of uses that the money laundering process may serve. BCCI acted for 
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Manuel  Noriega  and  the  Medellin  drugs  cartel,  but  also  had  accounts  for  the  Central 
Intelligence Agency and facilitated the Iran-Contra deal (Bosworth-Davies and Saltmarsh, 
1994:22).  However,  the need for secrecy is  not chronic;  it  may be an obvious point,  but 
nevertheless, one that has to be made, that the need for secrecy, and the amount of secrecy, 
will be dictated by factors such as the activity concerned and the amount of profit to be made.
Fifthly, the bank secrecy laws started in Europe many years ago in places such as 
Switzerland, Luxembourg and Liechtenstein. However, the high financial profits associated 
with  these  laws  inspired  other  countries  to  offer  the  same  services.  Consequently,  it 
exacerbated  the  problem  of  money  laundering.  For  example,  Panama  depends  on  the 
operation of the canal and the expenditure of the US military base. However, the revenue 
from its  banking system is of vital  importance.  Some governments have formulated their 
economic policies in such a way as to provide a safe base for money laundering activities. 
For example, in order to attract foreign money through government issued bonds in 1992, the 
authorities in Pakistan clearly stated that ‘…no questions would be asked about the source of 
the funds, with no identity to be disclosed’ (Time, 30-3-1992).
Finally,  the drug business has played an important  role in the ongoing conflict  in 
Afghanistan. Asad and Harris (2003) considered money laundering to be at the core of narco-
politics  in  the  Afghanistan  war.  During  the  Afghan-Soviet  war,  the  US  supported  the 
resistance groups with the help of finance and the supply of weapons. However, such help 
was provided secretly through the government of Pakistan. It is widely acknowledged that the 
CIA controlled the drug business during the Afghan-Soviet war, and the money earned from 
drug trafficking was used to finance resistance groups with regard to the Soviet forces (Asad 
and Harris, 2003). Similarly, in the mid-1990s in Afghanistan, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda had 
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full control over the drug business and drug revenue was one of the major forms of economic 
support for the regime (Lilley, 2006). 
However, in some countries, the laws regulating the control of money laundering are 
very strict because citizens are mandated to explain their wealth if they are in possession of 
wealth  beyond  their  salaries.  For  example,  in  Hong  Kong,  a  public  servant  has  a  legal 
obligation to explain if he is in possession of wealth in excess of his salary. Similarly in 
Britain, under the UK Proceeds of Crime Act 1995, the prosecution may apply to the court on 
a second conviction for a serious offence within a period of six years, to consider that any 
property in the possession of the defendant that has been acquired during the previous six 
years, and the source of which he cannot properly explain, be presumed to be the proceeds of 
his criminal lifestyle (Rider, 2003:353). In addition, the UK Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 
enables, even without prior conviction, the Assets Recovery Agency (ARA) to initiate civil 
proceedings, ‘civil recovery’, through the High Court, against any person that it thinks holds 
proceeds of unlawful conduct in the form of ‘recoverable property’. 
Therefore,  due  to  the  strict  enforcement  of  anti-money  laundering  laws  in  many 
countries,  money launderers  have  devised  more  complex  and sophisticated  techniques  to 
obscure the connection between the criminals and their crimes. The money laundered is often 
kept in bank accounts and is moved in and out of the country in question in order to protect  
the  criminals  from  law  enforcement  agencies.  On  the  one  hand  it  reduces  the  legal 
consequences that the criminal might encounter and, on the other, it enables the launderers to 
continue with their criminal activities.
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2.6 Money Laundering and Financial Crimes in Dubai 
As explained in Sections 2.3 and 2.4 of this chapter, the smuggling of cash is one of the 
common techniques used by money launderers to launder their criminal proceeds in different 
parts of the world, and the case of UAE is not an exception. Due to the existence of strict  
reporting requirement in many parts of the world, criminals smuggle cash to those areas with 
fewer anti-money laundering regulations and where strict bank secrecy laws are not in place. 
Richards (1999) has explained how criminals smuggle the proceeds of the drugs business 
from the USA into the Mexico and bring them back to the USA by using fake documents. 
According to Richards (1999)
A launderer  smuggles  cash from the US to Mexico without  declaring  the 
money on a CMIR report. He then turns around and comes back into the US, 
declaring  the  funds  at  US  Customs  as  legitimate  revenue,  backed  up  by 
invoices,  receipts,  etc.,  derived  from phony  business  dealings  in  Mexico. 
Customs then issues the proper forms, allowing the smuggler to deposit that 
cash  in  any  US bank  without  raising  suspicion.  Once,  the  cash  is  in  the 
account,  it  could  then  be  wire-transferred  anywhere,  since  there  are  no 
reporting requirements for wire transfers (Richards, 1999: 50) 
The detection of money laundering cases is no doubt difficult because money launderers use 
different techniques to wash their dirty money and place it in the legitimate financial system. 
The  government  officials  of  the  UAE  consistently  deny  the  existence  of  any  money 
laundering operation inside the country. However, at the same time they have acknowledged 
the  presence  of  an  external  threat  with  respect  to  the  abuse  of  its  financial  system  by 
organized criminals. This external threat usually comes from neighbouring countries such as 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, the former Soviet republics, etc. For example, after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, Russian money laundering affected many countries of the world. Winer 
and Williams (2003: 117) considered the ‘…Russian’s money laundering problem a global 
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one, affecting countries literally all over the world’ including the UAE and Dubai.  Farah and 
Braun (2007) explained how Russians come to the UAE and brought organized crime with 
them. 
Russians  began  flocking  to  the  Emirates  soon  after  the  Soviet  Union 
collapsed,  first  as  vacationers,  then  as  consumers  and merchants...  they’d 
come off the planes with empty shopping bags. The nouveau riche would buy 
up TVs, VCRs, every electronic item they could get their hands on. Pretty 
soon you had the Russian Mafia in  place and hundreds of hookers in the 
streets and hotel rooms (Farah and Braun, 2007:52) 
Because  money  launderers  conduct  money  laundering  operations  on  purpose,  they 
consequently try to avoid making any mistakes that might lead the investigating authority to 
track them down. For example, the UAE authorities have so far not been able to prosecute 
four suspects accused of laundering £150 million ($ 240 million) – one of the UAE’s biggest 
money laundering case in its history.  In a well-publicized money laundering case that started 
in August 2006, four persons and six companies were accused of transferring funds from the 
UK and the Netherlands  into  the  UAE by using fake documents.  They were accused of 
evading tax by cheating the tax authorities in the UK and in the Netherland while importing 
and exporting goods to and from the UAE by using fake documents. However, after more 
than two years of investigation,  the UAE law enforcement authorities have not been able 
provide adequate evidence in order to prosecute the suspects and the companies involved (see 
Za’za’, 2009). This clearly indicates how difficult it is to investigate a money laundering case 
and to prosecute those who are involved in it.
There  is  no doubt  that  the incidence  of  financial  crimes  is  increasing  in  the  Gulf  region 
because the UAE in general, and Dubai in particular, are used as a transit place for both legal 
and illegal goods (Jain, 2003). In addition, most of the Gulf countries, including the UAE, 
have a cash-based economy where brings huge amounts of cash into the country, and where 
66
carrying cash is a normal phenomenon. Cash is used for all major transactions. As a result, 
organized  criminals  are  taking  full  advantage  of  the  cash-based  system  where  criminal 
proceeds are often used to pay for huge transactions without any movement of money across 
the  country’s  borders  (see  Bosworth-Davies  and  Saltmarsh,  1994).  Consequently,  the 
activities  of  organized  criminals  manages  to  evade  the  attention  of  the  law  enforcement 
agencies in Dubai. For example, in 2006, Frank Gardner reported to the House of Commons 
Foreign Affairs Committee that:
Dubai particularly is an international conduit for both good and bad things. It 
was long a centre for smuggling gold into India. It has often been used as a 
place for money laundering, particularly by Russians who were coming out of 
the CIS3 states with just wads of cash, and buying up electronics and going 
back.  Nobody  ever  asked  where  the  money  came  from  (see  House  of 
Commons, 2006: Ev 44). 
Some bank officials interviewed in this current study identified an important factor that is 
also contributing towards the import of cash into the UAE and particularly into Dubai. As has 
been stated earlier  in the Introduction,  the UAE is made up of seven emirates.  However, 
Dubai and Abu Dhabi are the most developed emirates with modern and effective controls for 
checking the import of cash by any means. There are five international airports in the UAE in 
Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, Ras Al-Khaimah, and Fujairah. Apart from the Dubai and the 
Abu Dhabi Airports, there are no effective controls and modern systems for checking the 
import of cash in the other three Emirati airports. Money launderers are taking advantage of 
the  weakness  of  the  immigration  system in  these  three  airports,  and  once  the  money  is 
brought into the UAE, it can easily be moved to another emirate. AMLSCU Official No. 14 
stated that
3 CIS stands for ‘Commonwealth of Independent States’. It is a regional organization whose member countries 
are the former Soviet republics.  It was formed during the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. 
67
The main trading centre for money launderers is Dubai because the other 
five emirates are not fully developed compared to that of Dubai and Abu 
Dhabi. The least developed emirates are trying to attract more people to 
use their airports in order to generate more revenue thus leaving enough 
room for the money launderers to exploit and bring their illegal cash into 
the UAE (Field Notes, 2009). 
In the last few decades, the international political scenario has changed completely, and this 
has affected the UAE in many ways. The discovery of oil in the Gulf region and the booming 
economy and infrastructure has attracted manpower from around the world to work for the 
development of the Gulf countries. Other events in the neighbouring region, such as the end 
of the Cold War and the break-up of the Soviet Union, the neighbouring conflicts of Iran-Iraq 
(1979-88),  the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait  (1990),  the first  Gulf War of 1991, the event  of 
September 11, 2001, the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and of Iraq in 2003, have 
completely changed the political and security scenario of the region. All these regional and 
other  conflicts  have  created  a  big  market  for  drug  trafficking  and  arms  smuggling,  and 
organized  criminals  have  had  the  opportunity  to  exploit  the  situation.  Practically,  it  was 
difficult for the UAE not to be affected by these regional conflicts. Although the UAE did not 
physically involve itself in any of the regional conflicts, however it was not possible for the 
Emirates to save itself from the influences of these regional conflicts. One such influence was 
the infiltration of “black money”, earned through arms smuggling and drug trafficking in the 
regional countries, into the UAE. This was possible because the UAE has a stable political 
and sound financial system, and was the most convenient point for organized criminals to 
launder their criminal proceeds earned from drug trafficking and arms smuggling (Naufal and 
Vargas-Silva, 2009).
As has been stated in the Introduction, the UAE is one of the important financial centres in the 
world, with excellent investment opportunities. It is also a tax free zone. As a result, it has 
attracted people from around the world for the purpose of investment, employment, tourism 
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and  living.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  population  of  foreign  nationals  has  already 
exceeded that of local UAE citizens (Emiratis).  According to the World Fact Book published 
by the CIA, the total estimated population of the UAE is 4,798,491 inhabitants, making it 
115th country of  the  world in  terms of  population.  Furthermore,  the estimated  population 
growth rate of the UAE is 3.689% and the net immigration rate to the UAE is 22.98 migrants  
(s) per 1,000 population, thus making it the top country of the world in both cases. Based 
upon the 1982 census, the ethnic make-up of the UAE was Emirati  19%, other Arab and 
Iranian 23%, South Asian 50%, other expatriates (includes Westerners and East Asians) 8%. 
Less  than  20%  of  the  population  are  UAE  citizens  (Emirati)  (see  CIA,  2009).  The 
demographic figures mentioned above clearly reflect that the UAE citizens are a minority 
group in their own country.
It  is  a  known  fact  that  terrorist  organizations  have  learned  the  techniques  of  money 
laundering  from  organized  criminals,  where  the  criminal  proceeds  are  used  to  finance 
terrorist activities around the world (see Lilley, 2006; Schott, 2006; Berry, 2003). The UAE 
has been accused of being used for laundering the ransom money received by ships hijackers 
in Somalia. It was reported in one of the leading UK newspapers, The Independent, that the 
UAE financial  system has been used by pirates  to launder  large sums of ransom money. 
Sengupta and Howden (2009) reported that
Organized  piracy  syndicates  operating  in  Dubai  and other  Gulf  states  are 
laundering vast sums of money taken in ransom from vessels hijacked off the 
Horn of Africa (Sengupta and Howden, 2009:NP). 
The report further stated that
Around $80 million (£56 million) has been paid out in the past year alone – 
far more than has previously been admitted. But while some of this money 
has ended up in the pirate havens of Somalia, millions have been laundered 
through bank accounts in the United Arab Emirates and other parts of the 
Middle East (Sengupta and Howden, 2009:NP).
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The report pointed towards the operators of the piracy and stated that
The so-called ‘godfathers’ of the illicit operations, according to investigators, 
include  businessmen from Somalia  and the  Middle  East,  as  well  as  other 
nationalities on the Indian Sub-continent. There have also been reports that 
some  of  the  money  from  piracy  ransoms  has  gone  to  Islamist  militants 
(Sengupta and Howden, 2009:NP)   
Al-Mazeina, Deputy Commander General of the Dubai Police, denied the allegation made by 
the British newspaper regarding the involvement of the UAE in laundering the ransom money 
of the Somali pirates. Al-Mazeina stated that
Somali pirates’ money is not laundered through Dubai ... the UAE is the only 
country in the region where money laundering cases are taken to court and 
sentences issued (Gulf News, 22.4.2009) 
However,  since  September  11,  2001,  there  has  been  increasing  concern  about  the  link 
between money laundering  and the  financing of  terrorism worldwide.  In  this  respect,  the 
Government of the UAE was under immense pressure to improve and tightened its regulatory 
system because  its  financial  system was  accused  of  being  used  by  Al-Qaeda  to  finance 
terrorist activities. In 1998, for example, Al-Qaeda used the Dubai Islamic Bank to transfer 
funds in order to finance the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (Winer, 
2002).
The  UAE financial  institutions  were  again  in  the  limelight  following  the  terrorist 
attacks  of  9/11  on  America  in  2001.  It  is  alleged  that  the  hijackers  used  branches  of 
international banks such as the Bank of America and Sun Trust to transfer money from the 
UAE into the USA (Roth et al., 2004). Similarly, some of the hijackers of the September 11, 
2001 terrorist  attack  opened bank accounts  in  the  UAE and transferred  the  money to  its 
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branches in the USA. Interestingly, the hijackers transferred their money in multiple small 
transactions in order to avoid suspicion on the part of both the UAE and the US authorities, 
and they succeeded in this attempt (see Lilley, 2006). The 9/11 Commission also highlighted 
that the hijackers managed to avoid any suspicions with regard to their transactions because 
they were small. The report stated that:
Contrary  to  persistent  media  reports,  no  financial  institution  filed  a 
Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) in connection with any transaction of any 
of the 19 hijackers before 9/11, although such SARs were filed after 9/11 
when  their  names  become  public...  the  hijackers’  transactions  themselves 
were not extraordinary or remarkable (Roth et al., 2004: 141).
These kinds of comments had already been made by the Governor of Central Bank of UAE 
when  he  criticised  both  the  UAE and  the  US  financial  system  that  failed  to  report  the 
suspicious transactions which were used to finance the 9/11 terrorist attacks on America. In 
his lecture delivered at the Zayed Centre for Co-ordination and Follow Up under the title 
‘UAE Monetary Policy and Economy’, Al-Suweidi argued that
Those suspected of the attacks on America made simple remittances through 
the UAE, nothing that all the remittance were also done through and with the 
knowledge of the US banking institutions.  Therefore,  one can say that  all 
these institutions are guilty, but who would have predicted that these people 
would  launch  such  attacks  (see  UAE Interact,  October  28,  2001;  WAM, 
October 28, 2001) 
2.6.1 The Hawala Cash Remittance System
In  addition,  the  UAE is  the  hub  of  an  alternative  remittance  system known  as  Hawala. 
Hawala is an important alternative banking system operating in most parts of the world under 
different  names.  It  is  commonly  known  as  the  alternative  or  parallel  remittance  system 
operating outside,  or parallel  to, the traditional  banking system. It is also a term used for 
‘informal  financial  networks’  (De  Goede,  2003:513)  also  commonly  recognized  as 
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‘underground banking systems’  (Gilligan,  2004:24).   There are  a  number of underground 
banking  systems,  some  of  which  have  very  sophisticated  structures,  whereas  others  are 
involved in informal barter. Some of the well known underground banking systems are “the 
Chinese ‘chit’ or ‘chop’ system, the Pakistan ‘Hundi system’ and the Indian Hawala” (Rider, 
2004:81). 
It would be impossible to trace the exact origin of the Hawala system. Bosworth-Davies and 
Saltmarsh (1994) argued that the Hawala system was in practice many hundreds of years ago 
before the introduction of the Conventional banking system. Most literature on Hawala traces 
its roots back to the South Asian region, and more specifically, India and Pakistan. De Goede 
(2003) stated that  the Hawala system had been used by traders as a  safe money transfer 
technique when travelling along the Silk Route many centuries before the partition of the 
Indian Sub-continent. It is an accepted fact that the Hawala system originated in non-Arab 
Muslim countries. However, many sources suggest that the term ‘Hawala’ has Arabic origins 
(De Goede, 2003:513; Nawaz, et al., 2002:333). The term ‘Hawala’ means ‘to change or to 
transfer’ (De Goede, 2003:513). It is also refers to ‘…the transfer of property or information 
via a third party or fiduciary’ (Bosworth-Davies and Saltmarsh, 1994:76).
Today,  despite  the  introduction  of  strong  international  financial  systems  for  money 
exchange, the Hawala system operates for the purpose of money transfer, both domestically 
and internationally. Buchanan (2004) explains how the Hawala system operates:
A person can  deposit  cash  with  a  Hawala  or  Chop money exchanger  and in 
exchange receive a chit, ticket or some sort of marker. Despite a rather innocuous 
appearance (though they can be impossible to replicate), the markers are actually 
coded bearer notes. When presented to a money changer in another country, the 
bearer will receive the same amount of cash, less a commission (usually 5–15 
percent of the amount) (Buchanan, 2004:120)
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The Hawala system has a number of advantages over the Conventional banking system 
(Rider, 2004; Buchanan, 2004) due to which many people, especially immigrants from most 
Asian  countries  around  the  world,  use  Hawala  to  send  money  to  their  homeland.  It  is 
considered a quick and cost efficient way of money transfer, often used by low paid workers, 
especially of South Asian origin. The Hawala system has the advantage of reaching to remote 
parts of the world that are usually not accessible by the normal banking system. For example, 
in Pakistan, the US Treasury Department stated that every year, more than ‘$7 billion flow 
into the nation through hawala channels’ (Lilley, 2006:147). With respect to Dubai, Vassiliev 
(2003) claimed that criminal proceeds are constantly flowing into its financial sector, mainly 
from the former Soviet republics, Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan. The Hawala system still  
plays a very important role in the transfer of criminal proceeds which could amount to be $20 
billion (Vassiliev, 2003). Interpol highlighted a number of advantages of the Hawala system 
with regard to the customer using it: 
• Cost-effectiveness – low overheads means a better exchange rate.
• Efficiency – the transfer takes one or two days at most.
• Reliability – it is so simple that very little can go wrong (as opposed to international 
transfers made through the banking system!)
• Lack of bureaucracy – if you know or are introduced to a broker, then it is unlikely (as 
the entire system is based on trust) that he will go through a KYC4 check on you.
• Lack of a paper trail – records of individual transactions are thin on the ground.
• Tax  evasion  –  Interpol  describe  Hawala  as  offering  a  ‘scrutiny–free  remittance 
channel’ (see Lilley, 2006:146-7)   
4 KYC refers to ‘Know Yours Customer’ 
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Until recently, there was very little concern about the practice of the Hawala system as a 
means  for  money transfer,  despite  its  widespread used  by immigrants  from South  Asian 
countries from around the world. Nowadays, it is widely believed that organized criminal 
groups have used the Hawala system to launder money generated especially from the drug 
business in the Indian Sub-Continent (Bosworth-Davies and Saltmarsh, 1994). Berry (2003) 
argued that
As India develops into an important regional financial centre, proceeds from 
criminal  activities  such as  trafficking  arms,  gems,  narcotics,  and migrants 
increasingly  are  laundered  in  the  country’s  financial  institutions  (Berry, 
2003:98)
India is recognized as one of the commonly used places for exporting narcotics to the world 
and importing gold from the Gulf region via Dubai and ‘…Hawala allows many deals to be 
financed and transacted without any money changing hands or crossing frontiers’ (Bosworth-
Davies and Saltmarsh, 1994:77).  
The terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre in September 11, 2001 has brought the Hawala 
system to the forefront of the news and political debates, especially in America and the West. 
The Hawala system was strongly criticised by the international media and politicians. Hawala 
is alleged to have been used by Al-Qaeda and Taliban to launder proceeds earned from drug 
trafficking  and  arms  smuggling  from Pakistan  and  Afghanistan  in  order  to  finance  their 
regime of terror abroad. For example, on October 5, 2001, the Times magazine published an 
Article, ‘A banking system built for terrorism’, which strongly criticised the Hawala system 
(Ganguly, 2001). It further stated that 
Welcome  to  the  world  of  hawala,  an  international  underground  banking 
system that allows money to show up in the bank accounts or pockets of men 
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like hijacker Mohammed Atta, without leaving any paper trail. There are no 
contracts, bank statements or transaction records, and yet those who use the 
hawala networks can move thousands of dollars around the world in a matter 
of hours (Ganguly, 5th October, 2001)
Similarly,  in  the  hearing  on  Hawala  and  Underground  Terrorist  Financing 
Mechanisms before the US Senate in November 2001, the Chairman, Evan Bayh (2001), said 
in his statement that
One system which bin Laden and his  terrorist  cells  use to  covertly  move 
funds around the world is through ‘hawala’, an ancient, informal and widely 
unknown system for transferring money (Bayh, 2001)
In February 2002, Douglas Farah reported in the Washington Post that
Pakistan  and  US  officials  estimate  that  the  Taliban  and  Al-Qaeda  have 
removed the equivalent of $10 million from Afghanistan. The money was 
taken across the Afghan-Pakistan border and was transferred from Pakistan to 
Dubai using the hawala system (see Lilley, 2006:147)
There are conflicting arguments about the extent to which the Hawala remittance system 
is  used to  finance terrorist  acts.  The Hawala system was criminalized  in the war against 
terror.  De  Goede  (2003:515)  stated  that  ‘…in  the  press  and  political  discourse,  Hawala 
became stereotyped as taking place in shabby, smoky, dark, and illegal places’. He further 
argued that:
In  the  war  on  terrorist  finance,  discourses  of  Hawala  have  led  to  the 
underestimation  of  the  complexity  of  cutting  off  terrorist  funding,  while 
criminalising remittance networks (De Goede, 2003:515)
The Hawala  remittance  networks  came under  attack  around the  world  in  the  war 
against  terror.  The  Bush  administration  for  example,  closed  down a  number  of  Hawala 
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networks  operating  in  the  US in  November  2001.  Reporting  to  the  House  of  Commons 
Foreign Affairs Committee, Gardner (2006) argued that
When I used to be a banker, we were always rather wary of doing business 
in Dubai because we could not be sure of where the money came from. It 
is very much a home of Hawala transactions, which are paperless, record-
less  transactions,  all  done  over  the  phone  (House  of  Commons, 
2006:Ev45)
Gardner (2006) downplayed any terrorist attack on Dubai and argued that
It has surprised a lot of people that Dubai has not yet been hit by a terrorist 
attack, but Dubai is a huge melting pot. If Al-Qaeda hit Dubai, it would be an 
own goal’ (House of Commons, 2006:62)
The criminalization of the Hawala remittance system and the campaign against it led many 
Arab countries, including the UAE, to introduce regulations for its monitoring and control. In 
many other countries, strict conditions were imposed on the Hawala networks and they were 
bound to record full details of their customers. As a result, the Central Bank of the UAE ,via 
Notice no. 1815/2001, ordered all Hawala remittance networks to keep complete records of 
all outgoing and incoming transactions and of their customers. The Central Bank of the UAE 
also warned of strict  punishment  if  the Hawala networks did not  abide  by the rules  and 
regulations. In this respect, the Hawala remittance system in the UAE is regulated under the 
Abu Dhabi  Declaration on Hawala  of 16th May, 2002. The government  of the UAE has 
mandated  the  registration  of  all  the  Hawaldar  (Hawala  Brokers/Dealers)  which  was  not 
compulsory before the introduction of the Hawala Declaration in 2002. It is clear from this 
section that money laundering and other financial crimes are a major problem in Dubai. 
76
2.7 Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism
As has been discussed earlier, money laundering is a rather complex concept. It is the 
process by which the ‘…proceeds from a criminal activity are disguised to conceal their illicit 
origins’ (Schott, 2006: I-1). Money laundering involves the proceeds of criminally derived 
property rather than the property itself. Similarly, the financing of terrorism is also a simple 
concept. It is the ‘…financial support, in any form, of terrorism or of those who engage, plan, 
or  engage  in  terrorism’  (Schott,  2006:  I-1).  However,  a  less  simple  concept  to  define  is 
terrorism itself, because the term has significant political, religious, and national implications 
for different countries (Whittaker, 2007). According to Whittaker (2007) 
Terrorism is about power: the pursuit of power, the acquisition of power, and 
the use of power to achieve political change. Terrorism is thus violence – or, 
equally important, the threat of violence – used and directed in pursuit of, or 
in service of, a political aim (Whittaker, 2007:5)
There  is  no  acceptable  unified  definition  of  the  word  ‘terrorism’.  It  remains  the 
subject of continuing debate in international bodies. Even the United Nations has failed to 
agree on a unified definition of terrorism. In a television interview on 28th October 2002, Sir 
Jeremy Green Stock – the chairman of the UN Secretary Council’s Committee on Terrorism 
–  reminded  the  interviewer  that  it  was  not  the  responsibility  of  the  committee  to  define 
terrorism.  He  stated  that  it  is  easy  to  define  terrorist  acts  which  should  include  ‘…
indiscriminate  use  of  violence,  particularly  against  civilians,  to  further  a  political  aim’ 
(Hailary, 2002, NP). Indeed, there is less clarity about the term terrorism. It is a concept with 
a lot of ideological and moral connotations, many competing definitions, and thus making it 
‘…shrouded it terminological confusion’ (Furedi, 2007; English, 2009). The Oxford English 
Dictionary defines terrorism as “…a policy intended to strike with terror those against whom 
it is adopted; a person who uses violence and intimidation in the pursuit of political aims; the 
fact of terrorizing or condition of being terrorized” (www.askoxford.com). However, official 
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definitions of terrorism to a large extent paint a different picture. For instance, the Federal 
Bureau  of  Investigation  (FBI),  defines  terrorism as  '…unlawful  use  of  force  or  violence 
against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or 
any segment  thereof  in  furtherance  of  political  or  social  objectives’  (FBI cited  in  Poole, 
2007:131). So also, the US Department of Defense described terrorism as ‘…the unlawful 
use of, or threatened use of force, or violence against individuals or property to coerce and 
intimidate  governments  or  societies,  often  to  achieve  political,  religious  or  ideological 
objectives' (cited in English, 2009:3). The variations between these definitions are significant 
enough to generate  a measure of confusion and potentially  unhelpful ambiguity (English, 
2009:3; Ahmad 1998; Poole 2007). A critical look at the FBI definition reveals that the word 
'unlawful'  tends  to  criminalise  acts  that  have  been  widely  considered  terrorist  in  nature, 
whereas other acts of protest also tend to intimidate/coerce the government by violence.  For 
example, a violent demonstration or riot, while unlawful, is not considered terrorist in nature. 
The Terrorism Act 2000 of the UK defines terrorism as ‘…any action or threat of action 
against a person or property or electronic system designed to influence government for the 
purpose of advancing political, religious or ideological cause’ (http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts).
Whittaker (2007) reviewed a number of definitions of terrorism by different scholars and 
institutions and concluded that terrorism is; 
• Ineluctably political in aims and motives;
• Violent – or, equally important, threatening violence;
• Designed  to  have  far-reaching  psychological  repercussions  beyond  the  immediate 
victim or target;
• Conducted  either  by  an  organization  with  an  identifiable  chain  of  command  or 
conspiratorial cell structure (whose members wear no uniform or identifying insignia) 
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or by individuals, or a small collection of individuals, directly influenced, motivated, 
or inspired by the ideological aims or example of some existent terrorist movement 
and/or its leaders; and
• Perpetrated by a sub-national group or non-state entity (see Whittaker, 2007:9-10)
Lilley  (2006) argued that  terrorist  organizations  have learned quickly  from organized 
criminals groups the art of earning money from criminal activities and laundering them so 
that it can be used for terrorist goals. The transactional features of money laundering and 
financing terrorism are quite similar, as both are concerned with ‘concealment and disguise’ 
(Schott,  2006:  I-2).  However,  it  must  be  remember  that  money  laundering  and  terrorist 
financing are two different concepts.   Terrorists often use the same techniques as money 
launderers  do,  in  order  to  hide  the  true  origin  of  their  money  (Kersten,  2002).  Money 
launderers enter their criminal proceeds into legal channels in order to conceal their criminal 
origins. Similarly, those who finance terrorism, also transfer funds which might be earned 
through legal or illegal means in such a way as to conceal their true origins and ultimate use 
(Winders  and  Sandler,  2006).  Money  launderers  are  rewarded  by  hiding  and  converting 
criminal proceeds into more legitimate funds, whereas terrorists are rewarded by concealing 
the origin of their funds and financing their terrorist activities (Schott, 2006).
Terrorism is a global phenomenon. In the past decade,  organized criminal groups and 
terrorist  organizations  have become globalized and have diversified their  activities.  Berry 
(2003)  argued  that  organized  criminals  and  terrorists  are  continually  searching  for  those 
territories which are suitable for their survival and expansion. Transnational criminals and 
terrorists are looking for countries with characteristics suitable for terrorist activities. These 
characteristics include: 
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Official  corruption,  incomplete  or  weak  legislation,  poor  enforcement  of 
existing laws, non-transparent financial institutions, unfavourable economic 
conditions, lack of respect for the rule of law in society, and poorly guarded 
national borders (Berry, 2003: 1) 
Criminal groups have taken advantage of globalization and, in recent years, terrorist 
groups  have  proven  that  their  reach  is  worldwide,  as  they  benefit  from  some  of  those 
conditions that make nations hospitable to organized crime (Berry, 2003).
However, there exists an interface between terrorism and organised crime. Within this 
interface, terrorists engage in organised criminal activities to support themselves financially. 
They often operate through network structures, and these structures sometimes intersect and 
terrorists  can  hide  themselves  among  transnational  criminal  organisations.  Added  to  the 
above, the two groups operate in areas with little governmental controls, weak enforcement 
of laws, and open borders. In addition, they use similar means to communicate by exploiting 
modern technology, and they corrupt local officials to achieve their objectives. Above all, 
both launder their money, often using the same methods and the same operators to move their 
funds (Lea, 2005).
However, a significant proportion of terrorist funding may not necessarily be derived 
from specific  criminal  activity.  Donations  and  contributions  from a  diverse  spectrum of 
supporters may, to a greater extent, provide a significant proportion of a particular group’s 
funds. While providing property for the purpose of committing serious criminal acts might 
effectively  ‘criminalise’  the  property  in  question,  it  is  not  necessarily  of  illicit,  and thus 
tainted, origin. It will often be quite clean, in the sense that we use that concept in the context 
of money laundering control (Rider, 2004). 
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According to Rider (2004):
Of  course,  many  terrorist  organizations  are  almost  indistinguishable  from 
organized  crime  and,  in  recent  years,  there  has  been  a  tendency  to  label 
terrorists as almost a sub-species of organized crime. Terrorists have stooped 
to ordinary crime to raise funds and secure their objectives and, of course, 
most terror networks would have the characteristics of a ‘continuing criminal 
enterprise’ (Rider, 2004:67)
Lilley  (2006) argued that  some of the traditional  terrorist  organizations  like the 
PLO,  the  IRA,  the  KLF,  and  ETA  have  already  used  crime  to  finance  their  terrorist 
activities.  More recently,  the Al-Qaeda and Taliban regimes  jointly  exploited  the  drug 
trade in Afghanistan to finance the regime and terrorist  activities.  In addition,  terrorist 
organizations also use a variety of ways to raise funds to finance their operations such as 
terrorist  camps,  providing them with  living  expenses,  funds to  plan,  train  and commit 
terrorist acts.  Terrorist fundraising is believed to come from different sources including 
Donations, the use of charities and non-profit organizations, front companies, 
state  sponsorship,  fraud,  smuggling,  the  narcotics  trade,  blackmail  and 
protection  rackets,  corruption,  counterfeiting,  and  other  criminal  activities 
(Lilley, 2006:137-8) 
The terrorist organizations use a variety of ways to supply funds to the frontline to be able 
to  continue  their  terrorist  activities.  Lilley  (2006:144)  has  outlined  some of  the  common 
methods used for terrorist purposes including
• Traditional money laundering;
• Online payment transfers;
• The use of front companies to create fictional business/trade transactions;
• Diamond trading;
• The purchase of, and trading in, works of arts, antiques or similar commodities;
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• Holding funds in cash and then using couriers to transport it; 
• Informal exchange mechanisms (Lilley, 2006:144).
  
The tragic attack on the Twin Towers in America on September 11, 2001 is one of the 
best examples of money laundering and terrorist financing. The 9/11 Commission Report 
explained how and from where the money was transferred to the US to finance the terrorist 
plot.  
The  9/11  plot  cost  Al-Qaeda  approximately  $400,000–500,000,  of  which 
approximately  $300,000 was deposited  into U.S.  bank accounts  of  the 19 
hijackers (Roth et al., 2004: 13)
The  9/11  Commission  Report  provided  a  fascinating  insight  into  the  way money 
entered into the US to finance the terrorist attack, and how the hijackers were able to remain 
below the money laundering radar of the US authorities.  The 9/11 Commission Report, in its 
‘Monograph on Terrorist Financing’, spelled out the problem:
For terrorist financial transactions, the amount of money is often small or 
consistent  with  the  customer’s  profile  ...  and  the  transactions  seem 
innocuous.  As  a  consequence,  banks  generally  are  unable  to  separate 
suspicious from legitimate transactions (see Lilley, 2006:133)   
Al Qaeda used three different means to fund their terrorist plot.
1. Wire transfers from overseas to the United States;
2. The physical transport of cash or traveller’s checks into the United States, 
and;
3. The accessing of funds held in foreign financial institutions by debit or credit 
cards (Roth et al., 2004:13)
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Once the  money entered  the United  States  using all  the  above-mentioned  means,  the 
hijackers used the US banking system to store their funds and facilitate their transactions. In 
terrorist  financing,  Lilley  (2006)  argued,  a  distinct  mechanism  is  being  used  to  finance 
terrorist activity by money earned through both legitimate and illegitimate sources. Terrorist 
financing is difficult to identify compared to the general money laundering process.
2.8 Conclusion
The essence of money laundering is not the global transport of money bags in order to 
fool the police, but the art of falsely legitimating one’s income or the acquisition of assets. 
The money laundering  process  allows  organized  criminals  and terrorists  to  both  hide  its 
source  and  to  freely  spend the  profits  generated  by  illegal  activities.  In  order  to  curtail 
criminal activity, the law must attack its motives - and the ability to spend ill-gotten gains. 
With law enforcement agencies making efforts to make it more difficult to remove the ability 
to  spread the  money,  the  incentive  associated  with  this  crime  is  significantly  decreased. 
Undeniably,  the  biggest  motivating  factor  is  the  spendable  money  which  is  generated. 
Therefore, lawmakers have focused their efforts at making it more difficult to spend or move 
the money without detection. By removing the ability to spend the proceeds, the incentive to 
commit the associated crime is significantly decreased. One of the central questions in the 
whole laundering issue is the alleged infiltration of crime-money into the healthy fabric of 
national and international trade and industry, corrupting and eroding the supposed integrity of 
bankers, builders, jurists or whoever it touches. Estimating the volume of money laundering 
has been accompanied more by fact creation than by fact finding. 
Wechsler (2001) argued that the financial abuses are not of recent origin. They have existed 
as long as there were finances to be abused. As he puts it:
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Financial abuses – money laundering, tax evasion, and rogue banking – have 
been around for as long as there have been finances to abuse. But globalization 
is creating new challenges as borders dissolve. New technologies enable tiny, 
remote countries to make quick money through their under regulated banking 
systems.  Recent  multilateral  initiatives  have  started  to  attack  the  problem 
(Wechsler, 2001:42)
 According to Wechsler (2001) the incidences of financial abuse have increased tremendously 
with the expansion of the international financial system. Globalization has changed the nature 
of the age-old problem and has undermined the old way of dealing with the problem.  As 
highlighted in this chapter, money laundering is a complicated issue. It has often been used 
by drugs cartels, arms traffickers, terrorists and other criminal groups. These groups often use 
banks to launder their money so that it appears as the product of legitimate business. Tax 
evaders also hide their money by structuring complicated transitions, with the sole purpose of 
hiding their wealth from the tax authorities (Wechsler, 2001).
As Likewise noted in this chapter, the crime of money laundering and it is link with 
terrorism, pose quite a number of problems for the world of the Twenty First Century. Money 
laundering has been identified as having a grave impact on domestic and international trade, 
the international banking industry, as well as the rule of law (Wright, 2006). Hence, tackling 
money laundering is essentially a global problem. 
Due to the fact that money laundering occurs outside normal economic activities, it is 
therefore difficult to estimate exactly the profit that is being generated from this crime on an 
international scale. 
According to Financial Action Task Force, 
The  International  Monetary  Fund,  for  example  has  stated  in  1996  that  the 
aggregate size of money laundering in the world be somewhere between two 
and five percent of the world’s gross domestic product (FATF) PAGE?
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The FATF further added that
Using 1996 statistics, these percentages would indicate that money laundering 
ranged between US Dollar (USD) 590 billion and USD 1.5 trillion. The lower 
figure is roughly equivalent to the value of the total output of an economy the 
size of Spain (FATF) 
However,  FATF  has  clearly  indicated  that  these  are  rough  estimates,  and  the 
organization  does  not  publish  any statistics  about  the  intensity  of  the  money  laundering 
problem. 
Thus,  the  need for  policy  development  in  order  to  counter  money laundering  has 
become  a  pressing  issue  for  world  economies.   More  importantly,  the  need  for  the  law 
enforcement and surveillance networks in place to tackle money laundering has to be made 
more effective has now become mandatory.  As Lea (2005) noted,  money laundering has 
become  the  focal  point  of  the  fight  against  organised  crime.  For  instance,  the  Financial 
Action Task Force based in Paris, has made recommendations for the development of sound 
anti-money laundering programmes.  The UN and the IMF have also introduced stringent 
measures to control the crime.  In addition, other regional organisations such as the Caribbean 
Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), the Asia Pacific Group (APG), the Organization of 
American States (OAS) and the European Union (EU) have all drafted and endorsed strong 
anti-money laundering measures among its member nations (see, for example, McDonald, 
2001;  Lea,  2005;  Wright,  2006).  The  following  chapter  will  look  at  the  legislative  and 
regulatory mechanisms that have been put into place by both international organisations and 
the UAE to combat money laundering. 
85
Chapter Three
National, Regional and International Regulations 
3.0 Introduction
In the previous  chapter  we examined the concept  of  money laundering  and other 
issues associated with it. It has also been acknowledged that money laundering has become a 
global phenomenon in recent years due to the impact of globalisation. It has been estimated 
that  over  80  percent  of  all  money  laundering  schemes  have  an  international  dimension 
(Harjit,  2000).  The  internationalization  of  organized  crime  and  money  laundering  has 
certainly raised serious challenges to domestic law enforcement authorities and the pressures 
are much more on them to develop more effective strategies  to combat the crime.  It has 
become obvious that  national  law enforcement  agencies can no longer rely on traditional 
unilateral domestic measures (Gilmore, 1992). The need for more international cooperation 
has become obvious due to the fact that the mobility of individuals across national borders 
has significantly increased and, as a result,  no country can afford to treat the problem of 
money laundering merely as a national phenomenon. The global threat of organized crime 
and money laundering  has  encouraged  the  international  community  to  engage in  a  more 
concrete and coordinated effort to fight back.
3.1 Controlling Money Laundering 
Different approaches have been adopted to tackle money laundering. In some countries, 
money laundering was controlled through codes of conduct or regulatory measures issued by 
banking  supervisors,  rather  than  through  legislative  measures.  This  was  the  case  in 
Switzerland,  where  the  first  reaction  towards  the  alleged  misuse  of  Swiss  financial 
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institutions for money laundering was taken in 1977, with a Code of Conduct signed by the 
Swiss Banks, the Swiss Union of Banks and the Swiss National Bank (Stessens, 2000). Under 
the code of conduct, ‘Swiss banks were obliged to refrain from carrying out a transaction if it  
would frustrate the goals of the CDB as, for example, when it was clear that the funds were 
criminally  derived’  (Stessens,  2000:101).  Initially,  the problem of  money laundering was 
considered a domestic issue and therefore all the efforts to combat money laundering were 
also dealt with domestically (for example, the case of Switzerland cited above). However, the 
efforts to combat money laundering have taken an international dimension, with the United 
States taking a lead in this direction.  
The scope of these measures now ranges from the international to the domestic level and 
from the governmental to the private sector. The activities include the enactment of new anti-
money laundering laws, the improvement of existing laws, the introduction of specialized 
financial  investigative training,  improved relationships  between law enforcement  agencies 
and  the  financial  community  and,  through  bilateral  and  multilateral  agreements,  nations 
joining  together  to  eradicate  money  laundering  (Paradise,  1997).  The  terrorist  attack  of 
September 11, 2001 on the Twin Towers was the trigger for US and international community 
concern to increase counter-terrorism enforcement. Consequently, it led to the application of 
many of the anti-money laundering due diligence requirements commonly used by financial 
and  non-financial  institutions  to  counter  terrorism,  and  the  awareness  that  the  failure  to 
comply with such requirements  can result  in legal  and economic  problems and a loss of 
reputation among other consequences. 
This  chapter  will  discuss  some  of  the  important  efforts  undertaken  by  the  international 
community  in  controlling  money  laundering  globally.  The  chapter  is  divided  into  two 
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sections. The first section ( 3.2.) examines the international initiatives and efforts to combat 
money laundering such as the provisions of the Basle Committee on Banking Regulations, 
the UN Convention against Illicit  Traffic  in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 
(1988) and the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime (2000). The section also 
includes  the  role  of  the  Financial  Action  Task  Force  (FATF)  in  the  development  and 
promotion of national and international policies to combat money laundering. This section 
also discusses the reasons for the creation of the international police force - Interpol - and its 
role  in the fight against  money laundering.  The second section (3.3.)  covers the regional 
efforts that have been introduced in order to combat the money laundering problem. In this 
section, the focus is on the efforts of the European Union and the Arab countries, especially 
the GCC countries, in their fight against money laundering. 
3.2. International Initiatives
3.2.1. The Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices
 Heavy foreign currency losses due to the closure of Franklin National in the United 
States  and  the  collapse  of  Bankhaus  Herstatt  in  Germany  have  paved  the  way  for  the 
establishment  of  the  Basel  Committee  (McCann,  2006:231).  The  Basel  Committee  on 
Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices was formed in 1974 by the Group of Ten (G-
10) industrialized nations. The basic purpose of its creation was to supervise banks in order to 
stop the money laundering process through banks (Tarullo, 2008). The membership of the 
Committee, until October 2005, comprised of representatives from Belgium, Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK 
and the USA (Hopton, 2006). The Committee adopted a unanimous declaration of principles 
for banks and other financial  institutions in order to ensure that they will not be used by 
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criminals to launder their dirty money, especially money derived from drug trafficking. The 
Basel Committee is considered the first international effort to address the problem of money 
laundering globally (Savona, 1999). 
 The possibility of the exploitation of financial institutions by criminals has been one of 
great concern to banking authorities, supervisors and management, from the point of view of 
the impact on their reputations and fears that it could undermine the public’s confidence in 
banks.  Due to  the  vulnerability  of  the  financial  sector  to  misuse  by criminals,  the  Basel 
Committee  on  Banking  Regulations  and  Supervisory  Practices  issued  their  Statement  of 
Principles  which  is  also  known  as  ‘The  Basel  Principles’  in  December  1988  (Hopton, 
2006:8). The Basel statement of principles urges the banks to adopt a number of procedures 
and basic policies in order to protect and reduce the misuse of the financial system in the 
form of money laundering (Gilmore, 1992). These principles focused on a number of key 
areas including:
• Customer identification
• Compliance with legislation
• Conformity with high ethical standards and local laws and regulations
• Full  cooperation with national  law enforcement  authorities  to  the extent  permitted 
without breaching customer confidentiality;
• Record-keeping and systems; and
• Staff training (Hopton, 2006:8-9)
Although, the principles of customer identification have been adopted by many countries, 
in some countries the approach was felt to be either very poor or even non-existent.  The 
Basel Committee acknowledged that everyone should adopt a minimum set of standards and 
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that these proposals would become the standard for supervisors to establish their national 
practices,  and  for  banks  to  design  their  own  programmes  (Gilmore,  1992).  The  Basel 
Principles were generally endorsed by banks and other financial supervisors worldwide that 
started  to cover  proceeds from all  criminal  activities,  not only those resulting from drug 
trafficking (Hopton, 2006).
In 2004 the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) based in Basel, Switzerland revised 
the 1988 Principles and announced a new set of guidelines on banking regulation (Tarullo, 
2008).  This  is  referred  to  as  Basel  II.   The main  focus  of  Basel  II  was to  align  banks’ 
regulatory capital more closely with risks. Glantz and Mun (2008) stated that
Progress in measuring and managing risk and the opportunities risk provides 
is  important  because Basel  II  implementation is  a large-scale  undertaking, 
making considerable demands on banks and regulators  alike and requiring 
appropriate rethinking of risk analysis globally (Glantz & Mun, 2008:1)      
The Basel Committee works under the auspices of the Bank for International Settlements and 
its Secretariat is located in Basel, Switzerland. The Basel Committee has no legal force or 
formal  supervisory authority;  however,  it  exerts  substantial  influence  on banks and other 
financial institutions. It set standards for banking regulations and supervision globally. The 
principles  of  the  Basel  Committee  have  also  been  approved  by  the  Offshore  Group  of 
Banking Supervisors which comprises of 19 major financial centres (Paradise, 1997). 
The Basel Committee meets three or four times every year. The main purpose of such 
meetings is to formulate and improve the supervisory standards and practices of the banks. 
There are approximately twenty five task forces and working groups of the Basel Committee 
that meet regularly (McCann, 2006). The main objectives of such meetings are
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To  strengthen  international  cooperation,  improve  the  overall  quality  of 
banking  supervisor  worldwide,  and  to  ensure  that  no  foreign  banking 
establishment escapes supervision (McCann, 2006:231)
The UAE is one of the countries that complies with the principles initiated by the 
Basel Committee in 1988 and has required all of its financial institutions to implement Basel 
II through the Central Bank of the UAE. The Basel Committee provided seminar sessions to 
both local and foreign banks in the UAE with regard to implementing Basel II, and continues 
to work with the banks to arrive at a decision on the way forward for the implementation of 
Basel II. 
3.2.2.  The UN Convention against Illicit  Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances (1988)
This Convention is also known as the ‘Vienna Convention’. The Convention was held 
from 25th November to 20th December 1988. It was attended by 106 countries and adopted a 
detailed treaty text consisting of ‘thirty four Articles and one annex’ (see Gilmore, 1999:50). 
The  basic  purpose  of  the  Convention  was  to  increase  global  cooperation  and  encourage 
countries to formulate effective legislative and administrative measures to counter the huge 
profit  generated  by  drug  trafficking.  The  Vienna  Convention  is  considered  as  the  first 
international attempt to criminalize the money generated by drug trafficking (Hopton, 2006).
According to Gilmore (1999);
In  addition  to  the  major  consumer  nations  of  North  America  and Western 
Europe, it has attracted the support of key transit states in central and Eastern 
Europe, the Caribbean and the Central America. Of even greater significance a 
growing  number  of  the  world’s  major  drug  producers  have  accepted  its 
obligations.  These  include  among  others,  Afghanistan,  Bolivia,  Colombia, 
India,  Iran,  Lebanon,  Mexico,  Morocco,  Myanmar,  Nepal,  and  Pakistan 
(Gilmore, 1999:51)
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The scope of the Vienna Convention was limited to drug-related money laundering 
activities. However, the Convention encouraged all countries to extend the scope of 
their  anti-money  laundering  measures  from  drug-related  money  to  the  proceeds 
generated  by all  serious crimes  (Savona and Feo,  1997;  Hopton,  2006).  The main 
features of the Convention include; 
• To criminalise drug trafficking and associated money laundering.
• To enact measures for the confiscation of the proceeds of drug trafficking.
• To enact measures to permit international assistance.
• To empower courts to order bank, financial or commercial records to be made available 
to the enforcement agencies, notwithstanding any bank secrecy laws (Hopton, 2006:7). 
The  Vienna  Convention  was  widely  received  by  the  member  states  and  is  now  widely 
regarded as ‘…constituting the essential foundation of the international legal regime ... in the 
anti-drug and anti-money laundering’ (see Gilmore, 1999:51)
The Convention  mandated  the  signatory states  to  criminalize  all  activities  concerning 
drug  trafficking,  including  the  production,  cultivation,  management  and  financing  of 
trafficking  operations  (see  Article  3.1.  of  1988  UN  Convention).  The  Convention  also 
required member states to criminalize money generated as a result of drug trafficking in order 
to counter money laundering (see Article 3.1.b of 1988 UN Convention). The confiscation of 
the proceeds derived from drug trafficking has been dealt with under Article 5 of the 1988 
UN Convention. The main objective of this Article is to disrupt the financial capability of 
drug dealers and the money that is being laundered. The Convention also required member 
states to establish measures both at the domestic level and at the international level, in order 
to enable the competent authority to ‘…identify, trace, and freeze or seize ... and confiscate’ 
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the proceeds derived from drug trafficking and drugs-related money laundering (see Article 
5.2 of 1988 UN Convention).
Article  7  the  Convention  put  more  emphasize  on  the  importance  of  mutual  legal 
assistance  among  the  member  states  in  order  to  combat  drug  trafficking  and  money 
laundering. It asked member states for ‘…the widest measure of mutual legal assistance in 
investigations, prosecutions, and judicial proceedings’ in respect of drug trafficking and its 
related offences (see Article 7.1 of 1988 UN Convention). This Article encourages member 
states to sign bilateral or multilateral treaties for the control of drug trafficking globally.
The  1988  Convention  also  tried  to  deal  with  bank  secrecy  laws  or  customer 
confidentiality  that  existed  in  some countries  and which  creates  hurdles  to  counter  drug 
trafficking as well as money laundering. Article 5.3 says that
Each party shall empower its courts or other competent authorities to order the 
bank, financial or commercial records be made available or be seized. A party 
shall not decline to act under the provision of this paragraph on the ground of 
bank secrecy (Article 5.3 of 1988 UN Convention)
 Bank secrecy laws or customer confidentiality exists in some countries, and criminals are 
taking full advantage of such a situation to launder money derived from illegal activities (see 
Chapter 5 on the UAE Central Bank’s AMLSCU).  The 1988 Convention actually wanted to 
restrict money launderers who take advantage of such measures, and such laws also create 
hurdles for bilateral or multilateral cooperation to counter money laundering.  According to 
Gilmore (1992);
Existing  bank  secrecy  law  is  being  used  in  many  instances  to  obstruct 
cooperation and the provision of information needed for the investigation of 
allegations of drug-related offences (Gilmore, 1992:69).
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In the fight against money laundering, the 1988 UN Convention was one of the great 
achievements of the international community. However, it is important to note that the fight 
against money launderers is not an easy task. International treaties like this have no doubt 
produced encouraging results, but money launderers constantly change their tactics and take 
full  advantage  of  the  fragmented  legal  arrangements  in  different  countries  which  they 
continue to exploit. The FATF in 1990 reported that
Many of the current  difficulties  in  international  cooperation  in drug money 
laundering cases are directly or indirectly linked with a strict  application of 
bank secrecy rules, with the fact that, in many countries, money laundering is 
not today an offence, and with insufficiencies in multilateral cooperation and 
mutual legal assistance (see Gilmore, 1999:63-4)     
There  is  no  doubt  that  the  1988  UN  Convention  was  an  important  and 
successful initiative in the fight against drug trafficking and money laundering. It has 
contributed a lot to future efforts in relation to anti-drug trafficking and anti-money 
laundering measures.  The most important  and influential  aspect of this Convention 
was the criminalization  of the proceeds derived from drug trafficking,  and also of 
money laundering (Savona and Feo, 1997). As has been explained earlier, the Vienna 
Convention formed the basis for much of the subsequent legislation. However, it has 
now effectively been overtaken by the Palermo Convention (Hopton, 2006).
3.2.3. The Financial Action Task Force and its Forty Recommendations
The Financial  Action  Task  Force,  commonly  known as  FATF, is  an  independent 
international  body  which  was  created  by  the  G-7 countries  at  the  Economic  Summit  of 
Industrialized Countries in Paris in 1989. The Financial  Action Task Force (FATF) is an 
inter-governmental body whose purpose is the development and promotion of national and 
international  policies  to  combat  money  laundering  and  terrorist  financing. The  FATF  is 
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therefore a 'policy-making body' that works to generate the necessary political will to bring 
about legislative and regulatory reforms in these areas (www.fatf-gafi.org). The basic aim of 
establishing  such  an  organization  was  to  develop  an  international  approach  towards 
controlling money laundering globally (Savona and Feo, 1997). FATF is a policy making 
body  that  attempts  to  generate  and  influence  the  necessary  political  will  with  regard  to 
introducing  national  legislative  and  regulatory  reforms  for  the  eradication  of  the  money 
laundering problem. The FATF is recognized as ‘…the international standard setter for anti-
money laundering efforts’ (Vaithlingam & Nair, 2007:354). The FATF has clearly stated in 
its mission statement that
The FATF is an inter-governmental policy-making body whose purpose is to 
establish international standards, and develop and promote policies, both at 
national  and  international  levels,  to  combat  money  laundering  (ML)  and 
terrorist financing (TF) (see FATA, 2009)    
Although, the FATF is located within the OECD, however it is not formally a part of 
any other international organization.  As the Head of the Financial  Affairs Division of the 
OECD remarked, ‘…it is not a permanent international organization nor a body managing a 
legally-binding convention’ (see Gilmore, 1999:82). It is considered as an ad hoc grouping of 
governments  and others  with the  sole  purpose  of  establishing  comprehensive  anti-money 
laundering  strategies  based  upon  international  cooperation.  One  of  the  important 
contributions  of  the  FATF towards  combating  the  money laundering  phenomenon  is  the 
package of forty recommended countermeasures  that was first elaborated in the February 
1990 Report (Gilmore, 1999).
The 1990 FATF Report is broadly grouped into three categories i.e. ‘criminal law, 
banking law and international cooperation’ (Savona and Feo, 1997:39). As far as the penal 
measures are concerned, the Report recommended nations to criminalize money laundering. 
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With  regards  to  banking  laws,  the  Report  recommended  the  elimination  of  anonymous 
accounts, the identification of hidden beneficial owners and record keeping. Furthermore, the 
report also recommended the need for:
Increased  attention  to  suspicious  transactions,  authority  to  report  such 
transactions with full protection for the reporting person and institution, non-
disclosure of such report to customers, and formalized anti-money laundering 
programs  fixing  responsibility  for  compliance  with  the  recommendations. 
Additional  recommendations  deal  with  the  heightened  security  for 
transactions  involving  countries  which  did  not  comply  with  the 
recommendations,  consideration  of  monitoring  significant  cross-border 
transactions and domestic cash flows, as well as encouragement of modern 
systems of money management rather than cash intensive practices (Savona 
and Feo, 1997:39)     
    
Until 1998, the membership of the FATF was limited to 26 principal industrialised countries. 
However, it was soon realized that the effectiveness of international anti-money laundering 
efforts could only be achieved through the increased involvement of strategically important 
countries  which  can  play  their  role  in  the  fight  against  money laundering.  According to 
Alexander  (2007),  by  February  2005  the  membership  of  the  FATF was  made  up of  31 
countries  and  two  international  organizations  i.e.  the  European  Union  and  the  Gulf 
Cooperation  Council.  Furthermore,  there  are  FATF-style  regional  anti-money  laundering 
bodies that hold the status of Observer with the FATF. Such bodies include
• Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG)
• Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF)
• Council  of Europe Select Committee of Experts  on the Evaluation of Anti-Money 
Laundering Measures (MONEYVAL) (formally PC-R-EV)
• Eurasian Group (EAG)
• Eastern and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG)
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• Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering in South America (GAFISUD)
• Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF) (Hopton, 
2006:18-19).
Some  members  of  the  FATF  are  also  members  of  these  regional  organizations.  These 
regional organizations have, among other functions, a specific mission to fight against money 
laundering activities in their region (Hopton, 2006).
The Forty Recommendations of FATF
The introduction of forty recommendations is no doubt a remarkable aspect of the 
FATF in 1990. The main objective behind the introduction of such recommendations was to 
criminalize money laundering and to strengthen law enforcement and detection mechanisms 
worldwide,  with  the  sole  purpose  of  eliminating  money  laundering.  These  forty 
recommendations provide a minimum standard for countering money laundering activities, 
both at domestic as well as at international levels. In 1990, the FATF redefined and expanded 
many  of  the  principles  already  put  forward  by  the  Basle  Committee  in  addressing  and 
targeting  the  control  of  the  financial  aspects  of  money  laundering.  In  1996,  these 
recommendations were revised due to the changing circumstances and challenges posed by 
the  introduction  of  new  technological  advancements  in  the  financial  system,  e.g.  cyber 
payments. The 1996 FATF recommendations serve as an international anti-money laundering 
standard  and have  been endorsed by more  than 130 countries  throughout  the world (see 
FATF, 2009).
The forty FATF recommendations are divided as follows:
• Scope of the criminal offence of money laundering (Recommendations 1 & 2)
• Provisional measures and confiscation (Recommendation 3)
97
Measures  to  be  taken  by  Financial  Institutions  and  Non-Financial  Businesses  and  
Professions to prevent Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing
• Customer due diligence and record-keeping (Recommendations 4 – 12)
• Reporting of suspicious transactions and compliance (Recommendations 13-16)
• Other measures to deter money laundering and terrorist financing (Recommendations 
17 – 20)
• Measures to be taken with respect to countries that do not or insufficiently comply 
with the FATF Recommendations (Recommendations 21 & 22)
• Regulation and supervision (Recommendations 23 – 25)
Institutional and other measures necessary in systems for combating Money Laundering and  
Terrorist Financing
• Competent authorities, their powers and resources (Recommendations 26 – 32) 
• Transparency of legal persons and arrangements (Recommendations 33 & 34)
• International Cooperation (Recommendation 35)
• Mutual legal assistance and extradition (Recommendations 36 – 39)
• Other forms of cooperation (Recommendation 40) (see FATA, 2009 official website 
for details)
After the terrorist attack in the United States on September 11, 2001, an extraordinary 
meeting of FATF members was convened in Washington DC, on October 29-30, 2001. In the 
meeting it was agreed to broadened the mandate of the FATF from not only dealing with the 
issue of proceeds from criminal conduct but also to cover the financing of terrorism. In this  
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regard,  eight  special  recommendations  were  introduced  that  deal  with  the  financing  of 
terrorism which was increased to nine at the end of 2004. These special recommendations 
included measures designed to fight terrorist financing and terrorist organizations as well. 
The nine special recommendations are complementary to the original forty recommendations. 
They commend FATF member countries to;
1. Take immediate steps to ratify and implement the relevant United Nations instruments
2. Criminalise the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts and terrorist organisation
3. Freeze and confiscate terrorist assets
4. Report suspicious transactions linked to terrorism
5. Provide the widest possible range of assistance to other countries’ law enforcement 
and regulatory authorities for terrorist financing investigations
6. Impose anti-money laundering requirements on alternative remittance systems
7. Strengthen  customer  identification  measures  in  international  and  domestic  wire 
transfers
8. Ensure  that  entities,  in  particular  non-profit  organisations,  cannot  be  misused  to 
finance terrorism (Gilmore, 2004:124)
9. Ensure  that  there  is  a  measure to  deal  with  the transportation  of  cash and bearer 
instruments across borders (see also FATF, 2004)
    
  Over  the  past  decade,  the  recommendations  of  the  FATF have  acquired  the  status  of 
internationally accepted standards in the fight against the control of money laundering. The 
FATF has achieved this status as a result of its commitment to the implementation of its 40 
recommendations  within  the  members’  states  and  also  outside  it  and,  with  the  help  of 
regional  bodies such as the Council  of Europe,  to get  tough with laggard countries.  The 
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FATF realized in 1996 that complete reliance on legal measures would not support the effort 
against  money  laundering  globally.  Because,  under  international  law,  the  40  FATF 
recommendations are not legally binding on any country,  it  started to work against those 
jurisdictions that had failed to comply with its recommendations, especially countries with 
strict banking secrecy laws that support money laundering activities (see Gilmore, 2004). In 
its February 2000 Report, the FATF set out criteria for listing ‘Non-Cooperative Countries 
and Territories (NCCTs)’ and the procedure to be adopted to review the progress made by 
countries and territories. Counter measures can be applied in the event that a country is on the 
NCCT  list.  One  of  the  most  important  consequences  would  be  the  application  of 
Recommendation 21 with regard to NCCT list countries, and all FATF countries are required 
to comply with this recommendation (Hopton, 2006). This recommendation states that
Financial institutions should give special attention to business relationships 
and transactions with persons, including companies and financial institutions, 
from  countries  which  do  not  or  insufficiently  apply  the  FATF 
Recommendations. Whenever these transactions have no apparent economic 
or  visible  lawful  purpose,  their  background and purpose should,  as far  as 
possible, be examined, the findings established in writing, and be available to 
help competent authorities. Where such a country continues not to apply or 
insufficiently  applies  the  FATF Recommendations,  countries  should apply 
appropriate counter-measures (see FATF Recommendation 21, FATF, 2009) 
Alexander (2007) stated that appearance on the NCCT list conveys a message to other 
countries  that  these  jurisdictions  lack  proper  anti-money laundering  measures,  and warns 
them to think carefully before engaging in any financial transactions with these countries. 
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3.2.4. The UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime (2000)
The United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime was adopted at the 
millennium meeting in November, 2000. In December, 2000, it was opened for signature at a 
high level conference held in Palermo, Italy. It is significant in the sense that it was the first  
legally binding UN instrument against organized and serious crime. A total of 184 countries 
signed the Treaty and it entered into force on 29th September, 2003 (see Hopton, 2006). The 
Convention  required  the  signatory  states  to  establish,  within  their  domestic  laws,  the 
following distinct criminal offences:
• Participation in an organized criminal group
• Money laundering
• Corruption
• Obstruction of justice (Hopton, 2006:8)
Furthermore, the Convention asked the member states to commit to the following:
• Criminalizing offences committed by organised crime groups, including corruption 
and corporate or company offences;
• Cracking-down on money laundering and the proceeds of crime;
• Speeding up and widening the reach of extradition;
• Protecting witnesses testifying against criminal groups;
• Tightening cooperation to seek out and prosecute suspects;
• Boosting the prevention of organized crime at national and international levels; and 
• Developing  a  series  of  protocols  containing  measures  to  combat  specific  acts  of 
international organized crime (See Wright, 2006: 193)
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The  Convention  stressed  the  need  for  mutual  cooperation  among  member  states  on 
matters  such as  ‘…extradition,  mutual  legal  assistance,  transfer  of  proceedings  and joint 
investigations’  (Hopton,  2006:8).  It  also  required  the extension  of  technical  assistance  to 
developing countries  in  order to take necessary measures  in dealing with the problem of 
organized crime. Some of the main features of the Convention are discussed in the following 
section.
The scope of the Convention is set out in Article 3 which states that the Convention is 
applied to the ‘…prevention,  investigation and prosecution’ of offences,  including money 
laundering, corruption and other serious crimes as has been defined under Article 2 of the 
Convention. Article 2 of the Convention clearly states that that application of the Convention 
is related to offences that involve ‘an organized criminal group’ and are ‘transnational in 
nature’. 
The Convention under Article  2 provided a broader definition of an ‘organized crime 
group’ which was lacking due to the absence of a universally agree definition (see Chapter 1). 
Article 3.2 clearly excluded domestic offences from its scope and focused on offences that 
have  a  transnational  dimension  in  one  way  or  another.  The  2000  UN  Convention  also 
provided many detailed provisions for mutual international cooperation against transnational 
organized crime. Gilmore (2004) argued that most of the internal structure of the 2000 UN 
Convention  has  been  inspired  by  the  1988  UN  Convention.  However,  the  2000  UN 
Convention presented some new features such as the protection of witnesses and victims 
(Articles 24 & 25  of 2000 UN Convention). The close link between organized crime and 
corruption has been dealt under Article 8 & 9 of 2000 UN Convention. It required all member 
states to criminalize the laundering of the proceeds derived from crime. This Article covers 
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all aspects of money laundering i.e. money derived from crime including conversion, transfer, 
concealment or disguise, acquisition, possession, etc. (Article 6 of 2000 UN Convention).
One of the important aspects of the Convention is the provision of measures in order to 
prevent money laundering (See Article 7  of 2000 UN Convention). These measures were 
introduced with the sole purpose of attacking the financial aspect of the organized criminal. 
In order  to deter  money laundering,  the Article  asked for all  the signatories  to introduce 
comprehensive domestic regulatory and supervisory systems for banks and other financial 
institutions that are vulnerable in terms of being used for the purpose of money laundering. In 
this  respect,  more focus was put on measures such as ‘…customer identification,  record-
keeping,  and  the  reporting  of  suspicious  transactions’  (See  Article  7.1.a  of  2000  UN 
Convention).  Under  Article  7.1.b,  member  states  were required  to  introduce  a  ‘Financial 
Intelligence Unit’ and to monitor the movement of cases across national borders (Article 7.2 
of 2000 UN Convention). The member states were encouraged to sign treaties for the purpose 
of controlling money laundering activities (See Article 7.3 of 2000 UN Convention). Finally, 
Article 14 explains the method to be used in dealing with the confiscation of the proceeds or 
crime or property.
It  is important to mention that the UN Convention of Transnational Organized Crime 
2000  is  a  significant  achievement  and  development  that  shows  the  commitment  of  the 
international community to combating money laundering. It also explains the link between 
organized crime and money laundering. A convention like this provides the best norms of 
international cooperation in relation to eliminating money laundering activities globally (see 
Stessens, 2000).
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3.2.5 The Role of Interpol in Money Laundering Control
Interpol  is  the  international  police  organization.  Its  creation  came  after  ongoing 
struggle on the part of police institutions from many countries to forge an international police 
force.  As  a  result,  an  International  Criminal  Police  Commission  was  established  at  the 
International Police Congress in Vienna in 1923. After World War II, the same organization 
was renamed as the  International Criminal Police Organization in 1956, abbreviated as the 
ICPO – Interpol  (Deflem, 2002).  The General  Secretariat  of Interpol  is  located  in  Lyon, 
France. It has seven regional offices. Each member state maintains a National Central Bureau 
(NCB) which is comprised of well-trained law enforcement officers (Madinger, 2006).
Article 2 of the Constitution of Interpol states its aims as follows: 
• To ensure and promote the widest possible mutual assistance between all criminal 
police authorities within the limits of the laws existing in the different countries and in 
the spirit of the ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’, and
• To  establish  and  develop  all  institutions  likely  to  contribute  effectively  to  the 
prevention and suppression of ordinary crime crimes (see Fooner, 1989:35) 
Interpol facilitates cross-border police cooperation in respect of crime and criminals. It 
works closely with those organizations, authorities and services that work in the prevention of 
international organized crime (Interpol, 2009; Hurst, 2007). Interpol has four core functions: 
• Secure global police communication services,
• Operational data services and databases for police
• Operational police support services, and 
• Police training and development (for details see Interpol, 2009)
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Interpol provides efficient means of communication across borders between police forces. 
It also assists in intelligence gathering and provides access to vital police data in a safe and 
secure environment (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006; Hurst, 2007). Interpol keeps a wide range 
of databases and information. Such information includes,
Name and  photographs  of  known criminals,  wanted  persons,  fingerprints, 
DNA profiles, stolen or lost travel documents, stolen motor vehicles, child 
sex abuse images and stolen works of arts (Interpol, 2009) 
Interpol  not  only  maintains  important  databases  and  information,  but  also 
disseminates  such  information  among  member  states  through  its  system  of  international 
notices.  As has been stated earlier,  member states coordinate their activities with Interpol 
through their National Central Bureau (NCB). The NCB is the place where a member country 
places a request for assistance if required, in other jurisdictions (Madinger, 2006). In respect 
of a wanted person involved in a serious crime of a heinous nature, Interpol issues what is 
commonly known as a ‘Red Notice – an international request for the provisional arrest of an 
individual’ (Interpol, 2009). 
Interpol  has  prioritized  six  crime  areas  that  include  ‘…corruption,  drugs  and 
organized crime, financial and high-tech crime, fugitives, public safety and terrorism, and 
trafficking in human beings’ (see Interpol, 2009). To be able to work against its six priority 
crime areas, Interpol has established a Command and Control Centre that operates 24 hours. 
This is basically a crisis management centre. Its role is to assist and coordinate with any 
member  state  with  the  constant  exchange  of  information  if  any  serious  incident  occurs 
(Interpol, 2009). 
Interpol also work in the capacity building activities of its member states in respect of 
dealing with serious crime of a global nature. In this respect, it provides training facilities to 
the national police forces of various countries and also ‘…offers on-demand advice, guidance 
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and support in building dedicated crime-fighting components’ (Interpol, 2009). Such training 
ranges from sharing knowledge,  skill  and information,  to ensuring best practices  and the 
establishment  of  global  standards  for  combating  serious  international  organized  crime 
(Interpol, 2009).
Madinger (2006) argued that Interpol has taken a tough stance and is at the forefront of 
the fight against money laundering. It has promoted cooperation and assistance among its 
member  states  in  respect  of  investigating  money  laundering  cases.  It  provides  technical 
assistance to  countries  in  their  fight  against  money laundering.  In this  fight,  the General 
Assembly of Interpol adopted the Model Legislation on Money Laundering and Forfeiture of 
Assets  in  August  1985,  which  was  originally  drafted  by  Interpol’s  Caribbean  and  Latin 
American working group (see Zagaris, 1995). The legislation calls for the freezing of assets 
prior to the filing of criminal charges if it is suspected that they are the proceeds of crime. It 
also provides for the forfeiture of such property to the government if they are found to be the 
proceeds of crime. Through its extensive lobbying campaign, Interpol has asked its members 
to  formulate  their  domestic  anti-money laundering  legislations  and to  help  in  conducting 
international  financial  investigations  and  the  seizure  of  criminal  assets  (Zagaris,  1995). 
Interpol  constantly  adopt  a  number  of  resolutions  on  combating  international  money 
laundering and forfeiting the proceeds of crime. It has continued its efforts to forge consensus 
among its member states and, with the help of other international organizations, to cooperate 
in the fight against money laundering (Savona and Feo, 1997).
3.3. Regional Efforts to Combat Money Laundering
Money laundering and terrorist financing is no doubt an international phenomenon 
and no individual country can effectively deal with these problems alone. The international 
community  has  understood this  fact  and,  as  a  result,  along with  international  initiatives, 
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several regional initiatives have also been adopted by different countries in order to tackle the 
problem of money laundering and terrorist financing. This section will focus on the efforts by 
the European Union and the Arab states, particularly in the Gulf region, in fighting against 
money laundering and the financing of terrorism.
3.3.1. The European Union
3.3.1.1 The Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure, and      
Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime, 1990 
As stated and explained earlier, the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (the Vienna Convention) was the first 
international effort to fight the threat to global financial stability caused by the laundering of 
huge profits generated by drug trafficking. After the Vienna Convention came into force on 
11th November 1990, the Council  of Europe organized their  own convention of a similar 
nature.  The Convention on Laundering,  Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds 
from Crime was a planned effort by the Council of Europe to combat money laundering. It is 
also known as the Strasbourg Convention (Vettori, 2006). Unlike the Vienna Convention, the 
Strasbourg Convention was not limited to drug trafficking (Leong, 2007; Mitsilegas, 2003). 
The  1990 Convention  included  all  types  of  criminal  offences  and  the  offence  of  money 
laundering was extended to include money derived from all serious crimes (Gilmore, 1995). 
This was one of the important steps in the fight against money laundering. It was realized in 
the Convention that criminal groups commit a variety of crimes to make money; therefore, it 
required a wider strategy to control the proceeds from organized crime. 
The Strasbourg Convention came into force on 1st September 1993. It was signed and 
ratified by all fifteen European Union Member States of that time (Mitsilegas, 2003). One of 
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the important features of this Convention was its stress on the confiscation of the proceeds of 
crime.  It was clearly indicated in the Preamble to the Convention that:
Confiscation to be one of the modern and effective methods for use on an 
international  scale  to  combat  serious  crime,  differs  from  the  Vienna 
Convention as regards the predicate offences, which are no longer restricted 
to drug-related offences but include any type of crime (Vettori, 2006:4).
Chapter  2 of  the Strasbourg Convention  set  out  measures  to  be introduced at  the 
domestic level to combat money laundering. In this regard, it was stated in Article 3 that each 
party must adopt measures to enable the tracing, seizure and confiscation of the proceeds 
from  crime.  Article  4  required  states  to  introduce  measures  to  empower  the  competent 
authority in this regard. Vettori (2006) stated that
Particular emphasis is placed on the adoption of those measures necessary to 
empower  the  competent  authorities  in  order  that  bank,  financial  or 
commercial records be made available in confiscation proceedings, as well as 
to enable the use of special investigative techniques (such as interception o 
telecommunications,  access  to  computer  systems,  etc.  (facilitating  the 
identification of the ill-gotten gains) (Vettori, 2006:4)
Articles 7 – 10 set out measures for increased cooperation and assistance among the Council 
of Europe member states. Gilmore (1995) stated that the main purpose of the Convention was 
to facilitate among member states an increased cooperation with respect to search, seizure 
and confiscation of the proceeds of crime that generate huge profits. Vettori (2006) argued 
that  the  Strasbourg Convention  was the  first  regional  effort  to  allow for  the seizure  and 
confiscation of the proceeds from crime, as this measure had not been in place prior to that 
time. Therefore, in the Palermo Convention 2000, the United Nations introduced measures 
that called for the seizure and confiscation of the proceeds of crime. It was realized that the 
deprivation of the financial basis of organized criminals was an important step with respect to 
combating money laundering and promoting international cooperation (Savona, 1999).
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3.3.1.2. The EU Directives on Money Laundering Control 
As we know, the European Union is moving towards integration and harmonization of its 
currencies, financial markets and laws and regulations. Therefore, it was consider important 
to introduce measures to protect the European market from misuse by organized criminals for 
the purpose of money laundering. In this regard, the European Union issued three directives 
on the Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering. 
The first directive was issued in June 1991, and it asked the member states to amend their 
domestic laws in order to prevent their domestic financial systems from being misused by 
criminals for the purpose of money laundering (Leong, 2007). The 1991 Directive imposed a 
number of obligations on credit and financial institutions to prevent money laundering such 
as customer identification (See Article 3 of 1991 EU Directive), maintaining records (Article 
4 of 1991 EU Directive) and due diligence (Article 5 of 1991 EU Directive). It also asked for  
cooperation with competent authorities and a requirement to set up appropriate training and 
internal reporting procedures with regard to suspicious transactions. The application of the 
Directive  is  on all  banks and financial  institutions  whether  they  are  based  in  the  EC or 
whether they are EC branches of corporations based on their countries (Fisher, 2002). The 
1991 Directive required member states to implement necessary legislations such that:
• Money laundering was prohibited;
• Customer identification was verified and records kept;
• Suspicious transactions were monitored and checked;
• Institutions  should  cooperate  with  the  authorities  by  reporting  suspicions  and 
supplying relevant information;
• Suspects were not ‘tipped off’ that they were being investigated;
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• Anyone reporting a suspicion was to be protected from actions related to a breach of 
confidence;
• Institutions should implement and maintain adequate internal controls and employee 
training (Hopton, 2006:26)
The limitations of the first EU Directive were discussed and a second EU Directive was 
issued in December 2001.  This is known as the Second Money Laundering Directive (Leong, 
2007:57). According to Hopton (2006), the Second EU Directive was based upon two major 
proposals.
First,  to  extend  the  requirements  from  drug  trafficking  to  encompass  all 
serious  crime  including  tax  evasion  together  with  an  extension  of  the 
reporting requirements. The second, and more controversial, proposal was to 
bring  within  the  terms  of  the  Directive  a  number  of  non-financial-sector 
businesses (Hopton, 2006:26)
As a result, the scope of the Second EU Directive was extended to cover accountants 
and auditors, real estate agents, dealers in high value goods, casinos and legal professionals 
when assisting clients  in respect of property formation matters.  It  broadened the criminal 
activity definition to cover all organized crime and illegal activities affecting the financial 
interests of the community, instead of only drug-related activities. Finally, it also provided 
references to cooperation on fraud and corruption between the community and the money 
laundering regulation enforcement agencies in member states (Fisher, 2002).
In  order  to  strengthen  the  European  Union  anti-money  laundering  and  counter-
terrorist financing measures, a Third EU Directives was issued in June 2005. It consolidated 
and updated the first and second EU Directives. Efforts were made to ensure that the new 
rules were in line with the Financial Action Task Force’s revised Forty Recommendations of 
June 2003 (Leong, 2007). The main features of the Directive are as follows: 
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First,  the  new requirements  of  credit  and  financial  institutions  to  impose 
customer due diligence and record-keeping requirements, and communicate 
relevant  policies  and  procedures,  to  their  non-EU  branches  and  majority 
owned  subsidiaries.  Secondly,  the  prohibition  on  credit  institutions 
maintaining correspondent relationships with shell banks and imposition of 
certain mandatory due diligence requirements on cross-frontier correspondent 
banking relationships with respondent institutions from third countries. And 
thirdly,  provisions  enabling  certain  disclosures  to  be  made  without 
contravening the tipping off prohibition including disclosures to competent 
authorities and for law enforcement purposes, and in some cases disclosures 
between  institutions  within  an  EU  group  or  network,  and  to  other  EU 
financial institutions engaged on the same transaction (Smith, 2005: No Page) 
Leong (2007a and b)  stated  that  the  European Commission reviewed the  existing 
money laundering directives and it was decided to include the financing of terrorism in the 
Third Directive. As a result, the scope of the Third Directive was extended and started to 
include the financing of terrorism as a criminal offence on a par with money laundering.
3.3.1.3. The Europol 
Europol is the European Police Organization that deals with criminal intelligence. It is 
located in The Hague, Netherlands and was established in 1992 (Hanser & Sandifer, 2008). 
The basic aim of its creation is ‘…the improvement of the effectiveness and cooperation of 
relevant competent authorities within member states of the European Union in preventing and 
combating serious forms of organized international crime’ (Leong, 2007b:82). Europol deals 
with the following criminal activities: 
Illicit drug trafficking, illicit immigration networks, terrorism, forgery of money 
(counterfeiting of the Euro) and other means of payment, trafficking in human 
beings  (including  child  pornography),  illicit  vehicle  trafficking,  and  money 
laundering (Europol, 2009: No Page). 
According to  Leong (2007),  Europol  regularly  maintains  databases  of  intelligence  on 
serious organized crime and exchanges such information with member states whenever is 
needed. It also provides technical support for investigations in criminal analysis. Hanser & 
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Sandifer (2008) stated that Europol do not have any executive authority or power, and that its 
main  job  is  to  share  information  among  member  states  on  organized  crime.  The  entire 
organization comprises of ‘500 persons’ (Hanser & Sandifer, 2008:417). Europol works with 
a number of law enforcement agencies on a daily basis. Europol cooperates with a number of 
countries outside the European Union on the exchange of information regarding international 
criminal activities. 
3.3.2 The Efforts of Arabic Countries in Controlling Money Laundering
Organized  crimes  such  as  money  laundering,  terrorism,  drug  trafficking,  human 
trafficking are some of the important problems that the Arab world is facing today. It has 
been argued that the Arab world provides a fertile ground for organized criminals (Purdy, 
2005). Prior to the September 11, 2001 attack, the Arab countries were engaged in efforts to 
combat  money  laundering  and  the  financing  of  terrorism.  However,  since  2001,  Arab 
countries have accelerated their efforts and have been able to introduce legislation that deals 
with money laundering and terrorist financing. The following section explains some of the 
efforts of the Arab states in controlling money laundering in general. However, this section 
will focus on the effort of the Gulf Cooperation Council (the GCC) with regard to money 
laundering control in the Gulf region.
3.3.2.1 Arabic Convention on Counter Terrorism 19985
The Arabic Convention on Counter Terrorism, which entered into force on 7th May 
1999, was the result  of the Interior and Justice Ministers’ meeting on 22nd April  1998 in 
which 22 Arab States which were part of the League of Arab States, signed an agreement to 
fight terrorism. This Convention is considered to be not only a significant achievement for 
5 This is the translated name of the Convention from Arabic into English. It is not official and is used in this 
thesis only. This is the nearest translation to ‘Al E’tefakeyah Al Arabiah Le Mokafahat Al Erhab’  
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the Arab States in the fight against terrorism, but is also perhaps the first serious step in 
combating and criminalizing money laundering by Arabic Countries (Fo’aad, 2004). Among 
other  aspects  that  the  Convention  dealt  with  to  counter  terrorism was Article  19  of  this 
Convention, which deals with the seizure of assets and proceeds derived from the offences. 
Accordingly, if it is decided to extradite persons, any contracting state is required to seize and 
hand over to the requesting state, the property used or derived from, or related to, the terrorist 
offence, whether this property is in the offender’s possession or in the possession of a third 
party  (Article  19.a).  And when any property  is  related  to  a  terrorist  offence,  it  shall  be 
submitted to the requesting states, even in situations where the extradited person has not been 
handed over because he is absent, or has died, or for any other reason (Article 19.b). This 
shall all be without prejudice to the rights of any contracting state or of bona fide third parties 
with regard to the property in question (Article 19.c).
3.3.2.2 The Guiding Arabic Draft Law on Countering Money Laundering (amended on  
 August 2002)6
The  (amended)  model,  guiding  Arabic  draft  law  on  Fighting  Money  Laundering, 
appeared in nineteen articles in the Progress and Recommendation Report of the Sixteenth 
Conference of the Heads of Arab Drug Fighting Organizations in Tunis (July 10-11th 2002). 
The previous draft law was introduced during the fourteenth Arab Summit (2000) but faced a 
lot of criticism. Although the model guiding laws are not binding, they represent an important 
guiding source for the nations concerned when enacting or amending their laws. Despite the 
summing up of the 19 amended draft law articles compared with its previous 40 articles, the 
amended draft law managed to rectify many issues and to avoid the criticisms the previous 
draft had faced. On the other hand, some Arab countries had already issued and drawn up 
articles concerning fighting money laundering, while the minority were still proceeding.  
6 This translation of the name of this Convention from Arabic to English is not the official translation, and it is 
the nearest translation to the ‘Mashroo’a Al Arabei Al Namothagee Al Estershadee Le Mokafahat Ghasel Al 
Amwa’al’.
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3.3.2.3 The establishment of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task  
Force (MENAFATF) in 2004
On the 30th November 2004, the Arab counties decided to establish a Financial Action 
Task Force Style Regional Body (FSRB) for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The 
body, known as the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (hereafter 
MENAFATF) was established at an opening Ministerial Meeting held in Manama, Bahrain. 
The MENAFATF is comprised of 14 Arab countries including the members of the GCC. 
These  countries  are  Algeria,  Bahrain,  Egypt,  Jordan,  Kuwait,  Lebanon,  Morocco,  Oman, 
Qatar,  Saudi  Arabia,  Syria,  Tunisia,  the  United  Arab  Emirates  and  Yemen,  and  the 
headquarters is in the Kingdom of Bahrain. The new organization will join other FATF – 
Styled Regional Bodies (FSRBs) which already exist in several regions of the world, as an 
important mechanism of the global network aimed at the implementation of effective anti-
money laundering/counter-terrorist financing (AML/CTF) systems. (See Ministry of Finance, 
Bahrain, 2004)
 The MENAFATF has agreed on the following objectives and will work together to achieve 
them:
• To build effective arrangements throughout the region to combat effectively money 
laundering and terrorist financing in accordance with the particular cultural values, 
constitutional framework and legal systems in the member countries; 
• To  adopt  and  implement  the  40  Recommendations  of  the  FATF  against  money 
laundering; 
• To adopt and implement the Special Recommendations of the FATF against terrorist 
financing; 
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• To implement the relevant UN treaties and agreements and United Nations Security 
Council  Resolutions  dealing  with  countering  money  laundering  and  terrorist 
financing; 
• To  co-operate  to  raise  compliance  with  these  standards  and  measures  within  the 
MENA  Region,  and  to  work  with  other  international  organizations  to  raise 
compliance worldwide; and
• To work together  to  identify money laundering and terrorist  financing issues of a 
regional  nature,  to  share  experiences  of  these  problems,  and  to  develop  regional 
solutions for dealing with them (Ministry of Finance, Bahrain, 2004).
The first plenary meeting of the MENAFATF was held in Beirut in March 2005, and the 
member countries serve as President and Vice-President starting in Arabic alphabetical order. 
The decision to create the MENAFATF was applauded by Mr. Jean-Louis Fort, President of 
the Paris based FATF, who attended the meeting together with representatives of France, the 
United Kingdom, the United States of America, and Cooperation Council for the Arab States 
of the Gulf (FCC), the International Monetary Fund, the Word Bank, the United Nations and 
the Egmont Group, who were all chosen to sit as Observers to the MENAFATF. Finally, the 
MENAFATF enjoy the status of an observer with FATF observer status (Ministry of Finance, 
Bahrain, 2004).  
3.3.2.4 The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and its Anti-Money Laundering Measures
The  Gulf  Cooperation  Council,  commonly  known  as  the  GCC,  was  created  on  4th 
February 1981. It members consists of six counties including Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United States of Emirates. GCC is a regional organization of the Gulf  
States and it deals with a variety of political, economic, social and regional issues. The GCC 
came into existence not only because of the geographical proximity of the Gulf Arab states, 
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but because of the similarity of their culture, language, religion, laws and regulations, social 
and economic conditions.
The basic objectives of the GCC are:
1. To affect co-ordination, integration, and interconnection between member states in all 
fields in order to achieve unity among them.
2. To deepen and strengthen relations, links and areas of co-operation now prevailing 
among their people in various fields.
3. To formulate similar regulations in various fields including the following
o Economic and financial affairs
o Commerce, customs and communications
o Education and culture
o Social and health affairs
o Information and tourism
o Legislative and administrative affairs
4. To stimulate scientific and technological progress in the fields of industry, mining, 
agriculture, water and animal resources, to establish scientific research, to establish 
joint ventures and encourage co-operation by the private sector for the good of their 
people (see GCC, 2009;  FATF.GAFI, 2009).
The GCC member states have always co-operated with international treaties in respect of 
money laundering control. For this reason, none of the member state of the GCC has ever 
been blacklisted as a Non-Cooperative State in respect of combating money laundering by the 
FATF. However, the FATF has expressed concern about the lack of progress in certain areas 
in respect of combating money laundering in its 1998-99 Annual Report. In order to improve 
the anti-money laundering legislation in the Gulf region, the FATF worked closely with GCC 
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member states in order to improve the anti-money laundering measures in their respective 
jurisdictions. The FATF reached an agreement with the GCC in 1997 on how to carry out an 
evaluation of the anti-money laundering measures taken by the GCC member states. In this 
regard,  it  was  agreed  that  the  GCC  member  states  will  complete  a  self-assessment 
questionnaire  and will  return it  to the FATF, along with copies of the relevant  laws and 
regulation about money laundering control (see FATF, Annual Report, 1998-99). Initially, 
only  three  member  states  of  the  GCC  responded  to  the  self-assessment  questionnaire  - 
Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates - while the others responded a few years later. 
Furthermore, the FATF also worked closely with the GCC on how to implement its forty 
Recommendations  for  the  control  of  money laundering  in  the  region (see  FATF Annual 
Report, 1998-99).
3.3.2.5 The GCC Response to International Money Laundering Control Measures
Due  to  the  development  of  anti-money  laundering  measures  in  the  US  and  in  most 
European Countries, money launderers started to look for better places with fewer restrictions 
in order to launder money derived from criminal activities. The Gulf region with its important 
strategic  position  between  the  east  and  the  west,  and  its  increased  involvement  in  the 
international  financial  market,  attracted  launderers to  clean their  dirty money through the 
GCC member states. The advancement in information technology, the internet, and banking 
systems has opened ways, not only for legitimate businesses, but has also eased the job of 
criminals attempting to launder dirty money. The GCC states provide one of the important 
international business market place. With their increased involvement in the global financial 
system,  the  member  of  the  GCC  also  started  to  launch  and  develop  their  anti-money 
laundering measures in order to stop the flow of black money into their financial system.
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In their efforts to combat money laundering, the GCC member states have ratified most of 
the international agreements that target the reduction of the money laundering phenomenon. 
For example, the GCC has ratified the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, adopted in Vienna on the 19th December 1988 
which calls for the criminalization of the proceeds of drugs crimes and others. The GCC 
member  states  have  already  criminalized  money  laundering  through  their  domestic 
legislation.
On the financial sector side, the GCC has examined subsequent international efforts to 
combat money laundering. In this regard, the GCC has adopted the principles issued by the 
Basle  Committee  on  Banking  Regulation  and  Supervisory  Practices  issued  in  December 
1988. The GCC member states are committed to the responsible supervision of their banking 
system in order to prevent  criminals  from using their  banking system for the purpose of 
money laundering. Furthermore, the GCC states have also participated in many conferences 
organized by the United Nations to fight organized crime including drug trafficking, weapons 
smuggling, counter terrorism, currency counterfeiting, etc.
As  has  been  stated  earlier,  the  GCC is  a  member  of  the  FATF  and  has  played  an 
important  role  in  the control  of money laundering  in the Gulf region.  None of the GCC 
member states is on the list  of ‘Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories’  in respect of 
money laundering control. In their fight against money laundering, the GCC member states 
established a Financial Action Task Force Styled Regional Body (FSRB) for the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) on 30th November 2004, which is also known as the Middle East 
and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF). There are 18 member states of 
the  MENAFATF that  meet  frequently.  This  is  a  voluntary  and  cooperative  body  whose 
objective it is to raise compliance of its member states to international standards and to work 
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together  against  money  laundering  and  terrorist  financing  issues  (see  official  website  of 
MENAFATF, 2009).
Also the GCC has ratified the recommendations of the Arabic Convention to Combat the 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs in 1994 held in Tunisia (Ahmad, 2002) which deal with the 
criminalizing  of  money  laundering  activities  through  its  articles  as,  for  example, 
criminalizing the transfer or the movement of money in the knowledge that it is derived from 
any of these crimes, or participating in an effort to conceal, or disguise, the illicit origin of 
these moneys or to attempt to avoid the legal consequences of these activities.
3.3.2.6 The GCC Response to Regional Money Laundering Control Measures
At the regional level, the GCC countries have intensified their efforts to strengthen 
mutual  cooperation  in  order  to  combat  drug  trafficking  and  organized  crime,  and  the 
laundering of money generated by these illegal activities. They have realized the importance 
of  the  negative  effects  of  the  money  laundering  phenomenon  that  threatens  the  entire 
financial system of the Gulf region. In a press report in 2002, the Governor of the Central  
Bank of UAE, Sultan Al Suwaidi, announced the commitment of the GCC countries to the 
fight against money laundering. In his statement in Manama, Al Suwaidi stated that:
Fighting money laundering must start from the source countries which export 
such dirty money. GCC counties, although they do not have sources of such 
money, have the law and regulations  required for fighting such operations 
and putting an end to them. They are also continuously updating such laws 
(see UAE Interact, 2009)
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Al Suwaidi further stressed the importance of international cooperation and argued 
that ‘…there are missing links in such cooperation’ in the fight against money laundering’ 
(UAE Interact, 2009; UAE Interact, 2003).
The Gulf States’ Interior Ministers had already agreed at their meeting on 25 th October 
2000 to the establishment of a common strategic security system that would increase regional 
security for its member states. Furthermore, it was also agreed in the meeting, that the Gulf 
states would cooperate with one another to combat the flood of immigrant, drugs, money 
laundering  and other  organized  crime  that  were  posing  a  threat  to  the  Gulf  community. 
Furthermore, the Interior Ministers have ratified a unified strategy between the members of 
GCC to counter the radicals associated with terrorism. This was announced in the statement 
of the meeting that was held in Manama, Bahrain, on 30th October 2001. In this statement 
they emphasized a strategy that  would consolidate  the collaboration and the exchange of 
information and greater harmonization in the field of action against terrorists and radicals, 
and the consolidation of effort in this area. Also, the participants at this meeting recognized 
an  identical  instruction  for  all  members  of  the  GCC  to  counter  money  laundering, 
emphasizing the importance of coordinating with the international effort in this field.
The GCC has organized a number of joint seminars with the EU in the field of money 
laundering control and combating terrorist financing. In this regard, the first GCC-EU joint 
seminar  was  organized  in  November  2003  for  the  purpose  of  developing  a  continuing 
dialogue  among  member  states  in  both  organizations  in  their  efforts  against  money 
laundering and terrorist financing. Similarly, the Central Bank of the UAE also arranged a 
GCC-EU joint  seminar  on 5-6th March 2005.  In this  seminar,  the participants  exchanged 
views  about  the  laws  and  regulations  regarding  the  combat  of  terrorism  and  financing 
120
terrorism, and reviewed the laws and regulations implemented in the participating countries 
and shared information and experiences.
 Although, the GCC effort to counter money laundering between its member states has 
intensified in the last few years, it was clear that this endeavour was not a new objective for 
the GCC countries. In fact, it started with the foundation of the Council at the commencement 
of the Eighties, when the Security Unit subsidiary of the GCC examined the exchange of 
information  between  member  states,  especially  information  relating  to  big,  suspicious 
transactions  or  deals  carried  out  in  any  Gulf  state  or  Arabic  country  near  the  Gulf. 
Furthermore,  the  mutual  attempt  of  the  Gulf  States  to  endeavour  to  find  some  form of 
restriction  on  foreign  immigrants  which  constitutes  one  source  of  money  laundering 
operations, and the move towards a Gulf single currency will no doubt stimulate and push the 
member states to secure banks and the financial  institutions against any attempted money 
laundering operation which could affect any currency cooperation between the countries.
3.4 Conclusion 
The  unprecedented  actions  that  have  been  taken  by  the  international  community 
during the last  two decades were initiated to combat the significant threat posed by drug 
trafficking and the proceeds of drugs-related activities. However, it was extended from drug 
trafficking to other forms of serious crime in order to undermine the economic power of the 
drug traffickers, organized criminals and other criminal groups. Some of the important steps 
that were taken by the international community to combat money laundering included the 
Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices,  the UN Convention 
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances in December 1988, the 
UN Convention on Transnational Organised Crime 2000, and the creation of the Financial 
Action  Task  Force  (FATF)  in  July  1989  as  a  freestanding  specialist  body  which  could 
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concentrate exclusively on the international fight against money laundering. Furthermore, the 
creation  of  Interpol  as  an  international  police  force  also  shows  the  commitment  of  the 
international community to their fight against transnational organized crime, including money 
laundering. 
The most important aspect of the FATF was indeed the issue of the remarkable forty 
recommendations  in  1990. The main  thrust  of  these recommendations  was to criminalise 
money laundering  and to  strengthen enforcement  and detection  mechanisms.  These  forty 
recommendations were revised in 1996 and in 2003. The new versions have extended the 
scope  of  the  applications  of  the  forty  recommendations  such  as  the  criminalisation  of 
laundering  the  proceeds  of  all  serious  crimes,  broadened  the  scope  of  the  anti-money 
laundering role of banks to non-bank financial institutions and professionals such as lawyers 
and notaries; and toughened the reporting requirements and also strengthened international 
cooperation.
The  initiatives  undertaken  by  the  international  community  through  various 
Conventions for the eradication of money laundering at a global level have facilitated the 
development  of domestic  laws and regulations  in many parts  of the world.  The event  of 
September 11, 2001 accelerated the development and effectiveness of the international anti-
money  laundering  regime  globally  through  various  mechanisms  such  as  the  threat  of 
sanctions through international bodies like the FATF and its members against non-complying 
states or non-cooperative jurisdictions. There was a huge moral and political pressure from 
the international community for the strict enforcement of anti-money laundering mechanisms, 
such that it was hard for any country to resist compliance with these international standards.
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Along with the global effort,  there are also many regional bodies that are fighting 
against money laundering. In this chapter, we have examined the regional efforts made by the 
European Union and the GCC in combating money laundering.  The European Union has 
undertaken  substantial  efforts  against  money  laundering  control  such  as  the  Council  of 
Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation from the Proceeds of 
Crime 1990, the EU Directives on Money Laundering Control and the creation of a European 
police force – Europol – that is responsible for the fight against organized crime. Finally, the 
GCC has played an important role in the Gulf region with regard to the control of organized 
crime in general, and money laundering in particular.
To what extent the measures taken by the international community, regional bodies 
and national states have solved the problem of organized crime and money laundering is not 
known. It is extremely difficult  to estimate exactly how much money is being laundering 
every year. There are estimated figures available that clearly show the scale and intensity of 
money laundering problems, and the difficulties in controlling it. However, it is important to 
remember that the constant removal of the economic base of organized criminals will convey 
a general message to all that crime does not pay.  This might help to deter people from future 
crimes. In this regard, Sproat (2007:176) was right to argue that ‘…the logic suggest that, a 
comprehensive, effective and routine application of financial investigation and asset removal 
would prevent, or at least,  disrupt criminals from attempting to run their enterprises from 
behind bars or after they are released’. It will also encourage law enforcement officers to 
continue to work against organized criminals when they see these criminals behind bars and 
not  benefiting  from  their  criminal  activities.  Overall,  it  will  have  a  positive  social  and 
economic impact on society, and it will also build public confidence in the criminal justice 
system.
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 Chapters 1-3 have raise the important issues that form a background to this study namely:
• That defining organised crime has been problematic and the  nature and extent of 
organised crimes and money laundering  are unknown because of the global nature of 
these crimes and the sophisticated methods employed by those who engage in them. 
• That  the international,  regional  and local  measures that  have been put in  place to 
control money laundering are sound in theory but there is yet no study of how they 
operate in practice in individual countries.
This thesis examines how the Dubai government is talking the money laundering problem in 
the country focusing on how effective the measure put in place are in combating the problem. 
The research questions (listed on page 1) show that the focus of the research is on the role 
that the Dubai currently play and should play in the process. 
The next chapter will look at the research methodology and research techniques used 
in addressing the research question. 
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Chapter Four
The Research Methodology
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter will discuss how the research for this thesis was conducted, focusing on the 
research method, the data collection techniques and the strategies used. It will also consider 
the rationale behind the choice of methods and approaches taken. The choice of a particular 
research method entails  a host of assumptions concerning the nature,  type and quality  of 
knowledge that can be obtained. For instance, the nature of the relationship between theory 
and  research,  in  particular  whether  theory  guides  research  (the  deductive  approach)  or 
whether theory is an outcome of research (the inductive approach); epistemological issues - 
the question of whether or not a natural science model of the research process is suitable for 
the study of the social world; and ontological issues - the question whether the social world is 
regarded as something external to social actors or as something that people are in the process 
of fashioning (see Bryman, 2004). 
4.1. The Nature of Theory and Research
It is imperative to highlight the fact that social research does not exist in a vacuum or in a 
bubble.  It is not hermetically sealed off from the social sciences and the various intellectual 
allegiances  as  some  practitioners  hold  (Bryman,  2004).   In  order  to  address  this  rather 
contentious and imperative question, Bryman (2004) identified two key issues that are of 
particular relevance. First, methods of social research are closely tied to different visions of 
how social reality should be studied. By so doing, it is clear that methods are not neutral, but 
are  intrinsically  linked  with  the  ways  in  which  social  scientists  envision  the  connection 
between  different  viewpoints  about  the  nature  of  social  reality,  and  how  it  should  be 
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examined. Second, there is the question of how research methods and practice connect with 
the  wider  social  scientific  enterprise.  What  the  second  assumption  demonstrates  is  that 
research is invariably undertaken in relation to something - the something may be a burning 
social problem, or more usually a theoretical exploration
The questions that arise from the two assumptions above are (1) is research entirely dictated 
by theoretical concerns?  If that is the case, (2) what sort of theory is one talking about? and 
(3) is data collected to test or to build theories?  In order to address these questions it is 
pertinent to examine ‘what type of theory’ or positions of theory we are concerned with, and 
how that  relates  to  this  research.  Whist  there are  different  definitions  of theory,  Bryman 
(2004) argued that it is indeed an explanation of observed regularities. In social science we 
have  what  Merton  (1967)  referred  to  as  middle  range  and  grand  theory,  with  the  latter 
operating at  a more abstract  and general  level  (Bryman,  2004).  However,  Merton (1967) 
argues  that  grand theories  are  of  limited  use in  connection  with social  research.  Instead, 
middle-range theories are ‘…intermediate to general theories of social systems which are too 
remote from particularly classes of social behaviour, organisation and change to account for 
what  is  observed  and  to  those  detailed  orderly  descriptions  of  particular  that  are  not 
generalised at all’ ( Merton, 1967:39). 
The argument that Merton (1967) puts forward is that middle range theories are much more 
likely  to be the focus of empirical  enquiry.  Unlike grand theories,  middle  range theories 
operate  in  a  limited  domain,  whether  it  is  juvenile  delinquency,  racial  prejudice  or 
educational attainment (Bryman, 2004).  According to Bryman (2004), middle range theories 
vary in their range of application.   For example,  labelling theory represents middle range 
theory in the sociology of deviance. Its exponents sought to understand deviance in terms of 
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the causes and effects of societal reaction to deviation, and it was held to be applicable to a 
variety  of  different  forms  of  deviance,  including  crime  and  mental  illness.  By  contrast, 
Cloward and Ohlin’s (1960) differential  association theory was formulated specifically  in 
connection with juvenile delinquency and, in subsequent years, this tended to be its focus 
(cited  in  Bryman,  2004:6).   Thus,  middle  range  theories  fall  somewhere  between  grand 
theories and empirical findings, and they represent attempts to understand and explain limited 
aspects of social life and reality.  
What the discussions above demonstrate is that both middle range and grand theories have 
not been able to resolve or clarify what theory is, and this is due to the fact that the term 
theory is frequently used in a manner which means little more than the background literature 
in an area of social enquiry (Bryman, 2004). However, the position of the researcher here is 
to  demonstrate  that  the  research  sets  out  to  answer  questions  posed  by  theoretical 
considerations  around  policing.  In  this  sense,  the  theoretical  approach  that  guided  this 
research  is  deductive  theory.  It  is  clear  from  the  discussions  in  Chapters  1  and  2  that 
organised crime, and particularly money laundering, is an international problem and that an 
increasing number of the world’s security services and police forces, together with the United 
Nations, are involved in its policing, prevention and control.  It will, obviously, be impossible 
to  research  how  the  world’s  police  forces  are  policing  money  laundering,  but  an 
understanding of the role of the police in controlling the crime can be obtained from the study 
of how a particular police force deals with the problem. This study is about how the Dubai 
Police tackle money laundering. 
Deductive theory is principally used in sociology or social science to guide empirical inquiry 
(Merton, 1967). This approach adopted the following structure: (1) theory (2) hypotheses (3) 
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data collection (4) findings (5) hypotheses confirmed or rejected and (6) revision of theory. 
This brings into force the idea of research questions. Empirical research is driven by research 
questions. According to Miles and Huberman (1994:55) developing research questions is a 
valuable defence against the confusion and overload that is possible in the early stages of 
research.   Essentially,  research  questions  are  central,  whether  they  are  pre-specified  or 
whether they unfold during the project. According to Punch (2005), research questions do 
five main things (1) they organise the project, and give it direction and coherence (2) they 
delimit the project, showing its boundaries (3) they keep the researcher focused during the 
project (4) they provide a framework for writing up the project and (5) they point to the data  
that will be needed. 
The overarching aim of this study is to examine and evaluate the nature and extent of the 
money laundering problem in the UAE. It analyses and explores the efforts  made by the 
Dubai government to address the problems of money laundering. Drawing on both regional 
and international conventions to which the Dubai government is a signatory, the research 
explores the issues around partnership working, intelligence sharing and effective policing. 
Therefore,  on the  one hand,  the  thesis  sets  out  to  understand how the  UAE government 
regulates its financial sector by imposing anti-money laundering legislations upon financial 
and non-financial institutions, and by criminalizing the money laundering activities. On the 
other hand, the thesis explores international cooperation between the UAE government and 
other jurisdictions, with the sole purpose of knowing the procedure for identifying, tracing 
and freezing illegal money. In this context, it will examine how effective the existing rules 
and regulations and state mechanism of the UAE government are in order to combat money 
laundering problems, and whether reforms are needed to the existing laws. The research aims 
are complemented by the following questions:
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1. What are the limitations of existing rule, mechanisms and regulations in relation to 
money laundering in the UAE?
2. What  are  the  implications  of  regional  and  international  conventions  on  money 
laundering in the UAE? 
3.  What are the links between money laundering and terrorism?
4. What role does the Dubai Police play in the control of money laundering, and how 
effective is it in this role. 
4.2 The Rationale for Choosing a Case Study Approach
The research approach taken for this study is a case study approach. In this section, I argue 
that the case study method is a viable method for my research, despite the misunderstanding 
and stereotyping of the method as a weak offshoot of the social sciences.  Yin (2003) argues 
that  the  case  study  method  has  advantages  over  other  research  designs  in  the  following 
circumstances: when ‘how?’ and ‘why? ‘questions are being posed, when the investigator has 
little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some 
real-life context (Yin, 2003:1). The case study method also helps to retain the holistic and 
meaningful  characteristics  of  real-life  situations  such  as  the  individual  life  cycle, 
organisational and managerial processes, neighbourhood change, international relations and 
the maturation of industries (ibid:2),  while at the same time recognising its complexities and 
contexts. The dictionary of sociological terms defines a case study as: 
A method of studying social phenomena through the thorough analysis of an 
individual case. The case may be a person, a group, an episode, a process a 
community, a society, or any other unit of social life. All data relevant to the 
case are gathered, and all available data are organised in terms of the case. The 
case  study  method  gives  a  unitary  character  to  the  data  being  studied  by 
interrelating a variety of facts to a single case. It also provides an opportunity 
for the intensive analysis of many specific details that are often overlooked with 
other methods. (Theodorson and Theodorson, 1969, cited in Punch, 2005:145)
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Punch (2005) identifies four main characteristics of case studies from the definition provided 
by Theodorson and Theodorson (1969).  First, the case is a ‘bounded system’; second, the 
case is a case of something; third, there is an explicit attempt to preserve the wholeness, unity 
and integrity of the case; and fourth, multiple sources of data and multiple data are likely to 
be used, typically in a naturalistic setting ( ibid: 145). 
Yin  (2003:13-14)  defined  a  case  study  as  an  empirical  inquiry  that  investigates  a 
contemporary  phenomenon  within  its  real-life  context,  especially  when  the  boundaries 
between the phenomenon and the context are not clearly evident. His definition was further 
elaborated in a second set of conditions. The case study enquiry copes with the technically 
distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points, 
and as one result relies on multiple sources of evidence, with the data needing to converge in 
a triangulating fashion, and as another result (Yin, 2003: 14); and benefits from the prior 
development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis (Yin, 2003: 14). 
This  at  once  distinguishes  case  study  research  not  only  from  experimental  and  quasi-
experimental designs, which aim to divorce the phenomenon under study from its context, 
but also from historical research, which does not study contemporary events, and surveys, 
which  attempt  to  limit  the  number  of  variables  under  investigation   (Bergen and While, 
2000).   Miles  and  Huberman  (1994)  view  a  case  study  as  a  phenomenon  of  some sort 
occurring in a bounded context. Thus, the ‘case’ may be an individual, or a role, or a small 
group, or an organisation, or a community, or a nation. It could also be a decision, or a policy, 
or a process, or an incident or event of some sort, and there are other possibilities as well. 
Stake (1988) argues that a case study is a ‘…study of a bounded system, emphasising the 
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unity and wholeness  of that  system, but  confining the  attention  to  those aspects  that  are 
relevant to the research problem at the time’ (Ibid: 258).  
The main reason for using the case study method is  due to the distinctive place that  the 
method occupies in evaluation research.  This research involves the evaluation of approaches 
to  the policing of money laundering in  Dubai.   In addition,  the case study approach can 
provide an in-depth understanding of the problematic, and is quite useful for testing theories. 
According  to  Yin  (2003),  the  single  case  can  be  used  to  determine  whether  a  theory’s 
propositions  are  correct,  or  whether  some alternative  set  of  explanations  might  be  more 
relevant.   A single case study can also make a significant contribution to knowledge and 
theory  building  (Ibid:  40).  The  case  study  approach  can  help  to  capture  the  unique 
circumstances and conditions of an everyday or commonplace situation, and allows for  the 
development  of  a  holistic  “thick  description”  (Geertz,  1973),  which  encourages  the 
understanding of how participants interpret their experiences and what is happening to them 
in the study area. 
However,  despite  the  advantages  of  the  case  study  research  approach,  a  series  of 
methodological  issues have been raised in terms of its  desirability  as a research strategy. 
Hammersley,  Gomm and Foster (2000) identified four main problems associated with the 
case study approach: 
The first issue, and perhaps the greatest concern about the case study method, relates to the 
question of generalizability, that is, the notion that findings from a specific case study cannot 
be generalised to a wider population. This has been counteracted by other arguments such as 
by those who argue that the aims of case study research should be to capture cases in their 
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uniqueness, rather than to use them as a basis for wider generalisation or theoretical inference 
of some kind. Some have argued that what is involved is a kind of inference or generalisation 
that is quite different in character from statistical analysis, being ‘logical’, or ‘theoretical’ or 
‘analytical’ in character (Yin, 2003). Others suggest that there are ways in which case studies 
can be used to make what are, in effect, the same kinds of generalizations as those which 
survey research produces. Still others argue that case studies need not make any claims about 
the generalisability of their findings, that what is crucial is the use others make of it; that they 
feed into processes of ‘naturalistic generalization’ or facilitate the ‘transfer’ of findings from 
one setting to another on the basis of fit (Cronbach, 1975; Guba and Lincoln, 1989, 1984; 
Donmoyer, 2000; Lincoln and Guba, 2000; Stake, 1994); and that ‘…the only generalisation 
is;  there  is  no  generalisation’  (Lincoln  and  Guba,  2000).  In  this  situation  Stake  (1994) 
suggested  that,  by  contrast  with  naturalistic  generalization,  abstract  propositional 
generalizations  of  the  kind  aimed  at  by  conventional  social  science  can  be  harmful  in 
practical terms: false laws distract attention from direct experience and may lead people to 
oversimplify matters. Flyvbjerg (2006:228) took an extreme position by contending that one 
can generalise on the basis of a single or multiple case studies, and that the case may be 
central to scientific development via generalization as a supplement or alternative to other 
methods. Flyvbjerg (2006) also noted that the case study method is ideal for generalizing, 
using the type of test that Karl Popper (1959) called “falsification”. Falsification is one of the 
most rigorous tests to which a scientific proposition can be subjected: if just one observation 
does not fit with the proposition, it is considered not valid generally, and must therefore be 
either revised or rejected. Popper used the now famous example “all swans are white” and 
proposed that just one observation of a single black swan would falsify this proposition and, 
in this way, would have general significance and would stimulate further investigations and 
theory building. Therefore, the case study method is well suited for identifying “black swans” 
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because  of  its  in-depth  approach:  what  appears  to  be  “white”  often  turns  out,  on  closer 
examination, to be “black” (Flyvbjerg, 2006). However, the purpose of this research is not to 
generalise but to conceptualise. 
The  second issue relates to the extent to which the case study method is able to identify 
causal processes. The author contends that it is possible, particularly with the use of a single 
case study method, to identify processes in a way that is not feasible in survey research, 
because case studies are studied in depth and over time, rather than at a single point. It is also  
often argued that, by contrast with experiments, case study research can investigate causal 
processes ‘in the real world’ rather than in artificially created settings. Other formulations of 
this argument emphasise that outcomes can always be reached by multiple pathways, so that 
narrative accounts of events in particular cases are essential if we are to understand those 
outcomes (Hammersley, Gomm and Foster, 2000). 
The third concern relates to what Hammersley, Gomm and Foster (2000) referred to as ‘the 
nature of theory’. This issue relates to whether theory developed from the case study can be 
utilised to explain processes beyond the confines of the initial case. However, all research 
methods are subject to this limitation (Yin, 2003). According to Hammersley, Gomm and 
Foster (2000), while many case study researchers emphasise the role of theory, they differ in 
their views about the nature of the theoretical perspectives required. For some it must be a 
theory which makes sense of the case as a bounded system. Here, the emphasis is on cases as 
unique configurations that can only be understood as wholes. For others, the task of theory is 
more to locate and explain what goes on within a case in terms of its wider societal context. 
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The fourth and final concern relates to the authenticity and authority of case study research. 
As Devine and Heath (1999) argue,  researchers  who regard case studies as reflecting  an 
‘objective  truth’  are  perilously  close to suggesting that  there is  only one form of ‘social 
reality’. But, they also cite Bryman (1988), who argues that it is in the spirit of the case study 
method to accept that contradictory results may occur (Bryman 1988 cited in Devine and 
Heath, 1999). However, the problems identified above can be avoided if the limitations of 
any particular research method are taken into consideration throughout the research process. 
Despite these concerns, the case study method is considered the most appropriate research 
strategy for this study. The decision to undertake a case study approach was based on the 
aims and objectives of this research endeavour. The reasons for preferring the case study 
approach over others such as a survey, was mainly because the study is concerned with those 
institutions  and people i.e.  police officers  and bank officials,  who have been involved in 
tackling the money laundering problem in the UAE. In addition, the nature of the problem 
under  study  requires  uncovering  in-depth  information  which  could  reflect  all  possible 
dimensions of the problem. Therefore, it would be difficult to obtain such information by 
using other research methods. The case study method is said to be a microscopic study which 
looks  at  the  phenomenon  at  a  very  close  range  (Hakim,  1989).  Its  investigations  are 
considered to be more intensive and in-depth compared with surveys. In addition, one of the 
main characteristic of the case study method is its flexibility in terms of utilizing different 
data  collection  methods  such  as  in-depth  interviews,  questionnaires,  observations  and 
statistical techniques (Punch, 2005).
134
4.3 Data Collection Strategies 
A mixed method data collection approach was used in this study.  These methods ranged 
from  highly  structured  to  unstructured  in-depth  techniques,  including  analysing  official 
documents.  In  the  social  sciences,  most  researchers  use  the  multi-method  approach  for 
gathering data from the field. This process is called triangulation (Jupp, 2001). It is believed 
that  by  adopting  diverse  methods  of  data  collection,  this  will  counterbalance  any  bias 
associated with an individual research method and will consequently produce more reliable 
and accurate information (King, 2000).  In this study, the following research techniques were 
employed in order to collect data. 
(a) Policy and documentary analysis
(b) Semi-structured interviews with key actors
(c) Observations
4.3.1 Policy and Documentary Analysis
Documentary  information  is  relevant  and  plays  an  important  role  in  any data  collection 
process, particularly in case study research. A range of policy and operational documents will 
be collected from police forces for analysis.  Official documents are often factual because 
they provide ideas and queries that cannot be pursued by other research methods such as 
interviews and questionnaires.  In other words, documentary analysis can guide the researcher 
in terms of  what to look for, or to confirm using other research methods. 
Documentary data can also be used to corroborate and augment evidence obtained from other 
sources such as interviews. Vice versa, the information obtained from other methods such as 
the interviews could provide insight into the existence of and the need to locate, additional 
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documents. Furthermore, inferences can be drawn from documents. However, Yin (2003: 87) 
warned that inferences should be treated only as clues worthy of further investigation rather 
than as definitive findings, because the inferences could later turn out to be false leads (ibid: 
87).  Most  importantly,  as  police  work  is  often  guided  by  documents,  the  value  of 
documentary analysis to this research cannot be underestimated. Where the documents are 
recordings  of  events  that  had taken place,  I  will  not  assume that  the  documents  provide 
accurate, comprehensive and unbiased records of events. It is important as a researcher using 
documents to pay particular attention to the selection of documents in order to avoid bias.  
Although researchers have been critical of the potential over-reliance on documents in case 
study research, this is probably because the casual investigator may mistakenly assume that 
all documents contain the unmitigated truth (see Yin, 2003). Considering the nature of this 
research (police research) official documents are very important because they provide a ‘rich 
vein  for  analysis’  (Hammersley  and  Atkinson,  1995:  173).  Again,  the  strength  of  the 
documentary  data  are  that  they  are  stable  and  can  be  repeatedly  reviewed,  while  the 
collection process is unobtrusive as the documents are not created as a result of the research 
but are exact in the sense that they are published and in the public domain. Documents will 
also prove useful in terms of policy review and analysis, which is an important aspect of this 
research.  
Official documents were used both at the initial stage and were also consulted throughout the 
research study. Official documents were used to identify the rules and regulations imposed on 
banks, and on financial and non-financial institutions to regulate their financial matters.  The 
official documents used were drawn from the following:
• Anti-Money Laundering and Suspicious Cases Unit (AMLSCU) of the Central Bank 
of the UAE
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• Anti-Organised Crime Department (AOCD) of the Dubai Police Force
• Financial Action Task Force  (FATF)
• United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime
• International Monetary Fund
• International Money Laundering Information Network 
4.3.2 Semi-Structured Interviews and the Interview Process
Much has been written about what constitutes an interview as well as the different types of 
interviews  such  as  structured,  semi-structured  and  unstructured  interviews  (Kahn  and 
Cannell, 1957; Patton, 1990; Silverman, 2000, 2004a, 2004b; Bryne 2004; Bryman, 2004). 
Kahn and Cannell (1957) define interviews as a purposeful discussion between two or more 
people. Patton (1990) distinguishes three main types of interview: the formal conversational 
interview, the general interview guided approach and the standardised open-ended interview. 
Merriam (1998a & 1998b) distinguished different  types  of  interviews  using a  continuum 
ranging from highly structured, standardized, questionnaire-type interviews at one end, to the 
unstructured, exploratory types of interview at the opposite end. The different terms used to 
qualify interviews tend to be used loosely,  and sometimes interchangeably,  which can be 
confusing. 
Interviews are an essential source of case study evidence because most case studies are about 
human affairs.  Well  informed respondents  can provide important  insights  into a  situation 
(Yin, 2003: 93).  They can also provide shortcuts to the prior history of the situation, helping 
the researcher to identify other relevant sources of evidence (Ibid: 93) 
The researcher believes that the semi-structured interview is the most appropriate method to 
use in order to achieve the aims and objectives of this research. Semi-structured interviews 
are attractive because of the opportunity they provide to probe deeply, uncover new clues, 
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open new dimensions of a problem and secure accurate, inclusive accounts based on personal 
experience (Palmer 1928 in Burgess 1982:107).  The information generated through semi-
structured interviews will provide rich, in-depth material  that gives the researcher a fuller 
understanding  of  the  police  and  other  key  actors’  perspectives  on  the  topic  under 
investigation (Arksey, 2004). The advantage of the semi-structured interview also lies in the 
open-ended  nature  of  questions  which  allow  for  additional  information  and  discussion 
between  the  interviewee  and  the  interviewer.  The  interviewees  should  be  given  enough 
opportunity to expand on their answers and explore an issue fully. The questions should be 
worded  in  an  open-ended  way,  in  order  to  encourage  the  interviewees  to  express  their 
opinions, as well as to have the opportunity to elaborate on their views and their perceptions 
of issues associated with the research. This builds trust and encourages rapport.  
The  semi-structured  interview  is  comprised  of  exploratory  questions  framed  around  the 
study’s research questions. Thus, the interviews in this research focused on issues such as the 
laws, regulations, strategies and procedures; the nature of cooperation with other institutions; 
definitions of money laundering (personal vs. official); the nature and extent (scope) of the 
problem; the successes or failures of the different measures to combat money laundering, and 
the  links  to  other  forms of  organised  crime and terrorism.  The interview questions  were 
divided into the following sections. 
Section – I: Experience and training in money laundering  
Section – II: Criminalisation of money laundering
Section – III: Combating money laundering 
Section IV: Anti-money laundering treaties: regional and international
Section V: Know your customer policy (Bank Managers only)
Section – VI: Supervision and Monitoring of Banks (Central Bank officials only)
Section – VII: Detection and Prosecution of Money Laundering Cases (Dubai Police 
officers only)
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Section – VIII: Money laundering case load (Dubai Police officers only)
Section – XI: Coordination between the Central Bank and the Dubai Police
Section – X: Effectiveness of anti-money laundering measures 
The interviews as part of the data collection process were conducted on a face-to-face basis, 
tape recorded and lasted for half an hour. The use of audio tape was to counteract problems 
associated with an interview, which are the ability of the researcher to listen carefully and the 
researchers’ bias in the interpretation of the data. The use of tape recordings also aided the 
listening  process  and  gave  an  opportunity  for  an  unbiased  record  of  the  conversation. 
According to Easterby-Smith et al. (2003), good audio recordings are essential for accurate 
transcripts and they also enable the researcher to listen again to the interview so that he/she 
may  hear  again  points  that  may  have  been  missed  during  the  interview,  as  a  means  of 
ensuring the reliability and validity of the research. All the interviewees were advised of the 
tenor of the issues to be addressed in advance, or just prior to the interview. The researcher 
provided an information sheet detailing the aims of the research, and the structure of the 
interviews. However the interview questions were piloted. The following section gives the 
details of the piloting process.
4.3.3. Pilot Study 
Piloting or pre-testing the research instrument is an important and necessary component of 
social  science research.  Although pilots  are uncommon in case studies,  it  was considered 
necessary in this case because of the sensitivity of the research topic. It was essential to test 
whether it would be feasible to carry out the survey and how to deal with potential problems. 
The pilot study involved administering the questionnaire to a sample population similar to 
that which will ultimately be interviewed on a full scale basis (see Burns, 2000). Piloting the 
research instrument was also essential in order to reveal any confusion that may exist in the 
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questionnaire. Pilots are also used to check the order of the questions including the need to 
avoid the repetition of questions and checking the length of the questionnaire as well (see 
Punch, 2005).
Thus, after the approval the final draft of the questionnaire and with the permission of the 
research supervisor,  the questionnaire  was pre-tested.  To this  end, four individuals in the 
form of officials of the UAE Central Bank, the Dubai Police and managers of commercial 
banks were interviewed. The pilot study was completed in December 2008.
The pilot study went smoothly as all of the respondents cooperated to the extent that they 
were able. All of the interviews in the pilot study were conducted via telephone and were also 
recorded with the prior permission of the respondents.  Personally,  I  enjoyed interviewing 
them and also was able to obtain valuable information from them which would be helpful as 
part of my analysis. 
The  overall  response  of  the  respondents  was  very  encouraging.  I  was  told  by  many 
respondents that it was the first time that they had been interviewed with regard to such an 
important  issue  concerning the  UAE.  They knew about  government  policies  in  terms  of 
controlling the money laundering problem, but it was their first experience of discussing such 
an important matter with a PhD student. They promised me any type of cooperation in view 
the importance of the problem under consideration.  
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However, there were some important points which were raised by the respondents: 
1. During the course of the pilot study, I found that some respondents were not comfortable 
during the interview process. Although I explained to every respondent at the start  of 
interview the purpose of the study and the confidentiality of their responses, , on some 
occasions I felt that they were not comfortable answering my questions. Their unease was 
with regard to those questions which were related to providing statistics about money 
laundering cases. The two respondents from the Central Bank refused to respond to all  
such questions. They suggested that it would be necessary to obtain prior permission from 
their Head Office before they would be able to give me any data about money laundering 
cases.
2. All the respondents required an official letter from my research supervisor should I have 
to contact them in future to collect any type of information related to money laundering. 
According to them, the letter should explain the nature of the study and also my student 
status. Any such request for an interview should come through the proper channels, i.e. 
via the head of the institute which would make it easier for the respondents to openly 
express their views about the problem being studied.
3. One of the big demands from all  the respondents from all  three categories was to be 
interviewed face-to-face  instead of by telephone.  In their  opinion,  they could express 
themselves more openly when interviewed face-to-face than being interviewed via the 
telephone. Consequently, all respondents were interviewed on a face-to-face basis as part 
of the actual data collection process.  
4. The timing of the interview was not an issue. Generally, all interviews were completed 
within  half  an  hour.  In  addition,  no  respondent  complained  about  the  time  taken  to 
complete the interviews. 
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As I  mentioned earlier,  the interview process  went  well  and I  had no major  problem in 
interviewing my respondents for the pilot study. There were certain issues in identifying and 
processing  the  money  laundering  cases.  For  example,  the  identification  of  a  money 
laundering  case  is  the  job  of  the  Central  Bank  staff.  They  are  also  responsible  for 
investigating the suspected cases.  The Dubai  police has a very limited  role  in the whole 
process.  They  will  arrest  the  accused  person  only  when  they  have  obtained  sufficient 
evidence from the Central Bank staff. As far as the cooperation between the Central Bank and 
the Dubai police is concerned, generally it is good, but there is a lot of politics involved. If, 
for example, the Dubai police found a suspected money launderer, they cannot process the 
case without the due cooperation of the Central Bank staff as the Dubai police need evidence 
against the accused person which only the Central  Bank can provide. The officials of the 
Central Bank, on the other hand, do not cooperate properly because they consider it as an 
example  of their  own inefficiency if  the Dubai police  are allowed to initiate  a  suspected 
money laundering case. For this reason, the Dubai police have no option but to always look to 
the Central Bank to take the initiative against a suspected money launderer. The study reveals 
that there is a possibility of departmental jealousy between the Central Bank and the Dubai 
Police 
4.3.4 Observation
Observation  is  one  of  the  most  widely  used  methods  in  qualitative  research.  Personal 
observation is a vital tool in the sense that the researcher comes to know about many other 
issues which have not been communicated verbally. Along with using the main tool of data 
collection, it is important to record observations because it helps facilitate the analysis of the 
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data (Flick, 1998). The advantages of using observation includes that fact that it takes place 
in  the  real  world,  provides  a  detailed  rounded picture  of  a  social  phenomenon,  the  data 
collected are deemed to be reliable, to have high validity, and to be very rich (Matthews and 
Ross, 2010). Bearing in mind the importance of observation in qualitative research, I took 
notes during the course of the data collection. In this regard, a research diary was used to 
record  all  the  relevant  observations.  It  is  important  to  note  that  it  was  non-participant 
observation. The observation took place in the Dubai Police money laundering department 
and the Central Bank of the UAE.
4.4 Sampling
Sampling is an important step in social science research which often varies according 
to the nature of the study. In this study, a non-probability sampling method was employed in 
terms of the selection of the respondents. The main reason for of using a non-probability 
sampling approach is not statistical, but comes from the purposeful selection of respondents 
that can provide in-depth and rich information on the issues related to the study. Some of the 
interviewees for this research were selected by purposive sampling on the basis of having 
specific  characteristics  and  qualities  relevant  to  the  study.  As  Neuman  (2000)  stated, 
purposive sampling is often used when working with very small  samples such as in case 
study research.  Similarly,  Matthews  and Ross  (2010)  highlighted  the  fact  that  purposive 
sampling is generally associated with small, in-depth studies with research designs that are 
based  on  the  gathering  of  qualitative  data  and  are  focused  on  the  exploration  and 
interpretation  of  experiences  and  perceptions  and  that  this  includes  case  studies,  cross-
sectional studies, ethnographic and grounded theory designs.  Thus, with purposive sampling, 
there  is  no attempt  to  create  a  sample  that  is  statistically  representative  of  a  population. 
Rather,  people or cases are chosen ‘with purpose’ to enable the researcher to explore the 
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research questions or develop a theory (Matthews and Ross, 2010). Cases are selected on the 
basis  of characteristics  or experiences  that  are directly  related to  the researcher’s  area of 
interest, and this allows the researcher to study the area in depth (see Matthews and Ross 
2010).  The samples were drawn from bank officials and those of other agencies who are 
responsible for money laundering control as discussed below.
4.5. The Research Participants
This study involves the collection of data from three different types of respondents. These 
include Bank Managers, officials of the Anti-Organized Crime Department (AOCD) of the 
Dubai Police and of the Anti-Money Laundering and Suspected Cases Unit (AMLSCU) of 
the Central Bank of the UAE. In this regard, ten bank managers and fifteen officials from 
each of the Dubai Police Force and the Central  Bank of the UAE were interviewed. The 
Dubai Police Force has a special  branch entitled the ‘Anti-Organized Crime Department’ 
which deals with all kinds of organized crimes including the problem of money laundering. 
In  this  research,  fifteen  officials  from  the  Anti-Organized  Crime  Department  were 
interviewed.  These  officials  are  those  who  are  actively  engaged  in  fighting  the  money 
laundering problem in Dubai. Similarly, the Central Bank of the UAE has a special branch 
which tries to trace and eradicate the money laundering problem. This branch is entitled the 
‘Anti-Money Laundering and Suspicious Cases Unit’. In this research, fifteen officials were 
interviewed from this department who were specialists in dealing with combating the money 
laundering problem.  The section of respondents was based on the simple fact that these are 
the people who could provide the information that would answer the researcher’s research 
questions.  The success of the money laundering control process in Dubai will depend not 
only  on  what  legal  and  regulatory  provisions  exist  but  how  they  are  used  and,  more 
importantly, how those who are entrusted with the tasks see their roles vis-à-vis the others. 
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 4.6. Research Ethics 
The  Economic  and  Social  Research  Council  (2009)  defines  research  ethics  as  the  moral 
principles guiding research, from its inception through to the completion and publication of 
results and beyond (cited in Matthews and Ross 2010:71). Every research study poses some 
ethical  issues and it  is important  to know and understand them. These issues are usually 
related to the promise of anonymity and confidentiality with regard to the respondents, their 
identities,  and  the  need  for  informed  consent  (Noaks  and  Wincup,  2004).  The  basis  of 
informed consent  is  making sure  that  people  who are going to  take part  in  the research 
understand what  they are consenting to  participate  in (Matthews and Ross 2010).  In this 
research, an effort was made to keep the identity of all the respondents secret. The researcher 
did not use the names, designation, places of work and/or any other information which could 
reveal the identity of the respondents. The respondents were informed about the secrecy of 
their identity before an interview request was made to them. This in turn helped to create an 
open and favourable environment for the interview which was conducive to gathering reliable 
and accurate information. 
4.7 Access to the Study Area
Gaining access to the study area is always a crucial issue in social research. Access to the 
field area is usually  gained after identifying the ‘gatekeepers’  who, according to Burgess 
(1984:48) ,are those individuals who have the ‘…power to grant or withhold access to people 
or  situations  for  the  purpose  of  research’.  Access  to  the  field  area  was  gained  by using 
different formal and informal means. As a serving police officer in the Dubai Police,  access 
to the police was not difficult and only requires a formal application to the Head of the Dubai 
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police force.  This made access to the police even easier.  The researcher is convinced that 
there were no reactive effects as the officers saw the positive side of the research and the 
value for themselves as law enforcers dealing with money laundering. Access to the banks 
was also eased by a letter from the relevant authorities.  Neither the banks nor the police saw 
the  research  as  a  ‘police-led’  research.  It  was  made   clear   to  all  respondents  that  the 
researcher is a doctorate student and the aims and objectives of the research were also made 
clear to all of them.
4.8 Conclusion 
This chapter highlights how the study was designed and the means by which data was 
collected. The study was carried out in Dubai where police officers from the Dubai Police 
Force alongside other key actors and stakeholders who were actively engaged in combating 
money laundering in the banks were interviewed. Using different research methods, efforts 
were made to obtain a comprehensive picture of the phenomenon under consideration and to 
answer the research questions. The subsequent chapters are based on information and data 
obtained during the field work and the issues that arose from them.  
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Chapter Five
The Legal, Political and Inter-Agency Arrangements for the Policing of 
Money Laundering in Dubai
5.0 Introduction
In  Chapters  Two and  Three,  I  discussed  the  international  legal  and  other  statutory 
arrangements for policing trans-national organised crime generally, and money laundering in 
particular.  Whilst the two chapters explained the position of Dubai and the UAE in these 
arrangements, this chapter discusses the political and legal arrangements in place in Dubai for 
the policing of money laundering.
 As I mentioned in Chapter Two, Dubai is a signatory to all United Nations directives 
on tackling  organised crime,  money laundering  as  well  as  counter-terrorism.  In addition, 
since 2000, the United Arab Emirates, through its various relevant authorities, has issued and 
implemented laws, regulations and procedures which are in line with the requirements and 
recommendations of the Financial  Action Task Force (FATF) in order to raise awareness 
about risks posed by money laundering and  the financing of terrorism (Gulf News, October 
17,  2009).  In  this  regard,  it  could  be  said  that  the  Central  Bank of  the  UAE has  made 
considerable efforts to tighten its monetary regulations in order to prevent the infiltration of 
illegal and terrorist money into the region’s financial system. 
This  chapter  provides  a  review  of  the  laws  and  other  regulations  relating  to  the 
prevention and control of money laundering in the UAE, based on an analysis of the existing 
literature and the official documents obtained during the fieldwork for this study. The chapter 
analyses  both  the  internal  and  external  factors  that  have  served  as  a  conduit  for  the 
promulgation of money laundering laws in the region. For example, the terrorist attack on the 
USA on September 11th 2001 was a significant external factor with regard to the need to pay 
particular  attention  to  the  criminalisation  of  the  funding  of  terrorism  through  money 
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laundering.  In addition, the chapter examines the organisational arrangements in place for 
the policing of money laundering in the UAE and Dubai, the main components of which are 
the  National  Anti-Money Laundering  Committee  (NAMLC),  the  Anti-Money Laundering 
and Suspicious Cases Unit (the AMLSCU) located in the UAE Central Bank, and the Anti-
Organized Crime Department (AOCD) of the Dubai Police. The roles and responsibilities of 
each of these bodies in the policing of money laundering crime cases are explained.  The 
chapter looks at how these bodies are expected to operate in practice and the powers that each 
has in the policing of money laundering cases. Finally, this chapter discusses some of the 
problems that critics argue are hindering the fight  against  money laundering and terrorist 
financing in the UAE.      
5.1.      UAE Legislative Measures to Combat Money Laundering and the Financing of 
Terrorism
As already mentioned in Chapters Two and Three, the United Arab Emirates is among 
the world states  that  have made attempts  to regulate  its  financial  sectors  and criminalise 
money laundering and the financing of terrorism. Since the Vienna Convention in 1988, the 
Government of the UAE has taken steps that have made it difficult for organized criminals to 
abuse its financial system. The region has taken legal steps to keep illicit proceeds away from 
its financial sector by enacting laws and imposing regulations on banks and other financial 
institutions on what actions to take in a situation in which a customer is suspected of money 
laundering. 
The first anti-money laundering law in the UAE was the Federal Law No. 3 of 1987 
that allowed the State to punish those who acquire or conceal property derived from crime. 
Article 407 of 1987 law states that:
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Whoever  acquires  or  conceals  property  derived  from  crime,  with  full 
awareness of that, without necessarily being involved in its commitment, 
shall  be subject  to  the  penalty  assigned for  that  crime,  from which  he 
knows the property has emanated (see article 407 of 1987 Law)
This law was followed by a number of Central Bank circulars; for example, Central Bank 
Circular No. 14 (1993) which  introduced strict requirements on customer identification for 
persons opening new accounts. The Circular also introduced new requirements for accounts 
that are opened on behalf of charitable organizations in the UAE. In addition, Central Bank 
Circular  No.  163  (1998)  ordered  all  banking  staff  to  monitor  and  report  all  dubious  or 
suspicious transactions with respect to the deposit of cash or third party cheques when there 
are no associated commercial activities (see UAE Interact, 2002a; 2002b)
Efforts to keep ‘dirty money’ out of the UAE’s financial institutions have continued 
unabated. In 2000, the Anti-Money Laundering Regulation (AMLR, 2000) was passed. This 
directive was followed in 2002 by the Federal Anti-Money laundering Law No. 4 Regarding 
the Criminalisation  of Money Laundering -  also known as the Criminalisation  of Money 
laundering  Law,  2002  (CML,  2002)  and  the  Federal  law  No.  1  of  2004  on  Combating 
Terrorism Offences (CTO, 2004). These legal documents show the commitment of the UAE 
Government in taking concrete steps to ensure that its financial system may not be used to 
launder the proceeds of crime.  In addition, the aims of these regulations were to meet the 
international  requirements  for  more  transparency  in  the  financial  sector  (see  the  FAFT 
recommendations in Chapter 3), prevent the infiltration of illegal and terrorist money into the 
financial  sector,  and  enhance  the  cooperation  between  the  financial  sector  and  law 
enforcement agencies.  The IMF has commended the UAE for taking such steps in order to 
combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism (See IMF Staff Report, 2004:46).  
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In the following section, the discussion is focused on the main features of the above-
mentioned regulation and laws (AMLR, 2000, CML, 2002 and CTO 2004) which constitute 
the legislative framework in the UAE against money laundering and terrorist financing.
5.1.1 The Anti-Money Laundering Regulation 2000
The Anti-Money Laundering Regulation 2000 was introduced on 14th November 2000 via 
circular No. 24/2000. The same circular was amended later on 3rd June and 4th November 
2001 via notice No. 1045/2001 and notice No. 2371/2001. The 2000 Regulations obliged all 
financial institutions to take measures to identify money laundering cases and to report all 
suspected money laundering cases to the Anti-Money Laundering and Suspicious Cases Unit 
(the AMLSCU). Gradually, the 2000 Regulations were expanded to include not only financial 
institutions  but also insurance companies,  financial  markets/stockbrokers,  accountants and 
auditors. Thus, the 2000 Regulations meets the international standards introduced through the 
forty recommendations of the FATF and other international conventions and directives on 
money laundering (see Chapter 3). 
Similar provisions are contained in Britain’s Money Laundering Regulations of 1993/1994, 
reviewed  in  2003.1  The  British  Money  Laundering  Regulations  of  2003  extended  the 
statutory obligations of financial institutions to cover ‘…financial services, money transfer 
agents, auditors, external accountants and tax advisors, real estate agents, notaries and other 
1 The  UK  Money-Laundering  Regulations  1993  required  all  banks,  building  societies,  credit  institutions, 
authorised investment businesses (including solicitors and accountants conducting investment business),  life 
insurance businesses, and other undertakings carrying out financial activities listed in the annex to the Banking 
Co-ordination (Second Council Directive) Regulations 1992, to establish and maintain policies, procedures, and 
training  programmes  to  guard  against  their  businesses  being  used  for  the  purpose  of  money-laundering, 
irrespective  of  whether  or  not  money-laundering  has  actually  taken  place.  Failure  to  comply  with  the 
requirements of the Regulations is punishable by up to two years imprisonment, a fine, or both.  This provision 
guided  against  what  might  be  called  “the  culture  of  ignorance"  whereby  institutions  could  deny  "guilty 
knowledge". Institutions may be caught for failing to have proper systems in place. (See Gold and Levi, 1994).  
The  1993  Money  Laundering  Regulations  were  published  in  order  to  ensure  compliance  with  European 
Directives on money laundering.  
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legal professionals acting in any financial or real estate transactions, dealers of high value 
goods (when payment in cash of up to €15,000 is made) and casinos’ (Leong, 2007a:143).
The UAE Anti-Money Laundering Regulation contained five main procedures that 
financial institutions have to comply with in the fight against money laundering:
i. Verify Clients’ Identity -  the ‘Know Your Customer’ procedure 
ii. Report all unusual/suspicious transactions 
iii.  Train staff 
iv. Maintain records and keep files 
v. Apply  the ‘Tipping-off’ procedure
The British Money Laundering Regulations of 2003 (sections 3 – 7) also contained 
similar provisions. 2
In the following sub-sections, the above-mentioned five procedures are discussed in 
detail.
2 For  example,  nominated  officers  have  to  be  allocated  (MLRs,  2003,  s.7),  the  principle  of  Know  Your 
Customer (KYC) must be introduced (MLRs, 2003, s.4), records must be maintained (MLRs, 2003, s.6) and  
staff  need to be trained (MLRs, 2003, s.3.1.c.ii).  Failing to put these provisions into place may result  in a 
criminal conviction and a maximum penalty of two years imprisonment and/or a fine (MLRs, 2003, s.3.2.a). As  
HM Treasury put it in their regulatory impact assessment of the Money Laundering Regulations 2003:
The aim of these measures is to deter criminals from using UK businesses as conduits to 
launder their proceeds; and so to change the economics of crime by increasing both the costs 
and the risks of laundering. Criminals will be forced to use new, more circuitous routes to  
hide  the  origins  of  assets;  reducing  the  profits  available  from  crime,  and  the  amounts 
available to invest in ongoing criminal activities (see HM Treasury, section 48, 2003:10).
Indeed, at the end of July 2006 the Home Office Minister ,Vernon Coaker, claimed:
In the last three years alone we have seized nearly £250 million from criminals. So instead of 
benefiting from their criminal acts, these people have seen their cash being used for frontline 
policing, improving our financial investigation capacity and providing funding for local policing 
(Sproat, 2007:177) 
151
i) Verifying Clients’ Identity: The ‘Know Your Customer’ Procedure
The verification of a client, or what is commonly known as the ‘Know Your 
Customer’ requirement, is one of the fundamental principles of the international anti-
money laundering measures that were enforced in the early 1990s (see Chapter 3). 
For example, recommendation No. 5 of FATF states that
Financial  institutions  should not keep anonymous accounts  or  accounts  in 
obviously fictitious names ... Financial institutions should verify the identity 
of  the  customer  and  beneficial  owner  before  or  during  the  course  of 
establishing a business relationship or conducting transactions for occasional 
customers (see Recommendation No. 5 of FATF)
In the UAE, this requirement is contained in article 3 of the AMLR, 2000 that requires all  
banks to ensure customer identification and verification before allowing them to open a new 
bank account. The type of documentation needed at the time of the opening of a new account 
varies depending on whether the bank account is being opened by an individual, a cooperative 
society,  or  a  charitable,  social  or  professional  society.  For  example,  the  bank  will  need 
necessary documents relating to an individual account such as the full name of the account 
holder, the current address, the work place, and a copy of the individual’s passport. In the case 
of  an  account  being  opened  for  corporations  and  for  charitable,  social  or  professional 
societies, the banks will need the original certificate issued by the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs for these organisations. Article 4 of the AMLR 2000 strictly prohibits opening 
accounts with ‘assumed name or names’. 3
However, obtaining customer information and its verification is not a simple and easy 
task  It  requires  a  lot  of  time  and resources  to  obtain  information  and verify  documents, 
3 In the UK, the 1993 Money Laundering Regulations also requires financial institutions to follow a Know Your 
Customer (KYC) approach to record keeping (see Leong, 2007a). 
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especially  with respect  to overseas investors (see Bosworth-Davies,  1998; see Chapter  6). 
Furthermore,  there  are  problems  with  regard  to  customer  care  (Ashe  and  Reid,  2000), 
invasion into customers’ privacy, and confidentiality issues (Byrne, 2000).
ii) Reporting unusual/suspicious transactions
Globally, there are two styles of reporting obligations that are imposed on financial 
institutions. The first reporting style is known as the ‘threshold-based reporting style’ which is 
commonly known as the ‘American reporting style’, whereas the second is the ‘suspicious-
based reporting  style’  which  is  commonly  operated  in  most  European countries  (Hopton, 
1999). On the one hand, the threshold-based reporting style obliges all financial institutions to 
report  each  deposit,  withdrawal,  transfer  or  exchange  that  involves  an  amount  above  an 
already  specified  threshold.  In  the  USA,  for  example,  this  threshold  is  fixed  at  $10,000 
(Madinger,  2006:83).  On  the  other  hand,  the  suspicious-based  reporting  style  requires 
financial institutions to report those transactions which appear to be connected with money 
laundering  operation.  Both  types  of  reporting  style  have  their  own  advantages  and 
disadvantages with regard to the policing and control of money laundering. 
The UAE follows both styles of reporting. Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of AMLR 2000 require 
banks and moneychangers to fill appropriate forms if the amount of cash for transfer/drafts 
exceeds the  maximum threshold fixed under  the law. In this  regard,  money changers  are 
required to fill form No. CB9/2000/1 if the amount of cash for transfer/drafts exceeds AED 
2000 ($500) or equivalent in other currencies, and the banks will fill form No. CB9/2000/2 if 
the amount of cash for transfer/drafts exceeds AED 40,000 or equivalent in other currencies. 
With  regard  to  suspicious-based  reporting,  the  AMLR  2000  requires  all  financial 
institutions to establish procedures in order to ensure the reporting of unusual or suspicious 
transactions. Article 16 of AMLR 2000 states that
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All banks, moneychangers and other financial  institutions,  as well  as their 
Board members, managers and employees are obliged, personally, to report 
any  unusual  transaction  aiming  at  money  laundering  (see  Article  16  of 
AMLR, 2000).   
However,  where a case is classified as one of suspicious,  unusual or dubious transaction, 
article 6 of AMLR 2000 exempts the threshold requirements, and asks for the identification of 
the customer. This provision is aimed to check ‘smurfing’ – the act of breaking down large 
transaction into small multiple transactions so as to avoid the reporting requirement mandated 
by law (see Madinger, 2006; Lilley, 2006). An example could be a case where a launderer 
conducts multiple transactions of less than the AED 40,000 threshold in order to skip the 
reporting requirement.
As mentioned above, the AMLR 2000 requires all financial institutions, banks, money 
changers, insurance companies, financial markets/stockbrokers, accountants and auditors, to 
report all suspected money laundering cases to the  Anti-Money Laundering and Suspicious 
Cases  Unit  (the  AMLSCU).   Previously,  the  UAE  Central  Bank  circular  notice  163/98 
(op.cit.) instructed all banks to keep check on medium and large cash deposits, and to inform 
the UAE Central Bank of any suspicious or dubious transactions. However, there was no strict 
requirement on the banks to comply. The Anti-Money Laundering Regulation in 2000 now 
makes the reporting of suspicious transactions to the Central Bank  AMLSCU compulsory. In 
this regard, the AMLSCU has constructed a standard format for the reporting of suspicious 
transactions which can either be sent by airmail or electronically. The Central Bank of the 
UAE is connected electronically with all banks and other financial institutions, and this has 
made the reporting system a lot easier (D’Souza, 2005). In addition, to be able to establish 
proper and effective contact with the AMLSCU with respect to reporting suspicious cases of 
money laundering, article 16.3 of AMLR 2000 requires all banks, moneychangers and other 
financial  institutions to fulfil  two important  requirements.  First,  to appoint a ‘Compliance 
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Officer’ who shall be responsible for working as a bridge between the concerned financial 
institution and the AMLSCU, and second, to establish an effective internal control system for 
the implementation of anti-money laundering procedures.  
The AMLSCU is empowered to receive information on all suspected money laundering 
transactions  from the financial  institutions  in  the form of  Suspicious  Transaction  Reports 
(STRs) and to assess them for further action (see below for details). A Suspicious Transaction 
Report (STR) usually includes information such as the name and full address of the customer,  
passport details of the suspected client, a copy of the account opening form, bank statements 
showing last cash deposit, and the reasons for suspicion (D’Souza, 2005).4
Article 20 of AMLR, 2000 clearly stated that the reporting regulation is not meant to 
turn financial  institutions into a crime or detective agency, where they spend considerable 
time and resources investigating their customers’ affairs. However, it is also important that 
financial  institutions  do  not  wilfully  turn  a  blind  eye  to  the  suspicious  activities  of  their 
customers. Article 20 of AMLR 2000 states that
While  the  Central  Bank  is  aware  that  banks,  moneychangers  and  other 
financial  institutions  are  not  police  detectives,  the  ‘timing’  factor  remains 
crucial  if the concerned financial institution is able to retrieve the relevant 
information,  which  reflects  positively  on  the  reputation  of  the  concerned 
financial institution (see Article 20 of AMLR, 2000) 
In other words, the AMLR 2000 emphasises the importance of the cooperation of the financial 
sector in the fight against money laundering. 
A crucial issue, however, is the fact that different Transaction Reports are required for 
the two types of reporting systems.  For threshold-based reporting, the financial institution 
4 In the UK, banks and other financial institutions etc. are expected to report suspicious money laundering 
activities in a Serious Activity Report (SAR), more so since the enactment of the Proceeds of Crime Act, 2002, 
which criminalised non-reporting of suspicious cases (See Preller, 2008).
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completes a Currency Transaction Report (CTR) while for a suspicious-based reporting, the 
financial  institution  completes  a  Suspicious  Transaction  Report  (STR).   However,  the 
financial institution is not required to send a Currency Transaction Report (CTR) prepared on 
a threshold transaction to the AMLSCU.  For example, where an account holder wishes to pay 
cash to a bank for a transfer or draft and the value of the transaction reaches AED 2,000, or to 
a moneychanger for a transaction up to the threshold of AED 40,000, the financial institution 
is required to prepare a CTR but is not required to pass it on to the AMLSCU for further 
investigation,  unless  the  transaction  is  deemed suspicious,  in  which  case an STR will  be 
prepared instead of a CTR.
Indeed, it is imperative to stress that by allowing financial institutions to fill and keep 
CTRs without any obligation to inform the AMLSCU, this raises suspicion on the extent that 
financial  institutions  are  sincere  in  deciding  whether  a  transaction  above  the  maximum 
threshold limit is normal or suspicious. Also, the AMLSCU and law enforcement agencies 
have no access to CTRs. This means that a lot of important and valuable data is inaccessible 
to those who are responsible for money laundering control, and there is no accountability on 
the part of the financial institutions with respect to particular financial transactions that could 
be  money  laundering  cases.  If  financial  institutions  are  obliged  to  send  CTRs  to  the 
AMLSCU, it will make the financial institutions more accountable, and more valuable data 
will be accessible to the regulating authority and law enforcement agencies for the assessment 
of possible cases of money laundering. 
In  contrast,  when  a  breach  of  currency  declaration  requirement  is  detected  by  the 
Custom Authority, consultation with the AMLSCU is not required. Such cases are regarded as 
straight-forward cases. It is the duty and responsibility of the Public Prosecutor’s Office to 
take such cases to court and the violators will be punished for currency violation offences 
according to the law (see article 18 of CML, 2002). However, where the breach of currency 
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declaration  is  considered  by  the  Customs  Authority  to  be  a  case  of  suspected  money 
laundering,  the  case  would  be  passed  on  to  the  Public  Prosecutor  to  commence  an 
investigation  into  the  allegations.   But  before  any  investigation  is  conducted,  the  Public 
Prosecutor must first  seek authorisation from the AMLSCU.  Thereafter,  the case will  be 
passed on to the police for full  investigation.  A case will  not  be investigated  unless it  is 
declared as a suspected case of money laundering by the AMLSCU (see below; Figure A). 
What this clearly shows is another double standard in the system. Financial institutions do not 
have  to  declare  cases  where  customers  have  imported  money over  the  threshold,  but  the 
Customs  Authority  has  to  by  law.  However,  presumably,  where  the  excess  currency 
importation  is  not  through  a  banking  transaction,  it  is  more  likely  to  be  regarded  as  a 
deliberate and criminal attempt to violate the currency regulations law, not necessarily a case 
of money laundering.  It is  only where the case is  deemed to be one of suspected money 
laundering, that it will be passed on to the Public Prosecutor  as described above. 
Gold  and  Levi  (1994)  have  argued  that  the  suspicious-based  transaction  reporting 
system  is  more  beneficial  than  other  systems  in  the  sense  that  it  is  more  focused  on 
controlling money laundering operations. Money launders can avoid detection by making a 
series of transactions  below the threshold,  whereas a suspicious transaction system would 
look at the overall financial activities of the suspected person or organisation and institute an 
investigation accordingly. The use of a dual system of reporting in the UAE is confusing. It 
allows  for  an  ineffective  policing  of  money  laundering  cases,  as  many  potential  money 
launderers  may  escape  prosecution  when  their  cases  are  considered  to  be  a  ‘currency 
transaction’ case, rather than a suspicious transaction.  
iii) Staff Training 
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The training of staff members is one of the important components of an anti-money 
laundering monitoring programme. The staff members within financial institutions that deals 
with handling cash, record keeping and reporting, need appropriate training with respect to 
money  laundering  issues.  In  this  respect,  article  17  of  the  AMLR,  2000  requires  the 
Compliance Officers in banks, financial institutions and money changing organisations to: 
Provide training to staff responsible for receiving cash or overseeing accounts 
and their reports, on all matters pertaining to money laundering. The training 
should be in line with the responsibilities undertaken by the employees who 
should always exercise utmost prudence (see Article 17 of AMLR, 2000). 
The AMLR (2000) also requires the Central  Bank to assist financial  institutions in 
organizing  staff  training  programmes  and  compels  all  financial  institutions  to  send  the 
relevant  staff  members  on  such  training  programmes.  The  basic  purpose  of  the  training 
programme is to ensure that employees who handle the financial business of these institutions 
are aware of money laundering issues, money laundering laws and the appropriate procedure 
for reporting in the event of any suspicious money laundering transactions (see Ashe and 
Reid, 2000).
In this  respect,  the Central  Bank of the UAE has,  from time to time,  organized a 
number of seminars and workshops on anti-money laundering measures. In 2002, the Bank 
organized five anti-money laundering workshops/seminars which were attended by employees 
of the banks, financial institutions and moneychangers. In 2003, the Bank organized a further 
nine  anti-money  laundering  workshops/seminars  in  collaboration  with  the  FBI  and  the 
Emirates  Institution  for  Banking  and  Financial  Studies.  The  workshops/seminars  were 
attended by employees of the AMLSCU, the National Anti-Money Laundering Committee, 
the representatives of several banks, officials from the Dubai Police and the Police Academy. 
In addition, it is on record that thirty-two workshops and seminars have been carried out with 
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the  assistance  of  banking  officials  from  the  USA,  Germany  and  the  UK.  Furthermore, 
officials  from the  Central  Bank of  the  UAE have  participated  in  15  seminars/workshops 
organized by the Emirates Institution for Banking and Financial Studies (see Sho’aib, 2004).
iv) Maintaining records and file keeping
Article 18 of the AMLR, 2000 requires all banks and financial institutions to maintain 
proper record of their  customers’ information and of each transaction.  It  also requires the 
financial institutions to maintain appropriate filing systems so that information required by 
law enforcement agencies and the Central Bank could be produced whenever needed. This 
Article  is  in  line  with  FATF  recommendation  No.  12  that  puts  particular  emphasis  on 
maintaining records and keeping proper file systems for at least five years so that they can be 
consulted in any future cases of suspicious transactions/money laundering or the financing of 
terrorism.
Article 19 of AMLR, 2000 stipulates the types of information needed to be kept in 
financial institutions’ filing and recording system. These include  a copy of the passport of the 
customer concerned, or a trade license if the transaction is carried out by an institution, the 
volume of funds moving in and out (that is, the turn-over in the account), the source(s) of the 
funds, the form or nature of the transactions (for example, cash or cheques), the identity of the 
customer making the transactions, the destination of the funds and the way the account is 
being operated by the account holder.  As per FAFT recommendation No. 12 (op.cit.),  all 
financial  institutions  are  required to keep the above-mentioned information  for up to  five 
years following the closure of an account (article 21 of AMLR, 2000). Under article 22 of 
AMLR 2000, the above record keeping and filing system is applicable not only to financial 
institutions operating within the UAE, but also their branches overseas.
v) The Tipping-Off Procedure
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Collecting information with regard to a suspicious transaction and reporting it in the 
appropriate manner to the AMLSCU is a difficult and time consuming job. More difficult,  
perhaps,  is  the  task  of  further  investigating  the  case  and  acquiring  sufficient  additional 
information to make the decision as to whether or not the case deserves judicial proceeding. 
The designated body with this enormous responsibility is the AMLSCU. In this process, the 
AMLSCU has to engage with other government departments in the UAE and with financial 
institutions both in the UAE and overseas, in order to collect the information necessary to 
confirm whether or not the person being investigated has indeed engaged in or is engaging in 
money  laundering  activity.  The  evidence  collected  must  be  strong  if  the  person  or 
organisation is to be prosecuted for a money laundering offence or offences. 
Thus, maximum care is needed at this stage not to attract the attention of the person 
under suspicion which could affect and undermine the investigation process. Article 16.4 of 
AMLR, 2000, therefore,  strictly  prohibits  the designated  body (the financial  institution  or 
moneychanger) and their employees, including the compliance officer, from informing the 
customer  whose  transaction  is  under  scrutiny,  either  before  or  after  making  a  suspicious 
transaction  report  (STR)  to  the  AMLSCU. In  other  words,  a  key  requirement  is  that  all  
suspicious cases must be dealt with in secrecy during the period of interaction between the 
financial institution concerned and the AMLSCU over a suspected case of money laundering. 
Another important defect in the AMLR 2000 is the lack of a proper sanction against 
financial institutions in the event that they fail to report a suspicious transaction.  Article 16.6 
of AMLR, 2000 simply states that in the event that a financial institution fails to report a 
suspicious transaction to the AMLSCU, it will be punished according to the prevailing laws 
and regulations. The Regulation does not specify what the punishment should be imposed on 
a financial institution that has failed to report suspicious cases. This is unlike the situation in 
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Britain,  where  the  MLR  (2003)  clearly  stipulates  a  maximum  penalty  of  two  years 
imprisonment and/or  a fine on banks for failing to report a suspected money laundering case 
(MLRs, 2003, s.3.2.a). 
Due to the lack of clarity with regard to the punishment for a breach of its regulations,  
the AMLR 2000 has been referred to as a ‘regulation without teeth’.  However, the AMLR 
2000 is also often regarded as a preface to the more comprehensive anti-money laundering 
law  that  was  enacted  in  2002  namely  the  Federal  law  No.  4  (2002)  ‘Regarding  the 
Criminalizing of Money Laundering’ (CML, 2002). The 2002 anti-money laundering law 
clearly states the penalty that financial institutions could face if found guilty of breaching the 
law with respect to non-compliance with anti-money laundering measures (see Articles 15 – 
19 of this law). The next section describes this law, which, in effect, is the main anti-money 
laundering law in the UAE.
5.1.2 The Criminalization of Money Laundering Law, 2002 (CML, 2002)
The Federal Law No. 4 of 2002 ‘Regarding the Criminalization of Money Laundering’ 
(CML, 2002) was enacted on 23rd January 2002. Two years later, on the 28th July 2004, the 
UAE government introduced its first anti-terrorism law, namely Federal Law No. 1 of 2004 
Combating Terrorism Offences (CTO, 2004). The main aim of these two pieces of legislation 
was  to  criminalise  money  laundering  generally,  and  terrorist  financing  in  particular,  by 
establishing  anti-money  laundering  and  terrorist  financing  deterrence  frameworks  and 
procedures to be imposed on both the financial and non-financial sectors. The introduction of 
both pieces of legislation was a response to the international obligations and treaties that were 
signed by the UAE with respect to combating money laundering and terrorist financing (see 
Chapter 3). The key components of the CML 2002 are discussed in the following paragraphs.
i) Scope of the Law
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The jurisdiction of CML 2002 covers all individuals and financial institutions, as well 
as all other commercial and economic establishments (see articles 2 and 3 of CML, 2002). 
The law defines ‘financial institutions’  as ‘…any bank, finance company, money exchange 
house, financial or monetary intermediary or any other establishment licensed by the Central 
Bank,  whether  publicly  or  privately  owned’  (article  1  of  CML,  2002).  Commercial  and 
economic establishments are defined as ‘…establishments licensed and regulated by agencies 
other than the Central Bank, such as insurance companies, stock exchange and others’ (see 
article 1 of CML 2002). 
ii) Definition of Money Laundering
Article 1 of CML 2002 defines money laundering as: 
Any act involving transfer, conversion, or deposit of property or concealment 
or disguise of the true nature of that property, which were derived from any 
of the offences stated in clause 2 of article 2 herein (Article 1 of CML 2002).
iii) Conduct Amounting to the Offence of Money Laundering
Article 2 (clause 1) of the 2002 law says that a person shall be punished for money 
laundering if found guilty of the following offences:   
a. The conversion,  transfer  or  deposit  of proceeds,  with intent  to  conceal  or 
disguise the illicit origin of such proceeds
b. The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, 
movement, rights with respect to or ownership of proceeds.
c. The acquisition,  possession  or  use  of  such proceeds  (article  2.1 of  CML, 
2002)
162
In  other  words,  the  offences  covered  under  this  article  include  depositing  and 
transferring the proceeds of crime, the exchange of criminal proceeds with another currency 
or traveller cheques, and the establishment of trusts or companies to hide criminal proceeds. 
Article 2 also covers any person acquiring, possessing or using a property knowing that part 
of the property or the whole of it has been derived from criminal activity.  The key element in 
this law is that any person or financial institution will be guilty of money laundering offences 
if they possess or knowingly acquire the proceeds of a crime.
Anti-money laundering laws in many countries do not differentiate between those who 
launder the proceeds of their own crime, or launder the proceeds of another person’s crime. 
For example, in Ireland, the Money Laundering Law of 1994 criminalised the laundering of 
proceeds  from  one’s  own  crime  as  well  as  from,  or  on  behalf  of,  another  person  or 
organisation (see Handoll, 2007). Laundering the proceeds of one’s own crime is commonly 
known as primary money laundering where the executor of the crime and the laundering of 
the proceeds that are generated as a result of the crime, is the same person. Laundering of 
proceeds from a crime that has been committed by another person or on behalf of another 
person is called  secondary money laundering (see Ashe and Reid, 2000). The CML, 2002 
criminalises primary money laundering but is silent about secondary money laundering.
iv) List of Crimes Covered under Money Laundering Offences
The CML 2002 law provides a list of offences, the proceeds from which would automatically 
be  regarded  as  money  laundering.  The  list  included  serious  crimes  often  engaged  in  by 
organised criminals.  This provision is in agreement  with recommendation No. 1 of FATF 
which extended the scope of the offence of money laundering to all serious organized crimes. 
Thus, Clause 2 of Article 2 of the CML 2002 criminalised all kinds of proceeds derived from 
the following crimes:
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1. Sale of narcotics and psychotropic substances
2. Kidnapping, piracy and terrorism,
3. Offences committed in violation of environmental laws,
4. Illicit dealing in fire-arms and ammunition,
5. Bribery, embezzlement, and damage to public property,
6. Fraud, breach of trust and related offences,
7. Any other related offences referred to in international conventions to which the 
State is a party (Article 2, Clause 2, CML, 2002)
The  designated  body  (that  is,  a  bank,  financial  institution  and  any  of  the  commercial 
organisations listed in the law) is required to report to the AMLSCU all cases where, in their  
own opinion, a customer is involved in money laundering and the proceeds are believed to 
have been derived from the offences listed above. 
As stated above (Chapter 2) there is no income tax in the UAE. This creates a problem 
for the designated bodies (for example, banks) as to whether the huge lumps of money being 
deposited  is  money laundering  from crimes,  or  a  deliberate  effort  by wealthy  persons  to 
deposit their money in the UAE  in order to avoid tax in their home country. This situation 
creates a dilemma for the designated bodies as to what to report as a suspicious transaction, 
and also for the AMLSCU when it comes to the investigation of such cases. 
v) Penalties  for Individuals, Financial and Commercial Institutions found guilty  of  
money laundering
Article 13 of the CML 2002 sets out penalties for individuals found guilty of money 
laundering. Article 14 sets out penalties for institutions found guilty of involvement in money 
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laundering activities. Both individuals and financial institutions are covered by articles 1 and 
2 of the CML law. Financial institutions (and presumably all commercial organisations and 
moneychangers) are criminally liable if found to have used their names or accounts for any of 
the money laundering  activities  mentioned under article  1 and 2 of  the CML, 2002. The 
punishment for any person found guilty of money laundering is a prison sentence of not more 
than seven years or a fine not exceeding AED 300,000, and not less than AED 30,000. In 
addition, the law also provides for the confiscation of the proceeds of crime or the equivalent 
if,  for  example,  such proceeds have  been converted  wholly  or  partially  into some lawful 
properties (Article 13 of CML, 2002).5 The punishment for a financial institution found guilty 
of  money laundering  is  a  fine  of  not  more  than  AED 1,000,000 and not  less  than  AED 
300,000, in addition to the confiscation of any proceeds or the equivalent, if such proceeds 
have been converted wholly or partially into some lawful properties (see article 14 of CML, 
2002).
vi) Other Offences
(a) Failure to disclose a case of money laundering
It is an offence under the CML, 2002 to knowingly fail to disclose the suspicious criminal 
activities of anyone, if these activities fall under those defined in article 2.2 above. In other 
words, a person is guilty of an offence if, first, he knows that another person is involved in 
money laundering; second, such information comes to his attention during the course of his 
trade, profession, business or employment, and finally if he fails to disclose this information 
to  the  appropriate  authorities.   In  this  context,  article  15  of  CML  2002  states  that  the 
Chairman, directors, managers and employees of financial or commercial institutions will be 
guilty  of  an  offence  if  they  failed  to  report  all  suspicious  activities  to  the  AMLSCU as 
5  Similar provisions could be found in Part III of the UK Criminal Justice Act, 1993
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required  under  article  7  of  the  CML 2002.  The  punishment  for  this  offence  is  a  prison 
sentence or a fine of not less than AED 10,000 and not more than AED 100,000 or both 
(Article 7 of CML, 2002). 6
(b) Failure to disclose the importing of money  into the UAE
The smuggling of cash is  one of the old methods that  is  currently  being used by money 
launderers due to its obvious advantages. Criminals smuggle cash directly or indirectly and 
deposit it in conventional banks in those areas with fewer restrictions with respect to money 
laundering control. It avoids any paperwork and there is no danger of attracting the attention 
of the law enforcement agencies (see Chapter 2; see also Bell, 2003).
With respect to the UAE, there is no restriction on bringing large amounts of cash into 
the country due to the fact that the UAE, like all the other countries in the region, has a largely 
cash-based economy, where most of business dealings and purchases are made by using cash 
instead of credit cards or cheques. The UAE government has, however, introduced measures 
in order to keep check on the cash that is moving into the country. Article 6 of the CML, 2002 
required the UAE Central Bank to fix a maximum threshold limit of cash that can be brought 
into the Emirates without any need of declaration. Under this article, the UAE Central Bank 
has fixed the maximum threshold limit for cash that could be brought into the country without 
the  need of  declaration  at  AED 40,0007 or  equivalent  in  other  currencies.  This  provision 
6 Similar provisions could be found in s. 29- 31 of the UK Criminal Justice Act, 1993. The Criminal Justice Act  
1993 makes it a crime for financial institutions to fail to report matters that they “know or suspect” constitutes 
drugs money-laundering. This provision is updated by the Proceeds of Crime Act, 2002. The 2002 Act puts a 
legal obligation on commercial and banking institutions to report any suspicious transaction to the anti-money 
laundering authorities i.e. the National Criminal Intelligence Service (later replaced by the Serious Organized 
Crime Agency: SOCA) if they suspect that a client might be engaged in money laundering activities (Sproat, 
2007) Sections 330- 332 of the PoCA 2002 criminalizes failure to report suspicious money laundering activity 
on  the  part  of  the  regulated  sector.  Failure  to  comply  with  the  requirement  of  reporting  the  suspicious  
transaction means a compliance officer in the regulated sector has failed to do his duty to the State and could, on 
indictment, lead to 5 years imprisonment or a fine or both (Sproat, 2007)
7 See Regulation: Declaration When Importing Cash Money into the UAE, dated 26th January 2002 for further 
details. 
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legalised Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of AMLR 2000 on threshold amounts. Article 6 also requires 
the Central Bank of the UAE to establish procedures to be taken if more cash is brought into  
the UAE through any other means such as being brought through airports, seaports, border 
crossing or being sent by post.
Any person who wishes to bring more cash above the maximum threshold needs to fill a 
declaration form at the point of entry into the country. Failing to do so is a criminal offence 
under article 6 of the CML, 2002 and is punishable by a fine of not less than AED 2,000 and 
not more than AED 10,000 (Article 18 of CML, 2002).
(c) Tipping Off is a criminal offence
It is criminal offence under Article 16 of CML 2002 to notify the person whose transaction is 
under suspicion of possible involvement in a money laundering activity. The article stated that 
this is strictly prohibited, and under no circumstances should the person whose case is either 
reported to the AMLSCU as being suspicious,  or is under investigation by the police,  be 
informed. The violation of this provision is punishable by a prison sentence of not more than 
one year or a fine of not less than AED 5,000 and not more than AED 50,000 or both. This 
provision is applicable specifically to those who deal with suspicious money laundering cases 
such  as  employees  of  the  financial  institution,  staff  of  the  AMLSCU  and  Dubai  Police 
personnel.
However, the law can also be applied to any person who informs the person whose case 
is either reported to the AMLSCU or is being investigated by the police for suspicion of being 
involved in a money laundering activity. Such a person could be a lawyer who, for example,  
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obtained such information during his visit to a police station and later passed it on to the 
person or persons concerned. The prevention of disclosure of information to the person being 
investigated in terms of a suspected case of money laundering is considered crucial to the 
investigation process.8
(d) The offence of giving false notification
It is an offence under Article 17 of CML 2002 to give false notification against any person 
or  financial  institution  for  alleged  involvement  in  money  laundering.  It  is  a  criminal 
offence  to  supply  false  information  that  is  baseless  against  any  person  or  financial 
institution  with  the  purpose  of  causing  damage,  defamation  or  obtaining  any  sort  of 
commercial interest or gain. However, the law does not specify the minimum or maximum 
punishment that could be imposed on a person for such a false notification. This provision 
is a safeguard to both individuals and financial institutions, to protect them from any sort 
of potential damage that could be caused as a result of providing false information in bad 
faith  to  the  authorities.  Considerable  time,  efforts  and  resources  are  spent,  both 
domestically and overseas, to verify accusations made when a money laundering case is 
reported, in order to prepare a strong and sound case for prosecution. The provision of a 
safeguard  against  false  notification  in  money  laundering  cases  helps  to  prevent  the 
wasting of time and resources on baseless money laundering reports, or allegations against 
any individual or financial institution.
vii) International Cooperation with Respect to Money Laundering Cases
Chapter four of CML 2002 concerns international cooperation with regard to assisting other 
countries in money laundering cases. In this regard, Article 21 states that:
8  Similar provisions on ‘tipping off’ could be found in s. 32 of the UK Criminal Justice Act, 1993, updated in 
Section 333 of the Proceeds of Crime Act, 2002. ‘Tipping off’ is punishable under the 2002 law by a five-year 
prison sentence and/or a fine.
168
The competent judicial authority [in the UAE] may, as per request of a judicial 
authority in another country to which the State [UAE] is bound by an approved 
treaty and provided the act is established as a criminal offence in the State, or on 
condition of reciprocity, order the pursuit, freezing or provincial attachment of 
Property  of  Proceeds  derived  from  or  Instrumentalities  used  in  a  Money 
Laundering offence
Article 22 of the same law also states that:
Any ruling or judicial order providing for the confiscation of property, proceeds 
or instrumentalities relating to money laundering offences issued by a court or a 
competent judicial authority in a country to which the State [the UAE] is bound 
by ratified treaty may be recognised
Because the Government of the UAE is a signatory to all UN conventions and has signed 
other regional treaties with respect to combating money laundering and terrorist financing, it 
has a good track record of cooperation with other countries in this respect. The AMLSCU and 
the AOCD have helped in many overseas requests with regard to the collection of information 
and the investigation of money laundering cases. It is important to mention that any overseas 
requests for help and cooperation come through the Department of International Cooperation 
in  the  Ministry  of  Justice,  Islamic  Affairs  and  Auqaf.  This  department  usually  receives 
overseas requests through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Department of International 
Cooperation would then pass such a request to the concerned competent authority in the UAE. 
These include the Attorney-General’s Office and the AOCD (the police).  After completion of 
the  investigation,  the  final  report  is  sent  back  to  the  country  concerned  through  the 
Department of International Cooperation (see Figure 2).
5.1.3 The Combating Terrorism Offences Law, 2004
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The events of September 11, 2001 attracted the attention of the world to the global 
problem of terrorism, and this accelerated the efforts to combat the financing of terrorism. In 
this  respect,  many international  initiatives  were introduced to criminalise  the financing of 
terrorism, and much emphasis was put on international cooperation to fight such a crime. For 
example, FATF issued nine special recommendations as the minimum standard to be adopted 
by  the  signatory  nation-states  with  respect  to  the  global  fight  against  terrorism  and  the 
financing of terrorism. The Federal Law No. 1 of 2004 on Combating Terrorism Offences is 
an attempt by the UAE to meet the international norm in this regard.  
 ‘Terrorism’ is broadly defined in Article 2 of the CTO law as:
Every act  or omission [where] the offender commits  himself  to execute a 
criminal design, individually or collectively, with the intention to cause terror 
between people or terrify them (see Article 2 of the CTO, 2004) 
An act or omission also comes under Article 2 of the CTO if it causes a breach of public order 
or  endangers  the safety and security  of society,  or injures  persons or exposes their  lives, 
liberty or security to  danger, including  the lives, liberty and security of “…Kings, Heads of 
States and Governments, Ministers, and members of their families or any representative or 
official  of  a  State  or  an  international  organization  of  an  intergovernmental  character  and 
members of their  families  forming part  of their  household entitled by international law to 
protection or causes damage to the environment or any public or private utilities or domain, 
occupying, seizing the same or exposing any of the country’s natural resources to danger.” 
(see Article 2 of the CTO, 2004).  
Along with  criminalising  terrorist  acts,  this  law also  criminalises  the  financing  of 
terrorism.  It is an offence under Article 12 of the law for anyone to be involved in collecting 
and/or inviting others to collect or provide funds with the intention that they will be used 
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directly or indirectly for the purpose of terrorism. Furthermore, it also an offence under this 
law for anyone to be in possession of funds that will ultimately be used for acts of terrorism. 
They  key  element  of  this  law is  the  knowledge  that  the  funds  will  be  used  directly  or 
indirectly for the purpose of financing terrorist activities. In addition, Article 12 of the CTO 
2004 states that whosoever gains, provides, collects, carries or transfers properties, directly or 
indirectly, with the intention of using them, or knows they are going to be used, in whole or in 
part, to finance acts of terrorism, shall be punished.  The prescribed punishment for all those 
who are found guilty of involvement in terrorism (including the financing of terrorism) is 
imprisonment for life, in addition to the confiscation of any property or equivalent if that 
property is transferred or substituted in whole or in parts with other property gained through 
legal means. 
The CTO 2004 criminalises not only the direct or indirect financing of terrorism but 
also the laundering of money on behalf of terrorists. It is an offence under Article 13 of the 
CTO 2004 for anyone to carry, transfer or deposit funds on behalf of other persons, and to 
conceal  or disguise the purpose of  this  transfer  when that  purpose is  to  use the funds to 
finance terrorist activities. Anyone found guilty of this crime is punishable by a life sentence, 
along with the confiscation of any property related to the terrorist offences.
CTO 2004 covers all kinds of terrorist financing, whether such funds are derived from 
legal sources such as charities and donations, or illegal ones such as drug trafficking and arms 
smuggling.9
9 The UK also has terrorism-related money laundering legislation. Funds that are acquired through legal or  
illegal means, but are being used for the purpose of terrorism, are criminalised in the UK. The Terrorism Act of  
2000 defines four main offences that may have an impact on the financial sector. They include fund-raising 
(section 15), use and possession of funds (section 16), funding arrangements (section 17) and money laundering 
(section 18). According to the Act, a person commits an offence if:
a) He invites another to provide money or other property; or
b) He receives money or other property; or
c) He provides money or other property; or
d) He uses or possesses money or other property for the purposes of terrorism (see Leong, 2007b:49)
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Terrorist organizations use different techniques in order to conceal the original source 
of their funds. For this purpose, they open legal businesses or create shell banks in order to 
conceal  the  true  source  of  their  funds.  Article  25  of  CTO  2004  clearly  stated  that  any 
representative, manager or employee of a financial institution or any business organisation 
found guilty of contributing to, or facilitating,  any terrorist activities by using or allowing 
their names or accounts to be used to launder money that has been used or is to be used to 
finance terrorism, shall be punishable by a fine of not less than AED 100,000 and not more 
than AED 500,000. In addition, the premises used for the illegal activity shall be closed and 
the property confiscated (see article 25 of CTO 2004).
Because of the nature of the offences related to terrorism, the CTO 2004 puts more 
emphasis on the issue of tipping off.  All competent authorities are required to keep all kinds 
of information they have about  a suspected client  confidential.  Under Article  38 of CTO 
2004, it is an offence to disclose information relating to any person or organisation suspected 
of being involved in acts of terrorism or the financing of terrorism. Any person who is found 
to be involved in disclosing information to a suspected terrorist or others concerned shall be 
punished by a prison sentence of not more than five years (see article 38 of CTO, 2004).
5.2 Money Laundering Control Mechanism in UAE 
The structure in place for the policing and control of money laundering in Dubai is a 
combination of political, financial and law enforcement institutions. The three main bodies 
within this control mechanism are: 
According to Leong (2007b), the overall purpose of the Terrorism Act 2000 (amended in 2001, 2005 2006) is:
To cut off terrorist  funding, to facilitate sharing of information between law enforcement 
agencies  and  public  authorities,  to  increase  investigative powers  and  to  provide  for  new 
offences in relation to the duty to disclose information or suspicion of terrorist  financing 
(Leong, 2007b:49)
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(a) The National Anti-Money Laundering Committee (NAMLC) which has responsibility 
for formulating government policies on  combating money laundering in the country; 
(b) The Anti-Money Laundering and Suspicious Cases Unit (the AMLSCU) located in the 
Central  Bank  of  the  UAE.  The  AMLSCU  has  the  primary  role  of  assessing  all 
suspicious money laundering cases sent to it by financial institutions, and, on the basis 
of its assessment, decides which case should be put forward for further investigation. 
(c) The Anti-Organized  Crime Department  of  Dubai  Police  is  responsible  for  the  full 
criminal  investigation  of  all  suspected  cases  of  money  laundering,  including  the 
collection of further evidence to support a prosecution. 
For  the  enforcement  of  anti-money  laundering  legislation,  the  CML 2002 gives  to  these 
institutions different powers with regard to the identification and investigation of suspected 
money  laundering  cases  in  the  UAE.  There  are  other  legal  authorities  involved  in  the 
decision-making process, namely the Attorney-General and the Public Prosecutor whose roles 
are  restricted  to  the  decision  to  prosecute  (see  Section  5.4 below).  In  the  following sub-
sections, the functions of these three main bodies are discussed in detail.
5.2.1 The National Anti-Money Laundering Committee (NAMLC)
Due  to  the  increasing  concern  about  transnational  organized  crime  and  money 
laundering, the Government of the UAE has taken important steps to ensure that its financial 
system may not be abused by organized criminals (see Al-Abed et al., 2005).  In this respect, 
a National Anti-Money Laundering Committee was established in July 2000. The Committee 
is the national policy-making body with the responsibility of formulating and shaping policies 
and strategies to combat money laundering, both domestically and globally (WAM, 2005). 
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The Committee was set up under the chairmanship of the Governor of the Central Bank of the 
UAE and it consists of representatives of the following: 
1. The Central Bank
2. The Ministry of the Interior 
3. The Ministry of Justice, Islamic Affairs and Awqaf 
4. The Ministry of Finance and Industry
5. The Ministry of Economy and Commerce
6. Agencies concerned with issuing trade and industrial licenses
7. The UAE Customs Board (see article 9 of CML, 2002)
In addition, representatives of the five largest national banks and three main moneychangers 
are included in the Committee with the status of Observer.
The roles and responsibilities of the Committee outlined under Article 10 of the CML, 
2002 are as follows:
• To propose anti-money laundering rules and procedures in the State
• To  facilitate  the  exchange  of  information  and  coordination  between  agencies 
represented therein
• To represent the State in international anti-money laundering forums 
• To propose organisational regulations regarding the workings of the Committee 
[and ]
• Any other matters referred to it by competent authorities in the country (see article 
10 of CML, 2002).
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5.2.2 The Anti-Money Laundering and Suspicious Cases Unit (the AMLSCU), Central 
Bank of the UAE
Money laundering is a global issue and different countries have established their own 
legal  frameworks  in  order  to  fight  this  problem.  Many  jurisdictions  have  established  a 
centralised authority  with the responsibility  of receiving  suspicious  reports  from financial 
institutions, analysing them and disseminating them to the relevant law enforcement agencies 
for further investigation and prosecution. Such an entity is commonly known as the ‘Financial 
Intelligence Unit’ (FIU). This agency plays the role of a bridge between the financial sector 
and the crime investigating bodies within a state. The need for the establishment of FIUs was 
stressed  by  FATF  in  its  forty  recommendations  for  combating  money  laundering.  For 
example, FATF Recommendation No. 26 (2003) stated:
Countries  should  establish  a  FIU that  serves  as  a  national  centre  for  the 
receiving (and, as permitted, requesting), analysis and dissemination of STR 
and  other  information  regarding  potential  money  laundering  or  terrorist 
financing.  The FIU should have access,  directly  or indirectly,  on a timely 
basis, to the financial, administrative and law enforcement information that it 
requires to properly undertake its functions, including the analysis of STRs 
To  be  able  to  improve  international  cooperation  with  respect  to  fighting  money 
laundering and the financing of terrorism, the FIUs from 116 countries formed a group called 
the ‘Egmont Group’ (The Egmont Group, 2009a, 2009b; Leong, 2007b).  The Egmont Group 
was formed in 1995 with the purpose of promoting international cooperation and especially 
the exchange of information between FIUs globally (The Egmont Group, 2009a: Mitsilegas, 
1999). The initiative was taken by the FIUs of Belgium and the United States of America. The 
name of the group was derived from Egmont Palace in Brussels where the first meeting of 
these FIUs took place (Stessens, 2000). The members of the Egmont Group meet regularly in 
order  to  discuss  the  problems  of  international  cooperation  and  assistance  with  respect  to 
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combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism at the international level (Schott, 
2006; Enders and Sandler, 2006). The Egmont Group defined an FIU in the following words:
A Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) is a central, national agency responsible 
for receiving (and, as permitted, requesting), analyzing and disseminating to 
the competent authorities, disclosures of financial information [ ] concerning 
suspected proceeds of crime and potential financing of terrorism [ ] required 
by national legislation or regulation, in order to counter money laundering 
and terrorism financing (see The Egmont Group, 2009a)
The UAE is a member of the Egmont Group.
FIUs can be classified into four groups depending upon their nature and the type of 
administration  they  are  controlled  by.  There  are  Financial  Intelligence  Units  that  are 
established within and run by a police force,  the judiciary  or an administrative  authority. 
Some FIUs have also adopted a hybrid model of all of the above three (The Egmont Group, 
2009b). Thus, the structure of the FIUs in the 116 member countries of the Egmont Group can 
be classified into these four models: 
1. The Administrative Model: This is the most common type of FIU which exist in 76 of the 
member countries. In this model, the FIU is attached to a regulatory body such as the 
Central  Bank or  Ministry  of  Finance;  or  it  operates  as  an independent  administrative 
authority. The administrative model is in operation in countries like the UK, the UAE, 
Spain, Japan, India, France, Canada and Australia. In the UK, for example, the FIU is an 
independent administrative authority namely the UK Financial Services Authority.
2. The Judicial or Prosecutorial Model: There are only six members of the Egmont Group 
whose FIUs are affiliated  with a judicial  authority  or a prosecutor’s  office.  These are 
Argentina, Cyprus, Denmark, Latvia, Switzerland and Thailand. 
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3. The Law Enforcement Model: This is the second biggest group of FIUs comprising of 27 
member states where the Unit is attached to a general or specialised police agency. In 
countries such as Austria, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hong Kong, Iceland, New Zealand 
and Sweden, the FIU is attached to the police. 
4. The  Hybrid  Model: There  are  currently  nine  members  where  the  FIUs  comprise  a 
combination  of  the  three  above-mentioned  models.  These  countries  include  Georgia, 
Greece, Netherlands, Norway and Romania. (For a complete list of the FIU models see 
The Egmont Group, 2009b: 11-12; Masciandaro, 2005:361-364; Masciandaro, 2007: 67-
73).      
According to Stessens (2000), three basic functions can be attributed to any type of 
FIU as per the definition given by the Egmont Group. The first function is the ‘repository 
function’.  The  FIU  is  the  centralised  place  where  all  information  pertaining  to  money 
laundering issues are received and stored. The second function is the ‘analysis function’. The 
FIU is responsible for the analysis of the information it receives from financial institutions 
with regard to suspicious money laundering cases. At this stage, the FIU usually provides 
additional assessment and information to the case and arrives at a decision as to whether or 
not  the suspected case deserves  further  investigation.  The last  function  of the FIU is  the 
‘clearing  house  function’.  The  FIU  is  responsible  for  the  facilitation,  dissemination  and 
exchange of information with other competent authorities on suspicious financial transactions. 
At this stage, the FIU may exchange information with domestic regulatory authorities, the 
judiciary or with overseas financial intelligence units (see Stessens, 2000:184). 
It is important to mention that an FIU does not possess powers of investigation.  The 
Unit simply receives and assesses suspected money laundering case notes (STRs) sent to it, 
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and then forwards its reports to the appropriate law enforcement or investigating bodies to 
commence a full investigation.
Among the four different models of FIUs explained above, the UAE has adopted the 
administrative model for dealing with suspicious money laundering cases in the country. The 
Anti-Money  Laundering  and  Suspicious  Cases  Unit  (the  AMLSCU) is  the  Financial 
Intelligence Unit (FIU) of the UAE located within the Central Bank of the UAE. The Unit 
began  operations  in  July  1999  as  per  recommendation  number  26  of  the  International 
Financial Action Task Force (FAFT) (see also, UAE Interact, 2002a). The AMLSCU become 
a full member of the Egmont Group on May 5th, 2002.  The Unit also played a leading role in 
establishing the FATF-Styled Regional Body – The Middle East and North Africa Financial 
Action Task Force (MENAFATF) – responsible for the fight against money laundering and 
the financing of terrorism in the Gulf region (see Chapter 3; see also D’Souza, 2005).
Initially, this unit started its activities with six staff members. However, since the terrorist 
attacks on the USA on September 11th 2001, the role and responsibilities of the AMLSCU 
have increased enormously and the numbers of its staff have been doubled. At the time of this 
study, the AMLSCU comprises of six sections, each with a special duty with respect to the 
management  and analysis  of money laundering cases referred to the Unit.  These sections 
include: (a) the STRs and Suspicious Cases Analysis Section (b) the Follow-up Section (c) the 
STRs and Suspicious  Cases Record Keeping Section  (d) the International  Section (e)  the 
Legal Section, and (f) the Administrative Support Section. 
As  indicated  above,  the  Unit  receives  all  Suspicious  Transaction  Reports  (STRs) 
prepared by financial institutions (banks), money changers, commercial institutions and other 
economic, financial and non-financial institutions with regard to suspected cases of money 
laundering on the part of their customers and clients, and then assesses/analyses these reports 
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for further action. The Unit has the power of access to all the information pertaining to money 
laundering  kept  by  all  financial  institutions  working  within  the  UAE.  The  AMLSCU 
determines the format in which suspicious transaction reports should be written and the proper 
way  that  the  reports  should  be  communicated  to  the  Unit.  The  Unit  can  also  access 
information on money laundering kept in financial institutions abroad, through the National 
Anti-Money Laundering Committee.
The successful reporting of suspicious transactions to the AMLSCU depends upon the 
trust  and cooperation of the financial  sector,  that  is,  the banks,  moneychangers  and other 
financial institutions. This is a very crucial component of the process. The regulatory body 
responsible for the issuing of licenses to financial institutions and their supervision is required 
by the CML 2002 to setup appropriate mechanisms to ensure that financial institutions are 
complying with anti-money laundering rules and regulation. In particular, the regulatory body 
is required to ensure that the financial institutions put appropriate structures and systems into 
place for the reporting of suspicious cases to the AMLSCU (see article 11 of CML, 2002).
Article  20  of  the  CML  2002  gives  legal  protection  to  financial  institutions,  their 
directors,  employees  and authorised  representatives  against  any criminal  charges,  civil  or 
administrative litigation brought against  them by their  clients  for disclosing their  personal 
details  and information to the AMLSCU or the law enforcement  authorities  without their 
consent, even when it turns out that the information given was wrong, unless the information 
given to  the  AMLSCU was  found to  have  been given in  bad faith.  This  provision  is  in 
compliance with Recommendation No. 14 of FATF which states that:
Financial  institutions,  their  directors,  officers  and  employees  should  be 
protected by legal provisions from criminal and civil liability for breach of 
any restriction on disclosure of information imposed by contract or by any 
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legislative,  regulatory  or  administrative  provision,  if  they  report  their 
suspicions in good faith to the FIU, even if they did not know precisely what 
the underlying criminal activity was, and regardless of whether illegal activity 
actually occurred (see article 14 of FATF)
Once  the  AMLSCU  is  of  the  opinion  that  a  transaction  is  suspicious  and  needs  further 
investigation, it shall make the STRs accessible to the law enforcement agencies in order to 
assist them in their criminal investigation against the accused. Law enforcement authorities 
(including the Police) do not have direct access to STRs and bank accounts. They rely on the 
financial information on the accused as supplied to them by the AMLSCU
The  information  related  to  suspicious  money  laundering  cases  could  also  be 
communicated  or  exchanged  with  other  countries  at  their  request  in  accordance  with 
international conventions and treaties to which the UAE is a signatory, where such is needed 
for the purpose of fighting money laundering globally (see article 7 of CML, 2002). 
5.2.3 The Anti-Organized Crime Department (AOCD) of the Dubai Police
The  role  of  law  enforcement  agencies  in  the  control  of  crime  cannot  be 
underestimated.  In  recognition  of  the  need to  protect  the  economy of  the  Emirates  from 
organised  criminals  and  money  launderers,  the  UAE  established,  in  2000,  an  Economic 
Crimes Department within its Police Force. This department was established as a branch of 
the General Department of Criminal Investigation (the CID). In 2005, the Economic Crime 
Department was renamed the ‘Anti-Organised Crime Department (AOCD)’. The AOCD is 
responsible for investigating all cases of organised crime, including money laundering cases, 
in the Emirates.
However, it is important to mention that Dubai is the only Emirate amongst the seven 
Emirates making up the UAE that has its own independent police authority, the Dubai Police. 
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Dubai also has its own independent prosecution authority and courts, managed and controlled 
by  the  Government  of  Dubai,  not  the  Federal  Government  of  the  UAE. In the  other  six 
emirates, the police authority is controlled by the Federal Government of the UAE.
The Dubai Police’s Anti-Organised Crime Department has within it a specialised unit called 
the ‘Money Laundering Section’. This section is responsible for the investigation of money 
laundering cases referred to it by the Public Prosecutor or from overseas (see below).
5.3.  The  Processing  and  Investigation  of  Money  Laundering  Cases:     Roles  and 
Responsibilities
As indicated above, the starting point of the investigation of a money laundering case 
is the identification of a suspicious transaction. As was also explained above, the fact that a 
transaction is above the stipulated legal threshold does not automatically make it a suspicious 
transaction.  Financial institutions are not under any obligation to report all transactions above 
the  threshold  unless,  in  addition,  it  is  deemed  to  be  of  a  suspicious  nature.  Financial 
institutions are under obligation to declare all suspicious transactions in an STR. While all 
currency transactions above the threshold requires the completion of a CTR, such reports may 
not be sent off for further investigation.
Different  government  authorities  or  departments  are  involved  in  the  processing, 
investigation and prosecution of suspected money laundering cases in the UAE and Dubai. In 
this  section,  I  will  discuss  the  role  and  responsibility  that  each  and  every  one  of  these 
government authorities perform in the policing and control of money laundering cases. 
The  discussion  starts  with  the  role  of  the  AMLSCU,  the  establishment  within  the 
Central  Bank  that  receives  STRs  from financial  institutions  and  takes  the  initial  step  of 
deciding whether or not a suspicious case is worth further investigation. If the Unit decides 
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that a suspected person is not involved in money laundering, the case will not go any further.  
Otherwise,  the  STR  is  forwarded  to  the  Attorney-General  who  is  the  person  legally 
empowered to order a criminal investigation into the alleged offences against the suspected 
individual  or  financial  institution.  The  Attorney-General  then  passes  the  STRs  and other 
relevant documents to the Public Prosecutor whose role it is to initiate the investigation into 
the alleged offence, under the authority of the Attorney-General. The Public Prosecutor may 
reject  an  AMLSCU  decision  to  accuse  someone  of  money  laundering.  However,  the 
AMLSCU  is  empowered  to  override  this  decision.  Where  this  is  the  case,  the  Public 
Prosecutor  will  have  no  option  but  to  forward  the  case  to  the  AOED  for  full  criminal 
investigation.
The AOCD branch of the police has the important job of investigating all suspected 
money laundering cases referred to it by the Public Prosecutor’s office. As mentioned above, 
the Dubai Police has established its own Money Laundering section within its AOCD to deal 
with money laundering cases only.   If, after the investigation is complete, the police decide to 
press  charges  against  the  accused,  the  case  is  concluded  and  forwarded  to  the  Attorney-
General who must consult  with the AMLSCU before any final decision on prosecution is 
made.   If,  after  consultation,  it  is  agreed  that  the  accused  has  a  case  to  answer  and the 
evidence is strong enough, the case will be passed over to the Public Prosecutor to initiate  
criminal proceeding in the courts. 
 The  main  focus  of  this  thesis  is  the  role  of  the  Dubai  Police  vis-à-vis  the  other 
government establishments, especially the AMLSCU, with regard to the policing and control 
of  money  laundering.  What  is  the  nature  of  the  relationship  between  the  police  and  the 
AMLSCU? How much access do the police have to information kept by the AMLSCU on 
suspected  money  laundering  cases?  Should  the  police  be  able  to  demand  access  to  the 
AMLSCU files if access is denied by the latter?  Are there any defects in the current system? 
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If  so,  how should all  the legal  and political  authorities  work together  to  ensure effective 
money laundering control? 
Details of the roles of these government authorities are discussed below:
5.3.1 The Role of  the AMLSCU, Central Bank of UAE 
The Anti-Money Laundering and Suspicious Cases Unit (the AMLSCU) of the 
Central Bank plays an important role in money laundering cases in the UAE. The 
responsibility for starting an investigating into a suspicious money laundering transaction lies 
with the Unit (Articles 7 and 8 of CML, 2002). All suspected cases of money laundering must 
go through the AMLSCU before any decision could be made as to whether a judicial 
proceeding should be initiated against an accused person or not. Specifically, the roles and 
functions of the AMLSCU are as follows: 
• The AMLSCU is the only competent authority with the power to communicate with 
financial institutions and banks with respect to a suspected money laundering case. If 
any other government authority, including the police, requires any information from 
financial institutions pertaining to the investigation of a money laundering case, they 
are not legally allowed to contact the concerned financial  institution directly.  They 
will have to communicate their demands through the AMLSCU/the Central Bank of 
the  UAE.  For  example,  if  the  police  authority  needs  information  about  the  bank 
account of a suspected money launderer, it has to complete a special form explaining 
to  the  AMLSCU the  nature  of  the  information  needed  and the  reasons  why such 
information is needed.   In the UAE, law enforcement authorities have no direct access 
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to individuals’ bank accounts. Only the AMLSCU has that access. The AMLSCU has 
the power to obtain details of any private or commercial bank account in the UAE. 
• The  AMLSCU  is  technically  the  storehouse  where  all  the  information  related  to 
suspicious  transactions  are  received  and  kept.  On  the  receipt  of  an  STR  from  a 
financial institution, the AMLSCU makes the initial decision as to whether an accused 
person ought to be subject to further investigation.  Under Article 4 of CML 2002, the 
AMLSCU has the power to freeze a suspicious account for up to seven days, pending 
investigation into the alleged offence.  The purpose of freezing a suspected account is 
to prevent the accused person from dispersing his funds during the course of the unit’s 
investigation (see Lovett and Barwick, 2007).
• To  be  able  to  facilitate  the  investigation  process  against  the  accused  person,  the 
AMLSCU can order a financial institution to provide all kinds of information that the 
institution keeps with respect to the accused account holder.
• If,  after  analyzing an STR, the AMLSCU is convinced that the suspected funds or 
transactions have been derived from legal sources, it will request the Public Prosecutor 
to lift the freeze order on the suspected customer’s bank account. 
• However, when the AMLSCU is not satisfied from the documents provided that the 
funds in question are not the proceeds of crime, and the suspected customer, upon 
request by the AMLSCU, has refused or failed to produce additional documents to 
counteract  the  accusation,  the  Unit  will  immediately  send  a  report  to  the  Public 
Prosecutor with a request to extend the freezing order beyond the seven day limit.
• The AMLSCU will continue to collect further documents and information during the 
extended freeze period.  Such information could be either from local sources or from 
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overseas FIUs. If after the completion of the analysis of the information gathered, the 
AMLSCU is of the opinion that the account under investigation is a case of suspected 
laundering of money derived from crime; the Unit  will send its  final report  to the 
Public  Prosecutor  who  would  then  initiate  the  necessary  legal  action  against  the 
accused  person.  The AMLSCU report  to  the  Public  Prosecutor  often  contains  the 
information obtained from the financial institutions and the results of the Unit’s own 
analysis  of  these  documents,  as  well  as  other  information  obtained  locally  or 
internationally. This report does not include statements from the accused individual or 
party.
•  Whereas  the  AMLSCU is  responsible  for  building  up the  case  against  suspected 
money launderers, it has no power to accuse the suspect of any crime; neither does the 
Unit  have  the  power  of  criminal  investigation.  Hence  the  requirement  to  pass  the 
matter over to the Attorney-General in order to initiate further investigation. However, 
only the AMLSCU can decide which case goes forward for further investigation or 
ought to be discontinued; and the decision of the Unit on this is final. In other words, 
the  decision  as  to  whether  an  STR is  suspicious  or  not  lies  exclusively  with  the 
AMLSCU. No other government authority is included in this decision. Furthermore, 
there is no mechanism in place to challenge the decision of the AMLSCU if the unit  
decides, for example, not to pursue a criminal investigation against a suspected STR.
• It is important to mention that the FIUs in overseas countries constantly share a variety 
of information on money laundering with the UAE (the AMLSCU), in addition to 
making requests for cooperation through the relevant Ministries. The information that 
FIUs provide to one another constitute intelligence sharing with respect to important 
issues such as the legality of transactions or accounts and other issues that are not 
necessarily  related  to  a  specific  crime  or  trial.  In  addition,  the  information  shared 
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between FIUs is directly between the FIUs themselves, without any mediation by, or 
reference, to any Ministry or through the diplomatic conduit.
5.3.2  The Role of the Attorney General 
The involvement of the Attorney General in money laundering cases is justified on the 
ground that any accusation of money laundering against an individual or an institution is a 
serious matter that needs special legal attention.  Specifically, the role of the Attorney General 
involves the following: 
• Under Article 5(1) of the CML 2002 the Attorney General has the exclusive powers to 
order the criminal investigation of all cases of suspected money laundering received from 
the AMLSCU.   
• Under Article 5(2) of CML 2002, the Attorney General also has the power to issue a 
freezing  order  on  the  bank  accounts  or  property  of  a  person  suspected  of  money 
laundering if the account or property is suspected to have been derived from the proceeds 
of  crime.  However,  this  power  can  only  be  executed  through  the  Central  Bank  (the 
AMLSCU) and with the knowledge (but not the approval) of the concerned bank or other 
financial  institution.  The  freezing  order  usually  continues  until  the  case  is  fully 
investigated, or lifted if the suspected account or assets is not proven to have been derived 
from crime.
• It is also the duty of the Attorney General to inform the AMLSCU of the results of the 
police investigation into all money laundering cases before the final decision to prosecute 
is made.
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• Any request  for  assistance  from other  countries  also  has  to  go  through  the  Attorney 
General before the case is passed on to the Police. 
5.3.3 The Role of the Public Prosecutor
The Public Prosecutor:
• Examines the STRs from the AMLSCU forwarded to it by the Attorney-General and 
makes the final decision on whether the case should be passed on to the police for full 
investigation.  If  so,  the  Public  Prosecutor  is  then  required  to  instruct  the  Anti-
Organised Crime Department of the Police (AOCD) to commence a full investigation 
against the named accused individual or organisation. 
• The Public Prosecution Officer is also permitted under Article 4 of the CML 2002 to 
order  the  seizure  of  properties  or  the  proceeds  of  crime  of  the  suspected  money 
launderer whilst investigation into their alleged crime or crimes is on-going. If the 
Public Prosecutor is of the opinion that there is not enough information/evidence in 
the AMLSCU report to warrant full criminal investigation, he could issue a release 
order to the suspected money launderer.  However, this decision could be overridden 
by the AMLSCU. Once the AMLSCU has recommend in its final report the need to 
take legal action against the accused person, the freezing order will continue and the 
case will be sent to the police for further investigation, in spite of any objections from 
the Public Prosecutor.
• During full investigation into the alleged crime, the police act under the direction of 
the Public Prosecutor. The Public Prosecutor can order or authorise the use of specific 
investigative actions such as the deployment of special investigative techniques. 
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• Finally,  cases of  money laundering  from other  sources  (for example,  the Customs 
Authority) could be reported directly to the Public Prosecutor’s office. This would 
happen  where  an  individual  has  failed  to  declare  to  the  Customs  Authority  the 
currency  that  he  or  she  was  carrying  when  entering  into  the  UAE.  A  Custom 
Authority report would be made only when the amount of cash in question exceeds 
the maximum threshold limit of AED 40,000 or equivalent in other currencies, and 
the  individual  had  failed  or  refused  to  complete  a  currency  declaration  form as 
required by law. In this regard, there are two actions possible: on the one hand, where 
the case is deemed to be one of deliberate violation of the currency regulations, the 
suspect will be prosecuted in court. On the other hand, where the case is seen as one 
of  suspected money laundering,  Article  8.2 of the CML 2002 requires  the Public 
Prosecutor to first consult with the AMLSCU before taking any necessary action (for 
example, to pass the case over to the police for full investigation).  
5.3.4 The Role of the AOCD of the Dubai Police
The AOCD was created exclusively to deal with organised crimes and other financial crimes 
such as fraud and embezzlement. In the UAE, the AOCD is the only government authority 
that is empowered to investigate suspected money laundering cases. As mentioned above, the 
Dubai  Police,  unlike in the rest  of the UAE, has a Money Laundering Section within its 
AOCD that deals specifically with money laundering cases. Specifically, the role of the police 
includes:
• The  collection  of  evidence  from various  sources,  to  support  a  charge  against  the 
accused. Sources that are often used by the Dubai Police include undercover sources, 
such as informants who have firsthand knowledge of the suspect’s organised crime 
and money laundering activities; ordinary citizens; government agencies such as the 
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Customs  Authority,  overseas  FIUs  and  financial  institutions,  where  necessary  and 
other investigative techniques suggested by the Public Prosecutor.
• The Dubai Police would also investigate suspected money laundering cases referred to 
it  by the Customs Authority  via  the Public  Prosecutor  or an overseas  FIU via the 
Attorney-General/Department of International Cooperation. The investigation into any 
case of suspected money laundering will start only when the AOCD receives an order 
from the Attorney General/Public Prosecutor to investigate the case. All investigations 
are subject, as mentioned above,  to the approval and authorisation of the AMLSCU
• Once the  go-ahead  is  given by the  Attorney-General  for  criminal  investigation  to 
commence, and authorisation is given by the Public Prosecutor, the police will collect 
evidence in accordance with the law, having due regard to the rights of the suspect. 
The  police  investigation  may  include  the  taking  of  statements  of  the  suspected 
offenders  as  well  as  statements  from other  key  informants  such  as  witnesses  and 
employees.  The investigation  procedure  has  to  be  thorough and,  as  such,  it  could 
include  searching  the  accused  persons’  property,  collecting  forensic  evidence  and 
acquiring other important documentary evidence. 
• Once the police have completed their  investigation,  they are required to send their 
report along with their recommendation to the Attorney General to initiate criminal 
proceedings against the accused. Where the recommendation supports a charge, the 
Attorney General, before any decision is made to prosecute, will send the file to the 
AMLSCU for approval. Unless approval is obtained from the AMLSCU, a case may 
not be prosecuted in court. 
• Following the consultation with and approval of the AMLSCU, the Attorney General 
will require both the AMLSCU and the AOCD to meet to discuss the case and come 
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up with a definite  charge before the case is passed on to the Public  Prosecutor  to 
initiate criminal proceedings in the court. It is only after a unified single report from 
the AMLSCU and the AOCD to prosecute the suspected money launderer has been 
received, will there be a prosecution in court.
The Dubai Police AOCD is not only responsible for the investigation of domestic money 
laundering cases. It also assists in the investigation of money laundering cases on behalf of 
other countries. As mentioned above, such requests are made through the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the Department of International Cooperation in the Ministry of Justice, Islamic 
Affairs and Auqaf. The overseas requests are first assessed in the abovementioned Ministry in 
order to ascertain it relevance under the international and regional conventions and treaties to 
which  the UAE is  a  signatory.  The said department  will  then forward the  request  to  the 
Attorney General in Dubai from where the case is sent to the Dubai Police for investigation.  
As Alldridge (2003) stated, such requests for cooperation in criminal matters may come in a 
broad range of activities that include obtaining witness statements, collecting documentary 
evidences, locating and identifying the suspected individuals, requests for search and seizure 
of  funds  and  property,  transfer  of  prisoners  to  assist  in  criminal  investigation  and  the 
confiscation of the proceeds of crime.
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Diagram 5.1: Processes of Money Laundering Investigation
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5.4 Facts and Figures:  Money Laundering and Control in the UAE
Money  laundering  cases  are  very  sensitive  cases  and  therefore,  in  the  UAE, 
information about known and convicted money laundering cases are often kept secret and 
confidential. The attitude of not sharing information related to money laundering crimes was 
more  prevalent  in  the  AMLSCU  than  in  the  Dubai  Police’s  AOCD.   As  a  result,  it  is 
impossible  to  get  accurate  and  comprehensive  statistics  about  the  numbers  of  money 
laundering cases found and tried in Dubai.  However, FATF was able, in its 2008 Annual 
Report,  to  publish  some  basic  statistics  on  the  number  of  money  laundering  cases 
investigated, and the number of STRs sent to the AMLSCU. The information was collected 
mostly from the Dubai Police. They were presented in the FATF report as follows:
From January 2000 to February 2007, the Dubai Police had investigated 224 
cases involving money laundering, of which 91 arose from financial crimes, 
nine from drug-related offenses, and 124 from money laundering as an act in 
itself. Reflecting the fact that Dubai is an international financial centre and 
confirming local and overseas intelligence that foreigners attempt to launder 
money through Dubai, it was noted by the Dubai Police that, of the 224 cases 
investigated, 122 originated from countries other than the UAE, the highest 
being the United Kingdom with 43 cases, the United States with 13 and India 
with 10. In all, 30 separate countries were listed as being the origin of money 
laundering offenses investigated by the Dubai Police with European nations 
being [ ] 20 of those [countries]. The Dubai Police commenced 102 cases 
themselves in the same timeframe (see FATF, 2008:49-50). 
Table 5.1: Number of STRs Filed by Financial Institution (2004 – 2006)
Institution 2004 2005 2006
Banks 252 250 475
Moneychangers and other financial institutions 38 49 73
Dubai International Financial Center (DIFC) institutions - 2 8
Total 290 301 556
(Source: FATF, 2008:82)
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5.5 Impediments to Effective Money Laundering Control Mechanism
The Government of the UAE has provided sufficient legislative basis for the AMLSCU in the 
Central  Bank  and the  law enforcement  authorities  to  fight  money  laundering  effectively. 
However,  there  are  still  many  problems  that  hinder  the  overall  progress  with  respect  to 
combating money laundering in the country. Some of the problems that have been highlighted 
by critics of the UAE system are discussed in this section. 
a) The Exclusive Focus on International/Cross-Border Money Laundering Control and 
the lack of attention to the domestic problem of Financial Crimes that could also be 
money laundering.
The  numbers  of  money  laundering  cases  that  have  been  investigated  by  the  Dubai 
Police are very few; more than half of them were overseas request cases where the Dubai 
Police responded to overseas wishes to assist in the investigation of money laundering cases. 
Very few of the cases dealt with by the police were internal cases, where the identification, 
tracing and investigation of the money laundering occurred locally (see FATF, 2008).  This 
observation  can  be  verified  through  the  comparison  between  the  number  of  internal  and 
external money laundering cases that have been investigated by the Dubai Police between 
2004 and 2006 (see FATF, 2008, op.cit.) 
There is no doubt that the Government of UAE has been successful, to some extent,  in 
protecting its borders from cash smuggling and its financial system from the infiltration of 
illegal proceeds derived from organized crime that has been committed outside the country. 
Through the anti-money laundering laws and regulations, the financial and legal authorities 
have been able to detect, pursue and freeze suspicious transactions and funds that come from 
other countries into the UAE. However, critics have argued that the authorities have placed 
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far too much emphasis on pursing money laundering cases from abroad at the expense of 
fighting the internal money laundering phenomenon that exists within the country. 
Although there is a common belief that organized crime is not a matter of concern for 
the law enforcement authorities in the UAE, there is evidence that there are official concerns 
in  the  country  about  the  apparent  yearly  growth  in  the  incidence  of  financial  crimes. 
According to Taylor (2000), financial crimes in the UAE rose by 24.4 per cent, from a figure 
of 16,175 in 1997 to 20,123 offences in 1998: 
The [figures] showed crimes of fraud topping the list in 1998, the latest year 
for which full figures are available, with 12,806 reported cases, representing 
63.64  per  cent  of  the  total  number  of  financial  crimes.  Dud  cheque 
transactions accounted for the majority of fraud cases, with a 25.5 per cent 
increase in reported cases over 1997. Nearly 40 per cent of financial crimes 
were registered in the emirate of Dubai. Sharjah accounted for a further 32.15 
per cent, while only 12.72 per cent were registered in Abu Dhabi (see Taylor, 
2000) 
The UAE has become an easy target for financial crime, especially fraud. Criminals are 
using different tactics and are taking advantage of ineffective legislation and legal loopholes 
within  the  system to  perpetrate  different  types  of  fraudulent  transactions  and crime.  One 
prominent example was the case of an African man nicknamed ‘Baba’ whose real name was 
Foutanga  Dit  Babani  Sissoko.   Baba  had  allegedly  used  black  magic  to  perpetuate  an 
extensive fraud. It was reported in the daily newspaper  The Gulf News, of May 18th  2001, 
that:
Baba ...  allegedly  used magic  to  persuade a  senior manager  of the  Dubai 
Islamic Bank to wire about Dh 1billion to his bank accounts in New York, 
Miami, Geneva and the Isle of Man in 183 telex transfers between August 
1995 and January 1998 (Smalley, 2001)      
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DeFede (1999) reported that Sissoko used the financial systems of both the UAE and the USA 
to launder this money in the USA, whereby $150 million was transferred to the United States 
through Citibank in the UAE, but the authorities in both the UAE and the USA had turned a 
blind eye to such a huge transaction. It was reported in the Miami New Times on April 8, 1999 
that  ‘Citibank,  through  its  officers,  management,  agents  and  employees  knowingly 
participated  in  the  conspiracy  to  steal  funds from the  Dubai  Islamic  Bank’ (see  DeFede, 
1999).
Just  one year  after  the Sissoko case,  another  high profile  fraud case  hit  the  UAE 
economy that  amounted  to  nearly  $360 million.   This  involved  Madhav Patel,  an  Indian 
businessman. Patel  took huge sums of money as loans from different  banks in the UAE. 
Taylor (2000) reported that: 
Patel,  who  fled  the  UAE  with  outstanding  debts,  had  an  unblemished 
relationship with banks for over 15 years. He then managed to glean nearly 
$237 million  in  loans  plus  an unspecified  amount  in  letters  of  credit  and 
guarantees from 14 banks, and flee (Taylor, 2000).
 
Patel laundered all these millions of money into banks in the UK whilst he managed to escape 
from the country. These two cases were clear cases of money laundering in that substantial 
amounts of money, obtained by criminal (fraudulent) means (see Article 2.2. of CML, 2002), 
were  deposited  in  banks  outside  the  country  (the  UAE)  in  which  these  crimes  were 
committed. 
 Critics argue that the Sissoko and Patel cases are not the first fraud cases and will not 
be the last unless the UAE pays as much attention to the laundering of money obtained by 
criminal means inside the UAE. The implications for the UAE, in terms of the adverse effects  
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that this could have on the UAE economy, the banking sector, trade and the tourism industry, 
cannot be underestimated. 
Unfortunately, the UAE’s current legislation on money laundering is not extended to 
the exporting of cash out of the country. There are no regulations to scrutinize transactions 
sent abroad via the UAE financial institutions, as there are on transactions sent from overseas. 
The authorities in the UAE appear to be more interested in closely monitoring cash and funds 
that enter into the country than the cash and funds that are taken out of the country. Critics 
argue that the reason for this is simply because the anti-money laundering laws in the UAE 
developed as a response to international  pressure rather than as a reaction to a perceived 
domestic problem.
International cooperation with respect to the policing and control of money laundering 
is no doubt important. It portrays the positive image of the UAE and its financial system, and 
improves  the  country’s  reputation  internationally,  which  in  turn  is  conducive  to  further 
investment  in  the  country.  There  are  a  number  of  countries  that  do  not  cooperate  as 
completely as the UAE authorities do with international authorities in combating transnational 
money  laundering.  For  example,  Fisher  (2001)  argued  in  relation  to  the  UK  that  the 
authorities in that country do not always respond swiftly to overseas’ requests with respect to 
international money laundering cases and that, as a result, the country’s financial system is 
more vulnerable to being abused by money launderers. However, the authorities in the UAE 
should keep a proper balance between international cooperation in controlling cross-border 
money laundering and controlling the country’s internal money laundering problem. 
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b) The lack of Accountability of the AMLSCU and Financial Institutions
The above discussion (Section 5.5) clearly shows the dominant role that the AMLSCU plays 
in the policing and control of money laundering cases in Dubai. The AMLSCU verifies  the 
authenticity  of  STRs,  decides  which  cases  merit  further  criminal  investigation  and,  after 
investigation,  makes the final decision on which case should be prosecuted in court.  This 
shows that the AMLSCU is the most important authority in the decision-making process.  For 
instance, if an STR is deemed not to be suspicious under the accountancy assessment rules of 
the AMLSCU but, at the same time, the police authority might have undercover information 
that the same individual is involved in money laundering, these STRs will go unreported and 
the suspected person will not be investigated.  Although Article 7 of the CML 2002 clearly 
stated  that  ‘…the  said  Unit  [the  AMLSCU] shall  make  the  information  available  to  law 
enforcement agencies to facilitate their investigations’, it doesn’t give the police the exclusive 
right  to  inspect  an  STR or  to  ask  the  AMLSCU for  an  STR where  the  decision  of  the 
AMLSCU  is  not  to  subject  the  suspect  to  further  investigation.   The  AMLSCU  is  not 
accountable to anyone with regard to how the Unit chooses to assess and process STRs. 
The  Attorney–General/Public  Prosecutor  cannot  initiate  any  criminal  proceedings 
against  a  suspected  money  launderer  without  first  presenting  the  results  of  the  police 
investigation  into  the  case  to  the  AMLSCU  for  approval.  If  the  AMLSCU  arrives  at  a 
different conclusion to that of the police investigation, for instance, that the evidence collected 
does not support the charge against the accused, the suspected money laundering case will not 
be  taken  to  court  for  trial.  In  all  money  laundering  cases,  the  recommendations  of  the 
AMLSCU always take priority over that of the Dubai Police.  
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The point being made is that the Dubai Police has the important and tedious job of 
investigating money laundering crimes, collecting evidence and building up a case, but their 
role is minimal compared to the overwhelming and uncontrollable position of the AMLSCU. 
There is  no channel  of communication  between the AMLSCU and the AOCD. The 
Police cannot  ask for any further  information or help from the AMLSCU other  than that 
which is provided in the Unit’s reports on the STRs. The AMLSCU and the AOCD can meet 
only when the Attorney General requires them to meet in order to produce a single mutual 
report about a suspected money laundering case (see above). These departments do not share 
information regarding money laundering cases on a regular basis.  
Furthermore,  with  regard  to  CTRs,  financial  institutions  are  not  questionable  or 
accountable  for  decisions  taken  not  to  regard  a  CTR as  being  suspicious,  and  therefore 
deciding  not  to  send it  to  the  AMLSCU as  an STR. There is  no legal  duty  on financial 
institutions to substantiate their decision when they have decided that a transaction above the 
threshold limit is normal, and not suspicious. 
c)  The Absence of a National Database on STRs and CTRs 
Currently, there is no national database of CTRs and STRs in the UAE. This is unlike 
countries like Australia where a national database of CTRs and STRs is maintained and made 
readily available to the law enforcement agencies at any time (see Table 3 below). 
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Table 5.2 Reports Received at AUSTRAC Since 2000
Reports 2000-2001 2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004
STRs 7,247 7,809 8,054 11,484
CTRs 1,681,024 1,850,804 1,979,446 2,056,617
Cross-Border 
Cash
26,858 29,538 28,274 25,579
International 
Wire Transfers
6,107,534 7,057,084 7,493,765 8,685,843
Total Reports 7,822,663 8,945,235 9,509,539 10,779,523
Database 
Searches
686,817 791,255 873,815 1,225,388
Investigation 715 1,892 1,544 1,743
Taxation 
Revenue
AU$72m AU$33m AU$99m AU$72m
Source: AUSTRAC data, June 2004 cited in Jensen (2005:237)
The  creation  of  a  national  database  for  STRs,  CTRs  and  other  international  financial 
transactions  (without  thresholds),  and  making  this  database  accessible  to  the  Police,  the 
Customs Authority  and the security  departments,  would no doubt  be of great  value  with 
regard to the policing and control of money laundering in the country.  With no database 
available, it is difficult to monitor the activities of potential or actual money launderers; to 
know,  for  example,  whether  an  offender  currently  under  investigation  has  been  under 
suspicion in the past, but has not been prosecuted, or whether there was a CTR record of the 
suspect’s previous transactions that was held by the financial institutions but not declared as a 
suspicious account.   Having a database would be a valuable asset in the identification of 
persistent  violators  and  an  important  starting  point  in  the  collection  of  evidence  for 
prosecution.  In addition, it would give an indication of the nature and extent of the problem 
and would alert the authorities to the necessary steps that need to be taken in order to protect 
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the  national  economy  from these  criminals.  It  would  also  aid  the  fight  against  terrorist 
financing and other suspicious financial transactions both inside and outside the country. 
d) Lack of Training and Experience in partnership working
Although, the Government of the UAE has had anti-money laundering laws in place since 
2002,  the  control  mechanism  used  to  counter  money  laundering  crimes  is  still  largely 
underdeveloped. It is doubtful whether the training that officers of the Dubai Police have had 
on the policing and control of money laundering is adequate to deal with the changing nature 
of money laundering crimes globally. Although, as stated above, the Central Bank of the UAE 
has organized a number of workshops/seminars related to countering money laundering in the 
country,  such  programmes  have  often  been  used  for  publicity  purposes  rather  than  for 
focusing exclusively on training the officials of the authorities in such a way as to be able to 
deal more effectively with money laundering. Although Article 17 of AMLR 2000 identified 
training as a key issue in the policing of money laundering, there is no clear strategy in Dubai 
on the training of police officers, prosecutors and judges with regard to money laundering 
crimes.  Most money laundering training programmes are concerned with theoretical issues 
instead  of  the  practical  and  procedural  issues  on  how  to  detect  and  investigate  money 
laundering cases. 
 Moreover,  all  those involved in money laundering control  are  not trained together. 
Thus, there is no opportunity for all those concerned to exchange their views and develop a 
better  understanding of how their  roles are  related.  There is  no experience of partnership 
working. Each authority sees their role vis-à-vis the others in terms of the legal provisions 
defining that role, not as partners working to achieve the same goals and objectives. This issue 
is discussed further in Chapter Six.
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e) The Absence of Civil Confiscation Legislation
An important deficiency in the UAE money laundering legislation is the absence of a civil  
law on confiscation or forfeiture of property derived from the proceeds of money laundering. 
Civil forfeiture is increasingly being recognised by many countries as a relatively effective 
control  strategy  designed  to  tackle  the  phenomenon  of  organised  crime  and  terrorist 
financing.  In a civil proceeding, the burden of proof will be on the owner of the property to 
prove that the property is not the proceeds of crime,  and/or will  not be used in criminal 
activities such as terrorism.  Therefore, the forfeiture or recovery of any suspicious property 
will be based on civil standards (the probability), rather than the criminal standards (beyond 
reasonable doubt) that the said property is the proceeds of crime and/or is being used for 
criminal activities. 
5.6 Conclusion.
In this chapter, the following issues have been identified 
1. The UAE, like most countries, has initiated tough legal steps to criminalise money 
laundering and the financing of terrorism, although these efforts came as a result of 
international pressure to combat money laundering and to fight terrorism globally. The 
harsh penalties introduced in both the CML 2002 and CTO 2004 for those who are 
either  involved  in  money  laundering  and/or  terrorist  financing,  reveals  the 
government’s intention to ensure that organised criminals and terrorists do not find the 
UAE to be a safe haven, and to ensure the safety of the UAE financial system from 
abuse by organised criminals and money launderers. 
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2. The UAE money laundering laws criminalise all attempts to launder the proceeds of 
crimes committed abroad, in the UAE. The laws places responsibility on the financial 
institutions to report any suspicious transaction activities to the AMLSCU, failure to 
do so being punishable by law. The laws also require all those who bring cash into the 
UAE to disclose the amount of such cash at the time of entry to the UAE if it is above 
the threshold fixed by the Central Bank of the UAE.  However, it is  argued that the 
introduction  of  a  civil  law  on  confiscation  might  be  a  more  effective  means  of 
deterring money launderers who plan to invest their criminal proceeds in proprieties in 
the UAE. 
3. The UAE/Dubai operates two systems of reporting where a transaction is larger than 
the threshold allowed by law: a threshold reporting system (CTR) and a suspicious 
reporting system (STR).  A transaction  above the threshold may not necessarily  be 
regarded as a suspicious transaction.  The initial decision as to whether a transaction 
beyond the threshold is suspicious,  lies with the financial  institutions in which the 
deposit was made. Where a financial institution chooses not to regard a transaction 
beyond the threshold as being suspicious, it cannot be questioned by the AMLSCU or 
by the law enforcement agencies. The AMLSCU or the police have no access to CTRs 
kept  in  banks or other  financial  or  commercial  institutions.  This means that  some 
possible cases of money laundering escape investigation and possible prosecution.  In 
contrast, where persons attempts to smuggle cash into the UAE via the various ports of 
entry,  they are subject  to  quick and immediate  prosecution  for currency violation. 
Such cases are not regarded as money laundering unless the Customs Authorities have 
reasons to suspect that they are. 
4. All cases of suspected money laundering must be ratified by the AMLSCU before any 
further investigation or prosecution can take place. This could take place at any stage 
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in the investigation of the offence. The AMLSCU may choose to close a case even 
when police evidence shows that the suspect may have a case to answer. 
5. The AMLSCU is not accountable to anyone for decisions taken at the initial stage of 
inquiry into a money laundering case. The Unit is required by law to share information 
received from financial intuitions with the law enforcement agencies, but the latter do 
not have the power to request such information,  or have direct access to it.    This 
means that not all cases of suspected money laundering are subject to investigation. 
Similarly,  financial  institutions  may not be questioned over  decisions  taken not to 
regard a CTR as an STR. Furthermore, there are no national databases with regard to 
CTRs and STRs issued by financial institutions. This makes it difficult to know the 
true nature and extent of the problem of money laundering in the country.  
6. The Dubai police play an important role in fighting money laundering through the 
AOCD. The money laundering investigations carried out by the Dubai Police have 
been mainly on behalf of overseas’ requests to assist in the criminal investigation of 
cases. The police also deal with other money laundering cases. For example, cases 
referred to it  by the AMLSCU through the Public Prosecutor in the form of STRs 
received  from  financial  institutions  with  regard  to  suspected  money  laundering 
activities of clients, or cases referred to it by the Customs Authorities via the Public 
Prosecutor’s office, where a person crossing the borders into the UAE has failed to 
declare currencies in their possession that are above the legally permitted threshold. 
However, the role of the Police is minimal in terms of the legal mechanisms in place 
for controlling money laundering in Dubai. The Police may  have control over the 
process of further investigation into a particular offence,  but the final decision on 
prosecution is influenced by a non-judicial authority, the AMLSCU.
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7. The CML 2002 criminalises  primary money laundering  but  is  silent  on secondary 
money laundering. More important is the fact that the law regulates the laundering of 
cash and proceeds from overseas’ sources, but is silent on domestic money laundering 
where money obtained in the UAE by fraudulent means, for example, is exported out 
of the country. Although Article 2.2. of CML 2002 regards proceeds from fraud as 
money laundering, the law appears to have been interpreted so far in terms of cross-
border or international fraud. Dubai’s legal, political and economic structures in place 
for  dealing  with  money  laundering  are  focused  exclusively  on  the  international 
dimension of the crime.  The lack of legal regulation of internal or domestic money 
laundering means that the UAE financial system is still subject to abuse by those who 
export cash out of the country illegally.
8. There  is  no  established  tradition  or  national  experience  of  partnership-working 
between the authorities  (agencies)  involved in money laundering control  in Dubai. 
The current training programme for all involved in money laundering control has not 
addressed this issue, which is vital if the system is to work effectively. 
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Chapter Six
The Control of Money Laundering in Practice
6.0 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I examined the legal, political and administrative structures in place 
in the UAE and Dubai for the policing and control of money laundering, highlighting the role 
of the Central Bank, financial institutions and the law enforcement agencies, including the 
police. The chapter explained how the system is expected to work in theory and according to 
law.  This chapter examines the views and opinions of these key actors on how the system 
operates in practice, the problems they encounter during the course of their daily activities, 
and how they thought that the system should work in order for it to be more effective in 
controlling money laundering. The chapter is based on data collected from the questionnaire 
survey and interviews conducted with banking and law enforcement officers in Dubai. The 
respondents included 10 bank managers, 15 officials of the AMLSCU and 15 police officers 
working in the Anti-Organized Crime Department (AOCD) of Dubai Police (see Chapter 4)
The chapter is divided into four sections. Section 6.1 discusses how suspicious cases 
are identified,  based mainly on the responses of AMLSCU Officials  and Bank Managers. 
The section that follows (Section 6.2) examines the views and opinions of police officers on 
the  investigation  of  money  laundering  cases  and  their  relationship  with  the  AMLSCU. 
Section  6.3 discusses  the  views  of  all  respondents  on  the  nature  of  the  relationship  that 
currently  exists  between  all  parties,  especially  with  regard  to  the  sharing  of 
information/intelligence.  Section  6.4  provides  concluding  remarks  on  the  key  points 
identified by the respondents. The chapter sets the scene for a discussion of the possibility of 
introducing Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) in Dubai, in chapter 7. 
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6.1. Identifying Suspicious Cases
Whereas the law defines what constitutes money laundering, it was clear in Chapter 5 that 
those  involved  in  the  initial  decision-making  process,  namely  the  AMLSCU,  financial 
institutions (banks) and the Customs Authority, have considerable discretion with respect to 
which cases they would put forward as a suspicious case of money laundering. 
Due to the fact that the banks and the AMLSCU make the initial and often the most 
crucial decision on which bank deposit or transaction is suspicious, and therefore in need of 
further investigation as a suspected money laundering case, it is important to know the views 
of these respondents on how they would identify a  suspicious  case of money laundering. 
When asked what types of transactions they would most likely report as being suspicious, 
many of the Bank Managers and the AMLSCU officials said that they would suspect money 
coming into the country from war-torn countries and countries that are politically unstable, or 
those with poor security records. Bank Manager No. 2 explained:
You  know  any  cross-border  transactions  incoming  and  outgoing  with 
countries  such as Afghanistan,  Iraq,  some African countries  and others 
would  raise  suspicion.  You  see,  there  is  mess;  there  are  local  groups 
fighting each other, there is Al-Qaeda, Taliban, NATO [and] the American 
forces; weak governments with no control over their country [and so on]. 
In this situation, you never know what is the source of the money that is 
coming  to  our  bank from such countries.   Is  the  money  derived  from 
organized crimes in those countries and do they want to wash it through 
our banks? Is it genuine money earned through legal means? It is very 
hard for us to decide on the legality of these funds (Field Notes, 2009)
He continued:
Please  do  not  have  the  impression  that  there  is  no  money  laundering 
attempts from other countries which do not have any internal conflicts or 
what you called them:  developed countries. I have reported a number of 
suspicious  transactions  that  involved  people  from  some  European 
countries and the USA as well. [However] it is very easy to communicate 
and exchange information with countries that are stable and have sound 
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anti-money  laundering  systems  in  place,  whereas  with  non-stable 
countries, there is always an additional pressure on us (Field Notes, 2009).
The AMLSCU Official No. 9 added:
Different countries have different problems. There are countries such as 
Mexico  and Colombia  [  ]  that  are  famous for  drugs  and drug dealers. 
There is black money10 coming also from Russia and the other former 
Soviet republics. You know about Russian mafia that are famous for their 
organized crimes in Russia. They also try to launder their money earned 
from different organized crimes in Russia [in the UAE]. There are mafias 
[involved in] human trafficking and prostitution  in  European countries. 
We don’t have any organized crime here in the UAE. However, the UAE, 
being one of the important financial centres, has always been on the list of 
these organized criminals in order to launder their money (Field Notes, 
2009).
. 
There  appeared  to  be a consensus  of  opinion amongst  the bank managers  and AMLSCU 
officials  that  “black  money” enters  the  UAE as  a  result  of  two main  organised  criminal 
activities:  illicit  drugs  and  arms  smuggling  (Medler,  2005).   As  Bank  Manger  No.  4 
explained:
Some of the countries in our neighbouring region are well known for drug 
trafficking and arms smuggling, and criminals try to launder their  criminal 
proceed here in the UAE [ ]. Afghanistan is the main source of drug money in 
the  region.  You  know  that  Americans  used  drug  money  to  help  the 
Mujahedeen to fight against  the Soviet Union. Even Al-Qaeda and Taliban 
used drug money to finance its regime. Now, the warlords have taken full 
control  of  the  drug business  in  Afghanistan  and the  drug money  is  being 
laundered  through the financial  system of  the Gulf countries  (Field  Notes, 
2009).
AMLSCU Official No. 2 added:
10 Black money’ is one of the local terms generally used by the banks and law enforcement agencies to define 
laundered money. Others include: ‘dirty money’, ‘illegal money’ and ‘crime money’.
207
You see these regional wars in Iraq and in Afghanistan, and you also see the 
American and NATO forces, the Al-Qaeda, Taliban. How they are fighting? 
From where do they bring in the money to buy weapons? Who is supplying 
the weapons to them? Of course there are criminal groups that are supplying 
weapons and making money out of it. There are chances that these criminals 
bring their illegal money to the UAE to launder it through our banking system 
(Field Notes, 2009)
In addition to the geographical origin of the transaction, respondents were asked what other 
criteria they would use to identify ‘high risk accounts’.  Bank Manager No. 7 answered: 
Our decision  is  based upon taking into  consideration  the  standard  risk 
indicators such as the personal background of the client, [ ] his occupation, 
and the nature of business activity involved. (Field Notes, 2009)
Bank Manager  No. 10 replied that  the procedure  for  identifying  high risk accounts  is  an 
ongoing process, applied to both new and existing customers:
We constantly monitor all medium and large scale to and fro transactions. 
Any transaction that  is  not  compatible  with the economic status of the 
customer will be considered suspicious and will be reported to the Central 
Bank for further investigation (Field Notes, 2009)
The AMLSCU officials thought that large transactions should always be seen as potentially 
suspicious. As the AMLSCU Official No. 5 explained: 
If, for example,  a government employee deposits large sum of money 
into  his  account  while  failing  to  disclose  the  source  of  the  funds,  of 
course it is suspicious. Where did he get the money, keeping in view his 
economic  status?  Similarly,  for  example,  if  the  transactions  in  a 
businessman’s accounts are not compatible with that of the information 
he provided to the bank about his business, everybody will be suspicious 
of the money in his accounts (Field Notes, 2009). 
But there was no indication that the size of the amount was a key element in the decision to  
regard a transaction as being suspicious. As the AMLSCU Official No. 15 stated:
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A suspicious transaction has nothing to do with its amount. I know the 
common sense approach lead us to believe that any big transaction could 
be suspicious,  which is  wrong. The criminals  are very clever  and they 
know that any big transaction will be monitored by bank officials. (Field 
Notes, 2009) 
6.1. 1. The Hawala System
Questions were also asked about the respondents’ views on hawala – an informal means of 
transferring money, used primarily by poor people and generally believed to be a loophole 
that could be exploited by money launderers (see Chapter 2).  Some of respondents thought 
that there was far too much and perhaps unnecessary criticism of hawala. On the one hand, 
some believed that the perceived link between hawala, organised crime and money laundering 
is exaggerated, mainly by the Western media and the USA.  The AMLSCU Official No. 7 
belonged to this group.  He said: 
I am surprised that after 9/11, everybody was talking about the illegality and 
badness of  hawala, but nobody demanded punishing those banks that were 
used  by  the  hijackers  for  money  transfers.  I  believe  that  criminal 
organizations  have  always  used,  and  will  continue  to  use,  any  available 
means of money transfer for laundering their criminal proceeds. Criminals 
have always misused the banking system and the abuse of hawala remittance 
system is not an unusual case (Field Notes, 2009).
On the other hand, others thought that the link that was made between hawala and 9/11 has 
alerted the government to the need to pay more attention to the monitoring of hawala.  The 
AMLSCU Official No. 4 held this view. He said:
One  of  the  positive  developments  since  9/11  is  the  regulation  of  hawala 
which was not under government notice before. It is not only good for the 
government  to  keep  check  on  the  incoming  and  outgoing  financial 
transactions  through  hawala;  it  also  good  for  the  hawala  system as  well, 
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because it will not be misused by the criminals when it comes to laundering 
illegal funds derived from crime (Field Notes, 2009)     
Overall,  there  was  a  general  consensus  of  opinion  amongst  the  Bank  managers  and  the 
AMLSCU officials  that  money laundering  is  not  an  easy crime  to  detect.   According to 
AMLSCU Officer No. 10:
Criminals use different tactics in order to hide the true origin of black money. 
The problem with the UAE law is that it  puts the burden of proof on the 
Public Prosecutor, not on the accused party, due to which it is often difficult 
for  the  government  to  produce  solid  proof  in  order  to  punish  the  money 
launderers (Field Notes, 2009). 
The majority of the respondents recognised that money laundering is a multi-faced crime that 
has been increasing in spite of several efforts globally to curb it. It is believed that the UAE 
on its own cannot fight the problem. As the AMLSCU Official No. 14 put it:
Fighting money laundering and the financing of terrorism is the collective 
responsibility of the world community. No single country can eradicate this 
problem  effectively.  Mutual  coordination  and  collective  efforts  by  the 
international  community  is  the  key  to  success  in  the  effort  to  contain 
laundering operations around the world (Field Notes, 2009)
The AMLSCU Official No. 5 added:
[Although] many countries have now established their anti-money laundering 
mechanism, there are still missing links, and what you call the weakest link in 
international  cooperation  with  respect  to  money  laundering  and  financing 
terrorism  issues.  Unless  countries  cooperate  with  each  other,  the  efforts 
against money laundering and terrorism will be fruitless (Field Notes, 2009)
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The respondents acknowledge the role that the UAE has played in the fight against money 
laundering, through the signing of international treaties and through the criminal investigation 
of money laundering cases overseas. According to the AMLSCU Official No. 11:
The Government of the UAE is committed to sharing financial information 
with  its  overseas  partners  in  order  to  strengthen  mutual  cooperation  with 
regard to  fighting  money laundering and the financing of terrorism (Field 
Notes, 2009)
In support, the Police, on their part, emphasised the role that the AOCD has played in the 
international investigation of money laundering cases, especially the work that they have done 
with Interpol.  Police Office No. 3 explained:
The  AOCD has  helped  Interpol  in  many  criminal  investigations  and  will 
continue  to  do  so.  Similarly,  Interpol  has  also  helped  us  in  our  criminal 
investigations and has issued  Red Notices to arrest criminal suspects (Field 
Notes, 2009)
In particular, the police respondents mentioned examples of recent collaborative efforts with 
Interpol,  including  the  fact  that  the  UAE  has  recently  joined  the  Interpol  global  DNA 
database. The law enforcement agencies of the UAE now share the fingerprints and DNA 
profiles of over 70,000 suspects from 50 countries (see Sambidge, 2008). 
6.1.2.    Factors Encouraging Money Laundering in the UAE
When asked why it is that the UAE is a target for money launderers, many of the respondents 
said that it is  because of the stable political structure and the sound financial system of the 
country. In addition, some of the AMLSCU officials argued that criminals are taking full 
advantage of the cash-based economy in the UAE to launder money in the region.  AMLSCU 
Official No. 6 explained:
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If, for example, a person suddenly becomes rich without having any proper 
business  or  employment,  there  is  no  mechanism in  place  to  ascertain  the 
source of that person’s money. We do not have income tax in our country and 
there is no other way to know about the economic aspect of a person. Unless 
and until the Government has sound grounds for believing that his money is 
derived from organized crime, nobody can do anything to prosecute him. I 
know a few people in Dubai who have became rich overnight and nobody has 
asked them from where they got the money (Field Notes, 2009)
It is believed that criminals are also taking advantage of the weak immigration control 
systems at three of the five airports in the Emirates to import large sums of money into the 
region undetected. As the AMLSCU official No. 14 puts it: 
The least developed Emirates are trying to attract more people to use their 
airports in order to generate more revenue, thus leaving enough room for 
the money launderers to exploit and bring their illegal cash into the UAE 
(Field Notes, 2009). 
6.1.3. The ‘Know Your Customer’ Policy
Whilst the majority of bank managers and the AMLSCU officials expressed full support for 
the ‘Know Your Customer’ Policy, some were critical of the process, arguing that it is very 
easy nowadays to forge documents.  This was found to be particularly problematic in the case 
of foreign nationals. With the average annual immigrant growth rate in the UAE at 22.98% 
per 1000 population (see CIA, 2009), this is considered to be a significant problem.  As Bank 
Manager No. 9 stated:
From our new clients, we ask them to produce a copy of their passport, a 
driving license (if they have one), their employment status and the company 
for which they work, and any other documents that show their name, date of 
birth, nationality [and  so on]. To what extent these documents are true or 
forged, we don’t know, especially in the case of non-UAE documents (Field 
Notes, 2009).
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The AMLSCU Official No. 8 added:
We  know  that  bank  officials  face  [many]  practical  problems  when  it 
comes to the verification of the documents of overseas nationals. (Field 
Notes, 2009)
Some bank managers argued that  the competition amongst banks to attract  customers has 
meant that the verification of a client’s documents is sometimes not as thorough as it should 
be. According to Bank Manager No. 3:
We have our own limitation with respect to time, money and resources that 
we  can  spend  in  verifying  our  customers’  documents.  We  verify  all  the 
documents that we can, and we assume others to be true as well. You know, 
we are business organization and we have to do business as well (Field Notes, 
2009)
As  Lilley  (2006)  argued,  for  banks,  business  often  takes  priority  over  everything  else. 
However,  there  was  no  indication  that  bank  managers  do  not  take  the  verification  of 
documents seriously. Most of them realised that the KYC principle/policy is the first and most 
important line of defence against money laundering. As Lilley (2006) argued ‘…if a major 
bank finds it difficult  to implement  a basic ‘Know Your Customer’ system, what hope is 
there?’ (Lilley, 2006:189). However, the respondents were aware of the danger in labelling all 
potential clients as suspects in terms of money laundering. As the AMLSCU Official No. 4 
puts it:
You never know the intention of the person who wishes to open a bank account. It 
could be an ordinary person (Field Notes, 2009)    
There was no indication in all the responses from the Bank Managers that the fear of invading 
the privacy of customers or violating confidentiality was the reason for not carrying out a full 
verification of the client’s documents. 
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In response to the common saying that “black money can never become white without 
the support of bank officials”, some bank managers accepted that the system is not totally free 
of corruption, in spite of the provisions put in place to ensure that transactions are properly 
recorded (for example, the existence of the post of Compliance Officer). Some of the Bank 
Managers cited  some cases where bank staff  had being found guilty  of fraud and money 
laundering. 
6.1.4. Reporting Suspicious Transactions
All the bank managers interviewed said that they complied fully with the legal requirement of 
reporting suspicious transactions to the AMLSCU.  As Bank Manager No. 9 puts it:
We  have  clear  orders  from  the  Central  Bank  to  report  any  suspicious 
transactions that have occurred in our bank, and we fully comply with the 
reporting  requirements.  We  constantly  keep  check  on  all  large  deposits, 
withdrawals and transfers. We do not waste time if there is any suspicious 
transaction activity in our bank (Field Notes, 2009)
However,  the Bank Managers  were generally  critical  of  the CTR.  Whilst  some saw the 
benefits in the completion of the CTR form where a transaction violates the legal threshold, 
because “…it keeps a check on every large transaction” (Bank Manager 1, Field Notes xx 
2009), others considered it mere paperwork with no value at all.  As Bank manger No. 9 put  
it:
I do not understand the reason why we are forced to comply with the CTR 
requirement.  If a transaction is large but not suspicious, then what are we 
worried for? The Central  Bank doesn’t  need CTR from us, neither do the 
police.  I do not understand the logic of the CTR requirement (Field Notes, 
2009)
Bank Manager No. 5 was also against the CTR requirement. He had this to say:
214
The CTR requirement would have made sense if we were required to send 
it  to  the  Central  Bank,  the  police  authority  or  any  other  body  for 
monitoring purpose. By keeping CTRs within the banks, the Government 
has provided a good opportunity for corruption to the banks to hide their 
customers’ transactions from them. (Field Notes, 2009)
In contrast,  there was a general  support by the AMLSCU officials  for the completion  of 
CTRs, even though they did not receive copies from the banks. The AMLSCU Official No. 5 
said:
There may seem to be of no obvious benefit of filling in a CTR. It might  
look just like a paper activity for some bank officials.  [But] we cannot 
deny  its  importance.  Along  with  stating  the  amount  of  cash  to  be 
transferred, the CTR also includes information about the person who is 
sending  the  money,  and  the  one  who  is  receiving  it.  This  is  a  vital 
document for police investigation if [in future] any of these individuals is 
[later  found to be]  involved in  money laundering  or  terrorist  financing 
(Field Notes, 2009).
The AMLSCU Official No. 1 supported the above statement. He added: 
The  CTR  requirement  is  about  sharing  responsibility.  We  want  to 
communicate to the banks that they are also as much responsible as we are 
in fighting the misuse of our financial system. The CTRs are kept within 
the banks because we trust them. This is their duty towards the State. It is 
our  collective  responsibility  to  eradicate  crime-driven money from our 
financial system (Field Notes, 2009)
Finally, questions were put to all respondents on the link between money laundering and 
the  financing  of  terrorism,  with  particular  questions  asked  on  what  they  thought  about 
incidents  in  which the UAE had been involved,  such as the use of banks in  the UAE to 
transfer funds that were believed to be have been used by the planners of the 9/11 bombings 
in the USA in 2001.   The respondents generally supported the official line that both the UAE 
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and the USA must accept joint responsibility, but more so the latter. As AMLSCU Official 
No. 9 puts it:
Accusing the financial system of the UAE for providing funds for the event 
of 9/11 would be unfair.  Some of the 9/11 hijackers  opened normal bank 
accounts just like an ordinary citizen. They did not commit any crime here in 
the UAE. How would you know the intention  of a  person at  the  time of 
opening just a bank account? (Field Notes, 2009)
The AMLSCU Official No. 12 added:
Since  9/11,  the  AMLSCU  has  helped  with  a  number  of  criminal 
investigations with respect to money laundering and terrorist financing. We 
have  helped  with  many  overseas  requests  for  cooperation  in  money 
laundering cases from America, Britain, Germany, Pakistan and some other 
GCC countries (Field Notes, 2009)  
6.2. Investigating Money Laundering Cases
As shown in Chapter 5, the investigation of money laundering cases is the sole responsibility 
of  the Anti-Organized Crime Department  of  the Dubai  Police.  In  this  respect,  the Dubai 
Police is expected to engage with and share information (intelligence) with other internal and 
external departments such as the AMLSCU, the Customs Authority and Interpol. As has also 
been  explained  in  Chapter  5,  the  AOCD  exists  only  within  the  Dubai  Police  and  its  
jurisdiction covers the Emirate  of Dubai only. In the other six Emirates of the UAE, the 
enforcement  and  investigation  of  money  laundering  crimes  is  the  responsibility  of  the 
Economic  Crime  Department  that  exists  within  the  General  Department  of  Criminal 
Investigation.   This section describes the views of the police officers working within the 
Anti-Organized Crime Department of the Dubai Police at the time of this study, and who 
were  actively  engaged in  the  criminal  investigation  of  money laundering  cases.  Through 
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excerpts from interviews with the sample of 15 officers, one gets a picture of how money 
laundering cases are investigated by the Dubai police and, generally, what the response of the 
criminal justice system of UAE is towards money launderers.
6.2.1. Arrests
In response to the question of how they would go about arresting someone who is to be 
investigated for money laundering, the police generally agreed on the complex nature of this 
part of the process. All agreed that money laundering is a different and unique type of crime. 
Police office No. 4 explained: 
There is no single and unique way to initiate [investigation] into a suspected 
money laundering case. It varies from one case to another depending upon the 
nature of the case. In some cases, we arrest people on the spot, whereas in 
other cases we have to search homes, offices [and so on]. In some cases, we 
do not  even manage to  arrest  the  accused person for  years.  (Field  Notes, 
2009)
All the officers agreed that, generally, cases referred to them via the Customs Authority are 
easier to handle than cases that have come via the AMLSCU. As explained by Officer No. 4 
above, suspects in the former category could be arrested immediately at the port of entry.  
Some officers believe that there is some politics in the arrest of suspected money launderers 
as persons from certain countries are more likely to be targeted for arrest than others. As 
Officer No. 15 explained:
People  think  that  dirty  money  will  come  from  countries  with  internal 
problems such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia. However, very few would 
talk about Europeans and especially of America which is the home of many 
organized crime groups with numerous money laundering activities going on 
despite  its  advanced  anti-money  laundering  rules,  regulations  and  control 
mechanisms (Field Notes, 2009)
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6.2.2. The Investigation of Cases
Ringguth (2002) has argued that  people  underestimate  the real  difficulties  in  prosecuting 
money laundering cases:
Money laundering is, by its very nature, difficult to prove, for if the money 
launderers  have done their  job,  the money appears  to be clean (Ringguth, 
2002. No Page) 
Ringguth’s views were echoed by the majority of the police respondents. As Officer No. 9 
put it:
Money laundering cases are completely different from those of other criminal 
cases. In ordinary crimes, for example a car crash or a murder, you have a 
criminal  scene  and  you  have  witnesses.  You  go  there,  collect  as  much 
information as you can from the criminal scene and the witnesses. So, you 
gather information and then you continue to build the criminal case based 
upon  your  initial  investigation.  In  money  laundering  cases  it  is  totally 
different.  You have a criminal  scene,  documents and people involved, but 
you cannot  see  that.  You are  completely  blind.  Your  job  has  been made 
difficult  by  money launderers  because  they  [criminals]  have  already  used 
their mind during the laundering process. Our job is to start looking for the 
mistakes they have made to find fullproof evidence; it  is not an easy job, 
honestly (Field Notes, 2009)
The  officers  did  not  think  that  they  are  adequately  equipped  to  investigate  the  financial 
aspects of a money laundering case.  In this regard, they are not unique. Many police forces 
in  the  world  lack  the  expertise  to  investigate  financial  crimes.  According  to  Ringguth 
(op.cit.):
Globally, the concept of modern financial investigation, as a routine part of 
the investigation of major acquisitive crime, is still very much in its infancy. 
In  many  countries  police  investigation  is  primarily  directed  towards  the 
investigation of the underlying criminality: drug trafficking or whatever. It is 
still,  globally  speaking,  I  think,  comparatively  rare  for  investigators,  as  a 
routine part  of the investigation of major  proceeds-generating offences,  to 
‘follow  the  money’  and  establish  what  happened  to  the  proceeds...  but 
investigating the proceeds can and does often lead to the money launderers – 
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whether they are the criminals involved in the original offence themselves or 
others acting on their behalf (Ringguth, 2002: No Page).    
The police officers interviewed found it more convenient to focus on the criminal element of 
the crime; in other words, to ascertain that the suspect has indeed committed the crime.  The 
majority of police officers said that the financial aspect of the money laundering was of less 
concern to them than the criminality of the act itself. A financial investigation will give some 
priority to the proceeds of the crime. According to Madinger (2006),
A  financial  investigation  is  a  blend  of  the  more  traditional  investigative 
techniques  and those used by auditors for 3000 years.  The techniques  are 
actually very similar. Knowing this may not make a financial case any more 
attractive  to  the  law  enforcement  officer  who  has  no  background  in 
accounting, but there is no getting around the fact that somebody is going to 
have  to  prove  [  ]  that  financial  half  of  the  money  laundering  equation 
(Madinger, 2006:107)
Thus, whilst accepting the relevance of effective laws in the fight against money laundering, 
many of the officers said that this should be complemented by a better system of criminal 
investigation  in  which  police  officers  are  trained  in,  and able  to  use,  more  sophisticated 
methods of criminal and financial investigation. Some of the police officers also mentioned, 
as a very important hindrance to an effective money laundering investigation, the fact that the 
Dubai  Police,  unlike  the  FBI,  for  example,  do not  have  access  to  all  financial  data  and 
information. As Police office No. 4 puts it:
If the FBI can access all the financial information in the US directly, why 
can’t we do the same here in the UAE?  What is the difference? I believe if 
the Dubai Police is given direct access to the database of STRs and CTRs, it 
will improve our efforts in fighting organized crime in general, and money 
laundering in particular (Field Notes, 2009). 
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Another very important problem highlighted by the police respondents is the length of time 
that it takes for a case to travel from one authority to another. Many of the respondents said 
that  the  transfer  of  cases  from  the  AMLSCU  to  the  Attorney-General  and  the  Public 
Prosecutor and then to the police, takes far too long. ‘Justice delayed is justice denied’.  In 
addition,  some officers said that, compared with other crimes,  the investigation of money 
laundering cases is time consuming. 
6.3. Inter-Agency Cooperation and Information Sharing
A key issue raised in Chapter 5 is the apparent overwhelming role that the AMLSCU plays 
in the money laundering control system. The impression that came from the analysis was 
that the AMLSCU was unchallengeable and unaccountable to any of the other authorities 
working  within  the  system.  The  sharing  of  information  or  intelligence  between  law 
enforcement agencies is a key element in the fight against crime (see Chapter 7).  There is 
evidence that the law allows the AMLSCU to forward STPs to the police and to the other 
legal  authorities  involved  in  the  fight  against  money  laundering,  but  there  is  no  legal 
provision  or  evidence  of  any  other  types  of  exchange  of  information  between  the  law 
enforcement authorities and the AMLSCU. In fact, as mentioned in Chapter 5, the police 
have no access to any other financial information held on suspected money launderers by the 
Central Bank or by the financial institutions.  Thus, the picture given in Chapter 5 is that 
there is limited cooperation in terms of information or intelligence exchange between the 
banks and the law enforcement authorities during the processing and investigation of alleged 
money laundering cases.
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Leong (2007) argued that the increasing threat from money laundering and terrorist 
financing means that closer cooperation of the law enforcement agencies domestically and 
internationally  is  needed,  and  this  can  only  be  tackled  effectively  through  sharing 
information, assisting in investigations and ‘out of the box thinking’ (Leong, 2007:211).
Although there is no open blame-game for non-cooperation among the financial and 
law enforcement authorities, there was some evidence of a “power struggle” in the responses 
given by the different respondents with regard to their roles vis-à-vis the others. Each group 
thought that their role was more important than that of the others. This was particularly the 
case between the AMLSCU and the Police respondents. The AMLSCU officials argued that 
their role is crucial and more important than that of the Police because they carry out the 
initial financial assessment without which no case can proceed against an accused person. 
As the AMLSCU Official No. 9 puts it:
Money laundering cases are financial  crimes, [and] we do all the financial 
inquiry  before  we  send  the  case  to  the  Public  Prosecutor  for  further 
investigation by the Dubai Police. The information we provide serves as the 
foundation  of  a  money  laundering  case  on  the  basis  of  which  the  police 
authority built and extend their investigation. Therefore, the  AMLSCU plays 
a  more  important  role  than  any  other  government  institution  in  money 
laundering cases (Field Notes. 2009)
All the police respondents disagreed with this view. The majority of them talked about the 
rather condescending approach that the AMLSCU take towards police officers and their role 
in the money laundering control system.  According to Police Officer No. 8:
THE AMLSCU Officials give us the impression that they are more important 
players in money laundering cases than us [because] they are the ones who 
decide which case should go to court and which one should not. They take 
criminal investigation for granted (Field Notes, 2009). 
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Police Officer No. 8 added:
I remember one AMLSCU official told me: ‘Your job is easy compared to 
ours. We have to keep continuous check on every transaction of suspected 
money launderers. You just arrest people on the information we give you. We 
do the difficult job and you do the easy one’ (Field Notes, 2009)
Police Officer No. 5 further added:
I believe that our job is more difficult than that of the others who are involved 
in money laundering cases. The AMLSCU officials,  while staying in their 
offices, just give orders. If they need any information from banks about a 
bank account, they order them to provide the information. Our job is not like 
that. We do not give orders; we receive orders and act on them. We have to 
communicate  with  the  Public  Prosecutor,  the  AMLSCU,  the  Customs 
Authority, and the Court on the one hand and, at the same time, conduct the 
criminal  investigation  as  well.  Collecting  intelligence,  arresting  and 
interrogating suspects and witnesses; searching for the criminal property or 
money, searching cell phone records, SMS, forensic record are not easy jobs 
to do (Field Notes, 2009). 
Police Officer No. 1 concluded: 
I  do not  mind if  the AMLSCU plays  a leading role  in money laundering 
cases. We should change the attitude of ‘I am superior to you and my role is 
more important than yours’. We are all part of the one team that fights against 
money laundering. Thus, nobody is more important and superior than others 
(Field Notes, 2009)  
The argument  above, it  seemed, was over what was more important:  the financial  or the 
criminal  investigation.  The  police  officers  did  not  deny  the  importance  of  financial 
information in money laundering cases, but disagreed with the AMLSCU officials that once 
the initial  financial  investigation is done, the rest is easy. For the police, having financial 
evidence alone does not solve the crime; proper investigation is needed to attain a successful 
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prosecution.  As  Police  Officer  No.  1  argued,  criminal  investigation  is  as  important  as 
financial investigation; they are just the two sides of the same coin. 
More important was the argument over the cooperation between the AMLSCU and the 
police with regard to the sharing of financial data held on suspected money launderers by the 
AMLSCU and the banks.  The majority of police officers interviewed thought that during an 
investigation,  the  police  should  be  able  to  have  access  to  all  financial  data  without  any 
restrictions. The police officers thought that having direct access to bank records and other 
financial information held on the suspect by the AMLSCU would improve police efficiency 
in terms of the investigation. The fact that they do not have direct access to these financial 
data makes them to see their role as that of a passive actor rather than an active one. As 
Police Officer No. 12 explained:
We are dependent; dependent on almost every law enforcement agency. Our 
hands are tied. (Field Notes, 2009)
Police Officer No. 6 talked about the delays in the progress of the investigation into money 
laundering cases that often occur as a result of the lack of direct access to financial data held 
by banks and the AMLSCU.  He said: 
We have our own limitations. We can cover some distance, but not all. There 
are speed breakers that do not allow us to go fast; you feel frustrated. I do not 
understand why we have to access the record of a bank account indirectly 
through the AMLSCU; why can’t we take such information directly from the 
bank? These  formalities  are  there  to  slow down the  investigation  process 
rather than to facilitate it (Field Notes, 2009)
The above view was held by many of the police officers interviewed. According to Police 
Officer No. 9:
It is extremely difficult to give you a time schedule for any money laundering 
case. I must say that these are time consuming cases. It takes so much time to 
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communicate  information  [between]  the  law  enforcement  agencies  (Field 
Notes, 2009).
Police Officer No. 4 added:
You cannot fight money laundering effectively by introducing laws alone. 
You need effective implementation of the law. You need to  empower the 
investigative agency, give them more powers so that they can conduct the 
investigation of money laundering cases freely … If the FBI can access all 
the financial information in the US directly, why we can’t do the same here in 
the UAE?  What is the difference? I believe if the Dubai Police is given direct 
access to the database of STRs and CTRs, it would improve our efforts in 
fighting  organized  crime  in  general,  and  money  laundering  in  particular 
(Field Notes, 2009)
For the majority of police respondents,  it  is the AMLSCU officials  who are unwilling to 
cooperate with the police. According to Police Officer No. 4, the AMLSCU officials believe 
that they have “ownership” of financial information and are generally unwilling to share vital 
financial information with the police. As Police Officer No. 13 puts it: 
The AMLSCU is very strict  with regard to  sharing information  in money 
laundering cases with the AOCD. I do not understand this attitude. We both 
are  government  departments  and  our  goal  is  the  same;  to  tackle  money 
laundering cases. But sometimes, the AMSCLU behave as if the AOCD is 
under their authority (Field Notes, 2009).
The AMLSCU respondents, on their part, expressed strong resentment when asked if they 
would share more financial information with the police and/or allow them direct access to 
financial data in the possession of the Central Bank or financial institutions with regard to 
money laundering suspects. Some of the AMLSCU respondents were quick to emphasise the 
fact that the police are not trained in the investigation of financial data. As the AMLSCU 
Official No. 4 puts it:
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Police  officers  do  not  have  expertise  in  understanding  banking  records. 
Therefore, having access to bank records would not help the police at all. We 
are here to help the police. (Field Notes, 2009) 
The AMLSCU Official  No. 3 emphasised the need to maintain secrecy or confidentiality 
where peoples’ personal bank accounts are concerned. According to him: 
Most banks would prefer to maintain the secrecy of their clients’ information 
from  the  law  enforcement  agencies.  They  would  never  welcome  police 
coming to the bank and asking for their clients’ records. It does not give a 
good  impression  of  the  bank.  On  the  other  hand,  if  we  (the  AMLSCU) 
demand any records, they don’t mind giving them to us. Personally, I do not 
see any problems in the existing system. I believe there is a proper balance of 
powers between all the law enforcement agencies in money laundering cases 
(Field Notes, 2009).  
The  AMLSCU  respondents  were  generally  against  any  legal  move  to  grant  the  police 
powers of direct access to the financial records of suspected money launderers that are kept 
in banks or in possession of the AMLSCU. For the majority of the AMLSCU respondents 
interviewed, keeping financial information on money launderers away from the police does 
not  contradict  the  legal  requirement  that  they  should  share  STRs with  the  Police.   The 
overall attitude of the AMLSCU respondents was that of containing as much information as 
they can within the unit, and sharing only those pieces of information which the Unit thinks 
is worth sharing. THE AMLSCU Official No. 2 explained:
You know that money laundering is a crime against the State; therefore, it is 
my responsibility to keep that information secret. It is my duty not to share 
the suspicious  transaction activities  reported to us with any person. (Field 
Notes, 2009)
However, all the respondents interviewed acknowledged the importance of the sharing of 
information in money laundering cases. As Police Officer No. 4 stated:
The  sharing  of  information  is  the  key  to  success  in  resolving  every  problem, 
including that of money laundering as well. Each of us plays our distinct role, but our 
collective goal is the same – to fight money laundering. I think, instead of judging 
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ourselves as to whether I am possessing more information about a suspected money 
launderer than others, we should share each and every piece of information for our 
collective goal of eradicating the criminal proceeds from our society (Field Notes, 
2009).
The need to  share information  or  intelligence  is  crucial  as  money laundering,  like  most 
organised  criminal  activities,  is  becoming  increasingly  sophisticated  and  complex.  The 
financial aspects of organised criminal activities are becoming increasingly sophisticated, 
making it difficult for law enforcement agencies to track them down effectively.  As stated 
in Chapter One, many organised criminals have started to operate as legitimate businesses 
do. This has meant that structures put in place to control organised crime (including money 
laundering) must be sophisticated, well integrated and multi-agency (Dini, 1997).  The anti-
money laundering systems in most ‘developed’ nations adopt the multi-agency approach to 
dealing with the crime and on the sharing of intelligence, and the use of modern technology 
that  helps  to  develop  a  comprehensive  understanding  of  the  scale  of  the  problem  and 
establishes appropriate ways of tackling the crime.
The structure in place for dealing with money laundering crimes in the UAE is, in 
theory,  multi-agency.  But,  in  practice,  it  doesn’t  operate  as  one.  The  above discussions 
clearly show that the structure is not integrated; neither is it well coordinated. Instead, the 
law has created a hierarchy of authority with the AMLSCU at the top of the hierarchy.
These practical problems were outlined in the IMF report on the UAE (IMF, 2008). In 
this  report,  the  IMF  noted  that the  way  and  manner  that  the  FIU  (the  AMLSCU) 
disseminates information pertaining to STRs to the law enforcement agencies is inadequate. 
The report concluded: 
In  the  light  of  legal  and  resource  shortcomings,  in  addition  to  a  lack  of 
comprehensive statistics,  assessors were not able to conclude that the FIU 
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was effective in its core functions of receiving, analyzing and disseminating 
STRs (IMF, 2008:174)
Progress  can  only  take  place  if  all  the  agencies  concerned  recognise  the  need  to  work 
together more closely and more explicitly in the sharing of information/intelligence and the 
investigation of cases.  Whilst the police were quite critical of the existing arrangements and 
would like to see a change that would allow more cooperation in the sharing of information, 
the AMLSCU officials, on their part, felt satisfied with the existing system as it is.  In a 
nutshell,  the  police  officers  interviewed  were  demanding  more  powers  and  closer 
collaboration with the AMLSCU in all money laundering cases; the opening up of direct 
channels of communication between the two government departments, access to financial 
database held by the AMLSCU and the power to initiate legal proceedings without the need 
to consult the AMLSCU.  Most of all, there should be mutual trust between the agencies,  
transparency and accountability. 
When asked for suggestions for the future or the way forward, the need to have a 
structured way of sharing intelligence or information was the most frequently mentioned 
suggestion made by the police.  For example, according to Police Officer No. 3:
Intelligence-led-policing is prioritized in many developed nations in their fight 
against  organized  crime.  If  intelligence  obtained  through  different  law 
enforcement  agencies  is  fully  recognized,  shared  and  exploited,  it  helps  in 
targeting  the  organized  crime  more  effectively.  A successful  prosecution  and 
conviction of most organized crimes can easily be achieved through intelligence-
led investigations (Field Notes, 2009).
Some police  officers  suggested the  creation  of  a  new independent  anti-money laundering 
agency. As Police Officer No. 14 put it: 
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I think [ ] the government should create a new agency like SOCA in the UK. 
The AMLSCU and the AOCD should be part of such an agency.  I hope [this] 
will  improve  the  anti-money  laundering  efforts  in  the  UAE (Field  Notes, 
2009)
6.4. Conclusion
The following contains the main viewpoints expressed by the respondents:
1. The AMLSCU and bank officials are more likely to regard money coming from war 
torn countries, South America, developing countries, Russia and post-Soviet countries 
as suspicious compared to  funds coming from ‘developed’  countries,  even though 
they  realise  that  the  USA  and  Western  European  countries  also  have  organised 
criminals who, in the past, have tried to launder money in the UAE. Invariably, the 
size  of  the  amount  of  cash  being  deposited  may  not  be  as  important  as  the 
geographical  source  of  the  money,  the  personal  background of  the  client  and the 
nature of the business activity involved.
2. Police officers felt that there could be some politics involved in the selection of cases 
for  investigation,  whereby  suspects  from  certain  countries  are  targeted  for 
investigation more than others.  
3. The AMLSCU and bank managers felt that money laundering is a difficult crime to 
detect.  This is not helped by the cash-based economy in the UAE and the country’s 
weak immigration control policy which has made the application of the ‘Know Your 
Customer’  policy  quite  difficult.  Bank managers  felt  that  they  sometimes  have to 
balance their own economic interests against the need to do a thorough KYC check. 
However, there was no indication that bank managers do not take the verification of 
documents seriously.
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4. Police officers also attested to the difficult nature of money laundering cases. On their 
part, they accepted the fact that they are not  adequately equipped to investigate the 
financial aspects of a money laundering case. But, in this regard, they are not unique. 
Most  police  forces  all  over  the  word  are  not  adequately  equipped  to  investigate 
financial crimes. 
5. The AMLSCU officials supported the current arrangements on CTRs, but some bank 
managers thought that it was a waste of time. 
6. Police officers are quite critical  of existing structure with regard to how cases are 
moved “up and down” the system, between the agencies. They claim that this often 
causes unnecessary delays.  
7. A key issue for  the police is  how the different  agencies  work together  and share 
information  on money laundering  cases.   The  police  appear  to  agree  with  Leong 
(2007) that, in the light of the increasing threat from money laundering and terrorist 
financing,   there  is  a  need  for  closer  cooperation  between the  law  enforcement 
agencies domestically and internationally in terms of the sharing of information, and 
the development of an ‘out of the box thinking’ attitude. 
8. The police would prefer to have the right of direct access to financial information held 
by banks and a legal reform that would break the monopoly of the AMLSCU over 
financial  data.  The AMLSCU officials,  on their  part,  are  totally  against  any legal 
change that would grant the police direct access to financial data held in banks. 
9. However,  all  the  respondents  interviewed  acknowledged  the  importance  of  the 
sharing  of  information  in  money  laundering  cases.  As  organized  criminals  are 
becoming more sophisticated and complex, it was essential for the  structures put in 
place to control organised crime (including money laundering)  to be sophisticated, 
well integrated and multi-agency.
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10. The structure in place for dealing with money laundering crimes in the UAE is, in 
theory, multi-agency. But, in practice, it doesn’t operate as one. The discussions so far 
clearly show that the structure is not integrated, nor is it well coordinated. The law has 
created a hierarchy of authority with the AMLSCU at the top of the hierarchy, with no 
provision for oversight. Thus, the current system is neither transparent nor sufficiently 
accountable. 
11. However,  all  respondent  thought that  the UAE is doing its  best  to  control  money 
laundering by working with other countries in the fight against organised crime.
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Chapter Seven
Managing Intelligence, Partnership Working and the Policing of Money 
Laundering
7.0 Introduction
In the previous chapters, I have shown that the federal government of the UAE is very serious 
about  tackling  organized  crime  and  money  laundering  in  the  Emirates.  This  seriousness 
derives  from  the  full  support  given  by  the  government  to  international  legal  and  law 
enforcement  arrangements  to  combat  these  crimes,  and  the  passing  of  its  own  laws  to 
criminalise money laundering and all  sorts of financial  crimes, including the financing of 
terrorism.  However,  it  was  made  clear,  in  Chapter  5,  that  the  law empowers  a  banking 
“authority” - the AMLSCU - to dictate which case goes forward for prosecution and to have a 
say in the decisions to charge and prosecute suspected offenders. The role of the police is 
minimal in this process. 
Comments  from the  Dubai  police  officers  interviewed (Chapter  6)  suggest  that  the 
existing  arrangement  hinders  the  police’s  ability  to  carry  out  effective  investigation  as 
valuable information about suspects in the possession of the AMLSCU and banks are not 
available  to  the  police,  and  the  police  have  no  power  to  command  their  release.  More 
importantly, it appears that all the agencies involved in the investigation of money laundering 
crimes in Dubai are not working well together as equal partners in the quest to control the 
crime. There appears to be no structure or model in place on the sharing of intelligence or 
partnership working between all the agencies involved, besides the formal legal arrangements 
prescribed in  the CML (2002) (see Chapter 5).
The position of this thesis is that the police should occupy a central position in the fight  
against money laundering and organised crime, and that the control of money laundering in 
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Dubai would be more effective if all the agencies and authorities involved work together as 
equal partners, with equal access to intelligence data that are currently being monopolised by 
the AMLSCU and the banks. Accordingly, this chapter considers some models of policing 
arrangements already in existence in the UK that are used in the fight against organised crime 
and money laundering. The aim is to identify which model could be adopted in Dubai and 
why.
7.1. Intelligence Led Policing (ILP)
Simply  explained,  ‘intelligence-led  policing’  is  a  strategic,  planned  and  targeted 
approach to controlling crime. It is an approach that emphasizes the collection of intelligence 
which serves as a guide for policing operations (McGarrell, et al., 2007; Mawby, 2003)). The 
primary concern of ILP is to enhance the delivery of police work.  As Tilley (2003) puts it:
Intelligence-led policing is essentially about doing the practical business of 
policing  more  smartly,  incorporating  modern  information  technology  and 
modern methods. (Tilley, 2003:321)
More important is the fact that ILP, as a crime reduction strategy, requires the police to work 
in  partnership with other  law enforcement  agencies  to  tackle  law-breaking and to  ensure 
community  safety.  The  main  task  of  ILP  involves  gathering,  building  and  maintaining 
comprehensive information about the nature and pattern of crime and criminality through all 
possible means in a coordinated manner. The basic purpose is to analyse the crime, and to 
devise inventive strategies in order to tackle the crime effectively.  ILP is believed to be an 
informed and coherent law enforcement response to the problem of tackling crime (Tilley, 
2003).
In a nutshell, ILP is an approach to crime reduction whereby resources are moved away from 
retrospective crime investigations into pre-emptive operations based on analysed intelligence. 
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Rather  than  reacting  to  events  as  they  happen (on a  case-by-case  basis),  intelligence-led 
policing uses the knowledge already acquired to determine crime trends and patterns, and 
criminal activities in progress, and uses that body of information to influence the directions 
the police go in targeting particular individuals, activities, geographical locations and the like.
7.1.1. Criminal Investigation and ILP 
Criminal investigation is one of the vital components of police work. The scope of 
investigation varies, depending upon the nature of the crime. Investigating a local burglary, 
for  example,  would  be  different  from  investigating  a  suspected  case  of  terrorism.  The 
criminal  investigation  functions  of  the  police  involve  locating,  gathering  and  using 
information/intelligence  for  the  purpose  of  bringing  offenders  to  justice.  Criminal 
investigation is also a means to achieving other criminal justice objectives such as improving 
intelligence gathering, caring for victims, or managing crime risks.  
With regard to the United Kingdom, Wortley and Manzerolle (2008) argued that the 
collection of criminal intelligence by the police is not a modern day phenomenon. It started as 
far back as the very beginning, when the first batch of modern police officers walked the 
streets  of London in 1829 (see Emsley,  2008)  However,  for much of its  history,  Grieve 
(2004) argued, the police in England and Wales used criminal intelligence in a disorganized 
and inconsistent manner. Police tactics were investigation-led, carried out mainly to support a 
criminal case. Intelligence played very little role in the standard model of policing that was 
mainly reactive. Criminal intelligence was used on a case to case basis for the purpose of 
gathering enough evidence in order to secure a prosecution. It was never used in a proactive 
manner to target crime, or potential or actual criminals. 
233
The term ‘intelligence-led policing’ entered into common usage in policing around 
the early 1990s. References to the origin of the term pointed to the UK as its source. During 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, the crime rate was increasing in the UK, and there was a need  
for radical changes in the way the police operated (Gill, 1998). There was increasing concern 
that  traditional  authoritarian  policing  was  proving  to  be  inadequate  and  inappropriate  in 
curbing the increasing levels of crime. It was at that time that new policing initiatives were 
introduced such as community policing and problem-oriented policing.  As far back as 1975, 
a  report  entitled  the  Baumber  Report  for  the  Association  of  Chief  Police  Officers  had 
recommended increased use of intelligence by the police. For effective policing, the report 
emphasized  that  intelligence  needs  to  be  understood as  more  than  mere  information.  As 
Newburn et al. (2007) put it:
Baumber  argued  that  criminal  intelligence,  as  a  modern  policing  concept, 
requires that such a piece of information is put together with others and some 
form of analysis is performed in order to produce a fuller picture (Newburn, 
Williamson and Wright, 2007:200)(emphasis mine)
Furthermore, the report proposed a definition of ‘intelligence’ in the following manner:
Criminal  intelligence can be said to be the end product of a process often 
complex,  sometimes  physical,  and  always  intellectual,  derived  from 
information that has been collected, analysed and evaluated in order to prevent 
crime or secure the apprehension of offenders’ (ACPO 1975:para. 32 cited by 
Newburn, Williamson & Wright 2007:200).
The concept of intelligence-led policing emerged due to the failure of the traditional reactive 
approach to policing. ILP is a new law enforcement operational strategy that focuses on a 
proactive approach to tackling crime,  characterised by the collection and use of effective 
intelligence with the aim of targeting criminals. This approach is based on the belief that the 
general patterns of offending are known to the police. Therefore, instead of waiting for an 
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incident to happen and then reacting accordingly, ILP puts a lot of emphasis on targeting the 
criminals before they commit the crimes. According to Tilley (2003)
Intelligence-led  policing  involves  effectively  sourcing,  assembling  and 
analysing ‘intelligence’ about criminals and their activities better,  to disrupt 
their  offending, by targeting enforcement  [at]  where it  can be expected to 
yield highest dividends (Tilley, 2003:313).
In contrast, reactive policing is where the police react whenever an incident arises. According 
to Tilley (2003)
Reactive  policing  is  also sometimes  referred  to  as  ‘fire  brigade’  policing, 
involving responses to emergencies as they arise but little else. The first is put 
out,  the case is dealt  with and then the police withdraw to await  the next 
incident  that  requires  attention.  There  is  nothing  strategic  about  response 
policing.  There  are  no  long-term objectives.  There  is  no  purpose  beyond 
coping with the here and now (Tilley, 2003:313)
The old fashion reactive pattern of policing failed to yield effective crime control results, 
particularly in today’s plural society because, as Tilley (2003) argued:
Dealing with individual offences reactively and trying to solve them one at a 
time as evidence happens to be available is not an efficient or effective way 
of allocating police efforts. Instead, the police can and should actively pursue 
information  about  criminals  and  their  organization.  This  is  expected 
simultaneously to lead to improvements in both the detection and prevention 
of crime (Tilley, 2003:313)
The move to reform policing strategy in Britain came largely from within.  The move to 
ILP is associated with a number of important developments that took place during the early 
1990s. One of them was the publication of the Home Office (1993) report Helping Enquiries:  
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Tackling  Crime Effectively, commonly  known as  the  Audit  Commission  Report  of  1993. 
Furthermore, the benefits of adopting and implementing criminal intelligence procedures and 
processes in mainstream policing functions  were systematically  highlighted by successive 
reports by the ACPO (1978, 1986 and 1996). 
The Audit Commission Report (1993) emphasized the use of more intelligence. The 
report examined the mechanism of operational policing and was critical of the way the police 
were making use of resources. The report emphasized the need for policing strategy to focus 
on targeting criminals, and not only focusing on crime, because research has showed that a 
small percentage of recidivists commit a large amount of the crime. In other words, tackling 
criminals would prove to be more effective and cost efficient than simply focusing on crimes. 
Thus, the pressure on the police to be more effective and cost-efficient meant that a change in 
policing tactics was necessary. The report also acknowledged the significance of working in 
partnership for the purpose of crime prevention. Thus, this report played an important role in 
the shift in policing paradigms, from reactive to proactive law enforcement approaches. The 
basic aim of reforming policing was to give the police a greater sense of responsibility and a 
sense of purpose and direction that would help in their efforts to reduce crime.  
Kent  and Northumbria  Constabularies  took the  lead  amongst  UK police  forces  in 
implementing ILP. A policing model was designed by the Kent Constabulary that focused on 
solving the problems of burglary and motor vehicle theft. This model was formulated on the 
basis of systematically analyzing these offences and took a proactive rather than a reactive 
response in tackling them. After analyzing the pattern of crime, it was observed that a small 
number of persistent offenders were responsible for a large number of incidents. In addition, 
a consistency was observed with respect to victims and target locations (McGarrell, 2007). 
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Thus,  the systematic  collection of,  and analysis  of, intelligence,  has since become 
common  policing  strategy  in  the  UK,  used  to  inform and  direct  police  activity  at  both 
operational and strategic levels, in determining and targeting offenders. The surveillance of 
suspects, offender interviews, along with expanded use of confidential informants, were some 
of  the  main  methods  employed  for  gathering  intelligence.  Thus,  intelligence-led  policing 
became synonymous with the increased emergence of crime analysis. According to Oakensen 
et al. (2002), the intelligence-led policing regime includes:
The interpretation of crime and incident data through analysis, and community 
information  on  a  range  of  issues,  as  well  as  the  more  commonly  used 
information  gleaned  from  various  sources  on  the  activities  of  known  or 
suspected active criminals (Oakensen et al., 2002:7)
Over the years, intelligence-led policing has developed into a somewhat business-style model 
with  greater  emphasis  placed  on  the  sharing  of  information  with  local  partnerships  and 
strategic problem solving.  As Ratcliffe (2008) summarises it:
Intelligence-led  policing  is  a  business  model  and  managerial  philosophy 
where  data  analysis  and  crime  intelligence  are  pivotal  to  an  objective, 
decision-making  framework  that  facilitates  crime  and  problem  reduction, 
disruption and prevention through both strategic  management  and effective 
enforcement strategies that target prolific and serious offenders.  (Ratcliffe, 
2008: 89 cited by Wortley & Manzerolle 2008: 268)
7.1.2. A Conceptual Model of Intelligence-led policing
Ratcliffe (2003) has provided a conceptual model of how crime reduction can be achieved in 
an intelligence-led policing environment. 
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Diagram 7.1. An Intelligence-Led Policing and Crime Reduction Process
Source: Ratcliffe (2003) 
This model is also commonly known as the three-I model (interpret, influence, impact). In 
this model, the arrow that runs from the intelligence to the criminal environment entails that 
the police department analyses and interprets the criminal environment in order to determine 
who  are  the  main  players,  and  what  are  the  important  as  well  as  the  emerging  threats 
associated  with  them.   The second arrow that  runs  from intelligence  to  decision  makers 
means that the nature of intelligence determines and influences the kind of decision to be 
taken  with  regard  to  crime  control.  This  model  does  not  specify  who  should  take  the 
decisions  or who are the best  decision-makers.   This  is  left  for  the individual  analyst  to 
identify for himself (Cope, 2004). 
Ratcliffe (2003) argued that the  interpret  and  influence are the two most important 
components  of  the  three-I  model  of  intelligence-led  policing.  However,  this  model  is 
incomplete if the decision made on the basis of intelligence does not have an impact on the 
crime environment. In other words, the reduction in crime can only be possible if decision 
makers  have  an  impact on  the  criminal  environment.  For  the  prevention  of  crime,  it  is 
important that all the components of the three-I model must occur. The criminal intelligence 
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analysts must be able to interpret the criminal environment in an effective way; the analysts 
must be able to use intelligence to influence decision makers, and the decision-makers must 
be able to make use of available resources in order to effectively exert a positive impact on 
the criminal environment.
7.1.3 Problems with Intelligence-Led Policing
Intelligence-led policing is of recent origin and therefore the research community has 
been  less  involved  in  its  evaluation  than  in  other  forms  of  policing  such  as  community 
policing and problem-oriented policing. However, the model faces some basic problems in its 
implementation. Firstly, it cannot be predicted with absolute certainty how effective ILP is in 
controlling or tackling crime. Tilley (2003) stated that the officers involved in collecting and 
analyzing  the  intelligence  are  usually  particularly  busy,  thus  having  no  spare  time  for 
proactive work. 
Secondly,  there  is  the  problem  of  keeping  a  continuous  flow  of  intelligence,  and 
analysing and preparing it for operational policing. Because the ‘intelligence’ provides the 
very basis for the ILP approach, the collection of intelligence and making sense of it are the 
key to effective ILP. For ILP to work effectively, the police leaders/managers must have faith 
in the intelligence process itself. Finally, lack of training and information can create problems 
in effective communication between different specialized units. ILP is still in its early stages 
of evolution and therefore lacks a universally  acceptable framework that  can be put into 
action. 
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7.1.4. Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) and Organised Crime
The rapid changes at end of the 20th Century such as the end of the Cold War, the breakdown 
of national boundaries, globalization, the increase in electronic financial transactions and the 
internet,  have all  accelerated and facilitated the growth and development  of transnational 
organized crime (Woodiwiss, 2003). Globalization, and the use of improved technology, have 
opened ways for organized criminals to operate quickly and to extend their scope, thereby 
making the job of law enforcement a lot more difficult than before (Gill, 1998). 
As crime increasingly becomes a global phenomenon, police forces can no longer 
work alone, but have to work in collaboration with other forces across national boundaries. 
The police are no longer able to deal effectively with crimes in the traditional way of reactive 
policing.  There  is  a  need  to  change  policing  tactics,  bearing  in  mind  the  changing  and 
challenging circumstances. Thus, ILP has become a global policing phenomenon, adopted in 
most  ‘Western’  countries  as  a  modern  policing  approach  to  combating  organised  crime. 
Policing has to be fuelled much more by the collection and systematic analysis of intelligence 
in the struggle to contain transnational organised crime (Brodeur, 2003). 
Collaboration/partnership  has  also  become  a  key  feature  of  policing.  With  the 
increasing  move  towards  globalization,  many  of  the  more  serious  and  organized  crimes 
involve criminal activities that are carried out in more than one jurisdiction. Therefore, to be 
able to effectively control transnational organized crime, law enforcement agencies must seek 
active  partnership  with law enforcement  agencies  across  international  borders.  The  basic 
purpose of establishing such a partnership is to gain credible  intelligence on the criminal 
activities that are under investigation. As a result, the role and use of liaison officers abroad 
has  increased  significantly  and  has  played  an  important  role  in  the  collection  and 
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dissemination  of intelligence  across  national  boundaries  (Newburn, 2007;   Williamson & 
Wright, 2007)
The  move  towards  ILP  gained  momentum  in  United  States  in  the  post  9/11 
environment with the increase in demand for the establishment of global partnerships that 
could work closely with local agencies in order to expand the future capacity of the law 
enforcement agencies to tackle crime and terrorism. It is widely believed that the event of 
9/11 happened because of intelligence failures and the event could have been prevented if the 
law  enforcement  agencies  have  shared  information  in  time,  and  had  taken  a  proactive 
approach  rather  than  waiting  for  the  incident  to  happen and  then  responded accordingly 
(McGarrell et al., 2007).
The arrest of suspected terrorists following the major terrorists incidents in the United 
States, London and Madrid suggested that intelligence collected from different sources and 
through inter-agency cooperation was the key to identifying and arresting the culprits, and 
preventing future attacks (McGarrell et al., 2007).
7.2. The Policing of Money Laundering in the UK
In this section, I shall provide a brief discussion of the policing of money laundering 
in  the  UK  –  a  country  that  has  adopted  a  well  structured  intelligence-led  approach  to 
controlling the crime. As in many advanced and developed countries, money laundering is a 
major problem for the UK. London, being one of the most important financial centres in the 
world, has always attracted organized criminals with regard to laundering money generated 
from  criminal  activities.  O’Donovan  (2005)  argued  that  money  laundering  has,  in  fact, 
penetrated  into  the  financial  system  of  the  city  of  London.  For  example,  the  Financial 
241
Services  Authority  (FSA) reported that  General  Abacha,  the former President  of Nigeria, 
laundered his money through UK banks. Similarly, it is reported that between 1996 and 2000, 
£1.3 billion of money has been laundered through UK banks (see O’Donovan, 2005:125).  
In response to the problem, the powers of the UK police and non-police organisations 
with  regard  to  investigating  financial  transactions,  including  money-laundering,  have 
witnessed an extraordinary growth.  Since 1983, the UK has moved from a situation in which 
customer confidentiality was de facto, to one in which there is criminal liability for bankers 
who assist  in  disposing  of  what  they  suspect  to  be  the  proceeds  of  drugs  trafficking  or 
terrorism. Bankers can report transactions that they suspect to be the proceeds of fraud or 
robbery and they are regularly in receipt of (a) instructions from the Director of the Serious 
Fraud Office to disclose information under s.2 of the UK Criminal Justice Act 1987, and (b) 
Production  Orders  made  by  circuit  judges  under  Schedule  1  of  the  Police  and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984 to disclose details of accounts and background papers.  The obligations of 
the banks are two-fold: (a) "Pro-active" obligations - to inform the authorities about customer 
transactions  of  which  criminal  investigators  and  regulators  may  be  ignorant  and  (b) 
"Reactive" obligations - to respond to investigative enquiries about persons who are already 
"known to" the authorities (Gold and Levi, 1994). 
The  UK  has  a  history  of  legislation  against  money  laundering.  The  anti-money 
laundering legislation in the country originated as a means of tackling the proceeds of crime 
generated from engagement in the illegal drug trade (Harvey, 2005). According to Leong 
(2007a), money laundering offences in the UK originated in drug related offences introduced 
first  in  the  Drug  Trafficking  Offences  Act  of  1986  and  later  consolidated  in  the  Drug 
Trafficking Act of 1994. The scope of money laundering offences was later extended from 
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the  proceeds  of  drug  trafficking  to  include  the  proceeds  of  other  indictable  non-drugs 
offences through the Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
The law and legal regulations in the UK that are relevant to money laundering include 
the  Criminal  Justice  Act,  1988 (updated  by  the  Criminal  Justice  Act,  1993),  the  Money 
Laundering Regulations of 1993/1994, reviewed in 2003, the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 11, 
the  Criminal  Justice  Act,  2003 and the  Policing  and Crime  Act,  2009.  As mentioned  in 
Chapter 5, money laundering as it relates to the financing of terrorism is covered by the UK’s 
Terrorism Act, 2000 and its subsequent 2001, 2005 and 2006 additions. The most recent anti-
terrorism  law,  the  Counter-Terrorism  Act  2008,  also  has  provisions  related  to  terrorist 
financing.12 In  addition,  there  are  other  relevant  guidelines  of  government  and  industry 
advisory bodies approved by the Treasury (see Preller, 2008).
However, despite the fact that there are anti-money laundering regulations in place in 
the UK, they were not being implemented effectively prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks 
on  the  USA.  Kochan (2005:254)  argued  that  ‘London,  like  every  other  jurisdiction,  had 
allowed the implementation of its money laundering controls to lapse prior to the attack on 
the World Trade Centre on September 11. One money laundering reporting officer (MLRO) 
is reported to have said that:
11 The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 repealed all previous anti-money laundering laws and consolidated them 
into Part 7 of the Act. The Act introduced three main offences namely;
• concealing or transferring criminal property;
• entering into or becoming concerned in money laundering arrangements; and
• acquiring, possession and use of criminal property (see Leong, 2007a:142)
All the three offences carry a maximum of 14 years imprisonment (Leong, 2007a:142). The 2002 Act also 
introduced  the  Assets  Recovery  Agency  that  became responsible  for  the  confiscation  and  recovery  of  the 
property believed to have been obtained from the proceeds of crimes.  It also introduced powers for the police 
and customs officials to seize cash if such is believed to be crime related.
12 In February 2010, the Terrorist Asset-Freezing (Temporary Provisions) Act was passed into law by 
Parliament. This law is also relevant to the control of terrorist financing. 
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Prior to 2001, no one did a damned thing! People just weren’t interested; it 
was another ‘tick in the box’ exercise. You had a compliance department, you 
probably  had an  old  bombed out  compliance  officer  who was the  money 
laundering  reporting  officer,  who  had  no  resources  and  no  respect.  The 
guidance notes were generally geared to the retail sector and badly written. 
But it didn’t really matter, because no one really worried about them. The 
banks saw no risks to themselves, no one was going to fine them and no one 
was going to give them any grief. They were never going to get caught by the 
law (see Kochan, 2005:254) 
The exact scale of organized crime and the cost to the UK Treasury is unknown. There are 
tentative figures available that show that the total  losses from organized crime (including 
money laundering) in the UK are estimated to be around £40 billion a year (Bowling & Ross, 
2006:8). The Home Office White Paper,  One Step Ahead, A Strategy to Defeat Organized  
Crime  (Home Office, 2004) outlined the tentative cost of some of the organized criminal 
activities in UK thus:
The abuse of Class A drugs, produced by or smuggled into the country by 
organized  criminals,  has  costs  of  at  least  £13  billion  a  year,  at  a  highly 
conservative estimate.  In 2002-03, it  is estimated that around £7 billion in 
revenue was lost from all forms of indirect tax fraud, much of which was the 
result of organized fraud activity. Intellectual property theft is said to cost up 
to £9 billion annually. Organized immigration crime may be responsible for 
costs of a further £3 billion at least, not including the political and social risk 
it poses. The scale of fraud against business is also extremely large (Home 
Office, 2004:8-9).
Each of the above figures indicated huge economic losses to the UK exchequer. The social 
repercussions  are  even higher  than  the  economic  one.  Drug abuse,  tax  fraud and  illegal 
immigrants  all  have negative  impacts  on the community,  and are a  recipe  for  anti-social 
behaviour and insecurity in general.
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7.2.1. Gate keepers, the FSA
In reaction, the UK government has enacted more laws (as discussed above) and, in addition, 
created a number of ‘gatekeepers’ (Sproat, 2007:173) to constantly watch over those who try 
to launder the proceeds of their crime within the UK financial system. Until 2000, the Bank 
of  England was responsible  for  banking regulation.  However,  the failure  of the  Bank to 
police  the  Bank  of  Credit  and  Commerce  International  (BCCI)  that  was  being  used  by 
organized criminals to launder their dirty money in the UK, compelled the UK government to 
look for alternatives. As Kochan (2005) puts it:
The city of London has been beset by financial scandals. The collapse of the 
Bank of Credit and Commerce International, which funded drugs and terror 
groups through London, was especially devastating and had a global impact. 
London reacted by passing laws and shuffling around its institutions. But its 
massive  $4  trillion  financial  sector  still  looks  vulnerable  to  invasion  by 
launderers (Kochan, 2005:253) 
The ‘gatekeepers’ are expected to make it more difficult for organized criminals to wash the 
dirty  money  generated  from  criminal  activities.  An  example  is  the  Financial  Service 
Authority (FSA).
The FSA was  incorporated  on  7th June  1985 under  the  title  of  The Securities  and 
Investments  Board (SIB).  The Securities  and Investments  Board changed its  name to the 
Financial  Services Authority on 28th October 1997 and it  now exercises  statutory powers 
given to it by the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. The FSA took over the job of 
banking regulation from the Bank of England. In addition to the power to regulate banks, the 
FSA  also  has  powers  to  regulate  insurance  companies,  financial  advisers,  the  mortgage 
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business  and  general  insurance  (excluding  travel  insurance).  In  effect,  the  FSA  is  the 
umbrella organization that is responsible for the regulation of the entire financial sector in the 
UK (Kochan, 2005).  The FSA is accountable to Treasury Ministers and, through them, to 
Parliament. It is operationally independent of the Government and is funded entirely by the 
firms it regulates through fines, fees and compulsory levies. 
The Financial Services and Markets Act (2000) imposed five statutory objectives upon the 
FSA:
(a) market confidence: maintaining confidence in the financial system; 
(b) public awareness: promoting public understanding of the financial system; 
(c) financial stability: contributing to the UK's financial stability; 
(d) consumer protection: securing the appropriate degree of protection for consumers; and 
(e) reduction of financial crime: reducing the extent to which it is possible for a business 
carried on by a regulated person to be used for a purpose connected with financial 
crime
Under (e), the function of the FSA is to ‘…deter criminals and terrorists from trying to use 
the financial system to perpetrate financial crime and to make it easier to catch and punish 
those who abuse the financial  system’ (Leong,  2007a:144).   In this  regard,  the Financial 
Service Authority became the supervisory and regulatory authority responsible for issuing 
rules and regulations to banks and financial institutions in order to combat money laundering. 
In a nutshell, the main job of the FSA is to monitor compliance by banks and other financial 
institutions with regard to their obligations in relation to money laundering control. Under the 
FSA rules, all the banks and financial institutions are expected to have introduced effective 
systems for detecting and combating money laundering in all its forms. The FSA has also the 
authority to impose disciplinary actions on individuals or financial institutions if found guilty 
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of breaching or not fulfilling their anti-money laundering responsibilities. In this regard, the 
regulatory rules made by the FSA are similar to those made by the MLR, 2000. 
In recent years, the FSA has imposed huge fines on certain banks for non-compliance 
with its rules. For example, ‘…on January 15th 2004, the FSA fined the Bank of Scotland 
£1.25 million for failing to record the identity of more than half of its customers, and had 
imposed  fines  totalling  some £4.8  million  for  similar  breaches  by  other  banks  in  2003’ 
(O’Donovan, 2005: 124-5). 13  
7.2.2 The Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA)
Furthermore, the UK has modernized and re-structured its policing system in order to 
deal with organised crime, including money laundering.  There has been a merging of the 
functions of security agencies, the police and HM Revenue and Customs in the fight against 
organised crime and terrorism, including money laundering.
Due to the changing trends with respect to organized crime and terrorism, a need was 
felt in the UK to bring about considerable changes to the existing police force sytem. In this 
regard, there was a call for the establishment of a ‘British FBI’ (Sheptycki, 2007:51).  This 
call had the support of then New Labour government of Tony Blair. Consequently, in 2004, 
the  government  announced  its  plan  to  create  ‘an  FBI-style  national  force’  (Sheptycki, 
2007:51).  There  was  to  be  a  merging of  five  pre-existing  policing  and law enforcement 
13 On June 16th, 2010, the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, announced plans to abolish the 
FSA by 2012 and separate its responsibilities between three new agencies, including the Bank of England, with 
the Bank of England regaining most of its powers. The three new agencies would be: a Prudential Regulatory 
Authority created as a subsidiary of the central bank, a Financial Policy Committee also set up at the bank and a  
Consumer Protection and Markets Agency. In addition, the Chancellor planned to scrap the existing tripartite 
system of regulation in which the central bank, the FSA and the Treasury shared responsibilities, and placed 
most of the onus back on the Bank of England
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agencies namely the National Crime Squad [NCS], the National Criminal Intelligence Service 
[NCIS]14, the  National  Hi-Tech  Crime  Unit  (NHTCU),  the  investigative  and  intelligence 
sections  of  HM  Revenue  &  Customs  on  serious  drug  trafficking,  and  the  Immigration 
Service’s units with responsibilities for organized immigration crime.  The merging of these 
policing and law enforcement bodies led to the establishment of a new policing organisation 
called the Serious and Organized Crime Agency, commonly known as the SOCA (see Leong, 
2007b).  Sheptycki  (2007) argued that  the trend of  transforming the police  force was not 
limited to the UK only, but also existed in the developed countries of North America and 
Europe in response to the increasing transnational organized crime problem. Today, there are 
a number of law enforcement and security organizations whose mandate transcends national 
borders such as the UK’s Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), the Department of 
Homeland  Security  (USA),  the  Australian  Crime  Commission  (ACC)  and  the  Criminal 
Intelligence Service of Canada (CISC).
SOCA is a non-departmental public body and national law enforcement agency. The 
Agency was created by the Serious Organized Crime and Police Act 2005 and it formally 
came into being on 1 April 2006.  The functions of the Agency are set out in the Serious 
Organized Crime and Police Act of 2005.  According to the Act, the functions of SOCA in 
relation to serious organized crime are:
• Preventing and detecting serious organized crime, and
• Contributing to the reduction of such crime in other ways and to the mitigation of 
its consequences (SOCAP15 Act 2005, section 2(1).
14 Excluding the organized vehicle crime functions of the service which later became part of the Association of  
Chief Police Officers  Vehicle Crime Intelligence Service – AVCIS founded in 2006
15 Serious Organized Crime and Police Act 2005
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And in relation to other crimes, not just serious organized crime, SOCA functions include
• Gathering,  storing,  analysing  and  disseminating  information  relevant  to  (a)  the 
prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of offences; or (b) the reduction of 
crime in other ways or the other ways or the mitigation of its consequences (SOCAP 
Act 2005, section 3.1)
SOCA is divided into four directorates that specialized in particular aspects of work;
• Intelligence which gathers and assesses information, and uses it to produce the best 
understanding  of  organized  crime.  The  directorate  ensures  that  all  activity  is 
knowledge-led (that is, intelligence-led)  and directed towards agreed priorities, and 
that SOCA builds strong working relationships with other agencies, including other 
law enforcement partners;
• enforcement, which provides a flexible operational response to threats, building high 
quality criminal cases against key targets and organized crime groups;
• Intervention, which aims to make life harder for serious organized criminals, with a 
particular  focus  on attacking  criminal  assets  and working with the  private  sector. 
Intervention also houses the international arm of SOCA; and
• Corporate services, which supports, facilitates and develops SOCA’s capabilities. The 
staff of SOCA will operate from almost fifty sites in the UK, as well as overseas 
(SOCA Annual Plan 2006/7:8-9).
SOCA was initially established with the staff strength of 4,200 and has taken over the 
responsibilities of the four pre-existing agencies that were merged when SOCA was formed. 
The officials of the SOCA were taken from both the police and the former British MI5.
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SOCA is a classic example of a multi-agency policing structure set up specifically to 
tackle  transnational  organised  crime.   The  introduction  of  SOCA  indicates  ‘…a  hybrid 
agency  working  as  a  policing  body  but  specializing  in  covert  and  intelligence-gathering 
activity’ (Newburn and Reiner, 2007:939).  
7.2.3. The British National Intelligence Model
The British National Intelligence Model (NIM) is a recent effort by the UK government to 
promote  effective  intelligence  led-policing  on  a  national  basis,  and  to  standardise 
intelligence-related structures, processes and practices across all police services in England 
and Wales. Thus, the National Intelligence Model (NIM) is often mentioned whenever the 
concept of intelligence-led policing is discussed in the UK. 
The NIM is a model of policing that ensures information is fully researched, developed 
and analysed to provide intelligence which enables senior managers to be able to provide 
effective  strategic  direction,  and  to  make  tactical  resourcing  decisions  about  operational 
policing and managing risk (Flood, 2007; Mike and Tim, 2006). In this regard it is a business 
approach to policing,  the aim being to rationalise  and systematise  the ways in which the 
police  service  handles  information/intelligence  and  makes  key  decisions  about  the 
deployment of resources.  The goal is integrated intelligence in which all  forces and law 
enforcement agencies play a part in the creation of a general ‘intelligence culture’.
Devised  by the  National  Criminal  Intelligence  Service  (NCIS)  and  adopted  by  the 
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) in 2000, the NIM is at the centre of the Police  
Reform Agenda in the UK. 
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The NIM is about taking an intelligence-led, problem solving approach to crime and 
disorder. Essentially, the model professionalises the intelligence discipline by facilitating the 
identification of priorities and the allocation of resources:
NIM identifies  patterns of crime and enables a more fundamental  approach to 
problem solving in which resources can be tasked efficiently against an accurate 
understanding of crime and incident problems (ACPO, 2005:12)
The NIM emphasises three key factors: Priorities, Resources and Results
• Priorities  –  the  development  and  analysis  of  information/intelligence  to  enable a 
deeper  understanding  of  crime  and  non-crime  issues  and  the  identification  of 
Priorities (i.e., existing problem areas or emerging trends)
• Resources  –  effective  decision-making guided  by  the  identified  Priorities.  Finite 
resources  and information  gathering  activities  are  coordinated  and tasked to those 
areas which pose the most significant threat to the public, the community, etc.
• Results  –the  outcome  of  each  tasked  activity  is  evaluated  and  fed  back  into  the 
system, which continually develops existing intelligence, increases the Force's ability 
to  tackle  identified  problem  areas,  and  facilitates  the  assessment  of  the  Force’s 
priorities (Ref)
The structure and standardisation inherent in the NIM enables the smooth flow of information 
throughout the system, necessary for effective policing at three levels:
Level 1 – Local Issues – usually the crimes, criminals and other problems 
affecting a basic command unit or small force area. The scope of the crimes 
will  be  wide,  ranging  from low value  thefts  to  great  seriousness  such as 
murder. The handling of the volume of crime will be a particular issue at this 
level.
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Level 2 – Cross Border Issues – usually the actions of a criminal or other 
specific  problems affecting  more  than  one basic  command unit.  Problems 
may affect a group of basic command units, neighbouring forces or a group 
of forces. Issues will be capable of resolution by the Forces, perhaps with 
support  from  the  National  Crime  Squad,  HM  Customs  and  Excise,  the 
National Criminal Intelligence Service or other national resources. Key issues 
will be the identification of common problems, the exchange of appropriate 
data, and the provision of resources for the common good
Level 3 – Serious and Organized Crime – usually operating on a national and 
international scale, requiring identification by proactive means and response, 
primarily  through targeting operations by dedicated units  and a preventive 
response on a national basis (NCIS, 2000:8). 
A key element of the NIM is the promotion of partnership working or a cooperative approach 
to  policing,  which  requires  the  participation  of  other  agencies  and  bodies  working  in 
partnership with the police in the overall task of law enforcement and community safety. As 
ACPO (2005) puts it: 
NIM promotes a cooperative approach to policing and many of the solutions to 
problems will require the participation of other agencies and bodies. It is further 
strengthened  when  used  in  conjunction  with  other  partner  agencies.  [An] 
appropriate  use  of  intelligence,  risk  management,  the  allocation  of  resources 
(including  finance  and  technology),  engagement  with  partner  agencies  and  a 
review  of  tactics  are  all  systems  driven  by  NIM.  It  reduces  barriers  to 
effectiveness  by  producing  standardized  processes  and language  and creates  a 
cooperative working environment. (ACPO, 2005:12)
In a nutshell, the National Intelligence Model (NIM) is the product of the adoption of an 
intelligence-led model of policing nationally in the UK, with specific roles, responsibilities 
and procedures specified within an intelligence-led policing environment. The NIM provides 
a framework for effective policing to ensure that existing resources and procedures within the 
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Force are at their optimum level to achieve the best possible results. However, for the NIM to 
work  effectively,  capabilities  must  be  built  which  enable  information  to  be  gathered, 
recorded,  evaluated,  disseminated,  retained  and  disclosed  as  necessary,  from a  range  of 
available information sources.
7.2.4 The Need for Dubai to Adopt an Intelligence-Led Approach
It is imperative to note that the model adopted by a police force can have a considerable 
impact on the extent to which it achieves success in terms of tackling crime. The different 
models of policing identified above can have a considerable impact on the effectiveness of 
the force in tackling money laundering. For instance, the ILP requires that the police have 
access  to  all  forms  of  intelligence.  The  ‘partnership’  requirement  of  ILP  implies  that 
intelligence is shared freely and equally between all partners.  If one partner restricts the flow 
of  intelligence  to  the  others,  this  could  have  adverse  implications  for  the  investigative 
process. These are some of the problems that have been identified in this thesis. 
Policing  in  Dubai,  especially  in  relation  to  the  policing  of  money  laundering,  is  not 
adequately  intelligence-led.   The  use  of  intelligence  is  haphazard  and  inconsistent,  and 
therefore could not be regarded as constituting an intelligence-led policing approach. For 
instance,  Dubai still  adopts a reactive approach to the policing of money laundering (see 
Tilley’s definition)   as incidents are dealt with on a case-by-case basis. There is no evidence 
of crime analysis or analyses of patterns of operation that informs future action. A National 
Intelligence – Sharing Model based, perhaps, on the British NIM, would be beneficial to the 
Dubai police in the sense that it would establish an effective information-sharing structure 
that encourages partnership working between all agencies.  The existing barriers between the 
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agencies will be broken.  However, there will be the need to educate all agencies about the 
value of a structured intelligence-sharing approach and legal changes might be required to 
formalise the new system. In addition, the police will require training to be able to handle 
financial data. The result will be that manpower and resources will be utilised to maximum 
effect. There will be accountability and transparency and the policing of money laundering 
would be more effective. 
7.3. Conclusion
The partnership approach to crime prevention emphasises the importance of sharing 
information and responsibilities amongst the different agencies responsible for crime control. 
The idea of partnership and multi-agency working is embedded within some of the different 
policing  models  that  have  emerged  in  the  Twentieth  and  Twenty  First  Centuries.  For 
instance,  the ILP model puts particular emphasis on the process of collecting intelligence 
through different means and acting accordingly. When compared to the reactive approach of 
the crime prevention model which focuses on gathering information after the criminal act has 
been committed, the ILP approach emphasises the need for gathering information prior to the 
commission of crime – a proactive approach. 
One of the key arguments in favour of the partnership approach and ILP is that the 
terrorists attacks of 9/11, 7/7 and Madrid could have been avoided if there has been proper 
coordination, sharing of information and a proactive approach on the part of law enforcement 
agencies both inside and outside nation states. Although ILP offers some practical solution to 
crime problems, some critics have identified loopholes or shortcomings associated with the 
models such as problems with regard to the process of collecting intelligence by different 
means,  institutional  responses  in  analysing  such  intelligence,  problems  of  coordination 
among institutions, institutional politics, etc.
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This thesis has been able to highlight the fact that institutional responses to tackling 
syndicate crimes and other forms of crime in Dubai is reactive. There are instances when the 
police react  after  the commission of a crime.  It  has been established that  there is  strong 
evidence of the presence of organized crime in Dubai. Quite apart from the fact that Dubai is 
usually used as a transit point for not only shipping illegal goods to many other parts of the 
world, organised criminal gangs use Dubai as a base for supervising and monitoring their 
illegal activities in other countries. Similarly, the criminal proceeds are washed within the 
financial sector of the UAE in general, and in Dubai in particular.
The need for the integration of the ILP model can be deduced from the fact that the 
Central  Bank  of  the  UAE  enjoys  particular  power  and  authority  and  controls  money 
laundering  cases,  thereby  preventing  other  agencies  from participating  in  the  process  of 
detection.   It  is  important  to  note  that  developed countries  have  adopted  the  partnership 
approach and ILP in the policing of organized crime in general, and money laundering in 
particular. However, this initiative is yet to gain ground or take a hold in Dubai. For instance, 
as has been identified in this chapter and the previous ones (Chapters 5 and 6), the sharing of 
information among law enforcement agencies in Dubai pertaining to money laundering is 
minimal.  This is largely due to a lack of coordination between the Central  Bank and the 
Dubai police. Also there are institutional politics as to which organisation is more important 
than  others,  or  who  knows  better  than  others.  There  is  also  the  problem of  continuous 
government denial of money laundering in Dubai. For example, the Central Bank of the UAE 
denies the existence of any money laundering in the country. Other problems include the 
Central Bank of UAE’s approach to not sharing STRs and CTRs with the Dubai Police, the 
lack of a national database of money laundering cases, the lack of annual reports and statistics 
on money laundering, the fact that money laundering laws exist, but their implementation is 
not  effective,  and government  hesitancy with regard to  introducing effective  confiscation 
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legislation. These are some of the main problems that affect the policing of money laundering 
in  Dubai.  Therefore  the  government  needs  to  adopt  a  proactive  approach  to  controlling 
money laundering wherein all the partners in crime control should have a stake, coupled also 
with the modification its anti-money laundering laws and regulations. This could be achieved 
in the adoption of a National Intelligence Model. 
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Chapter Eight
Conclusions and Recommendations
This  thesis  sets  out  to  evaluate  the  policing  of  money  laundering  in  Dubai  by 
exploring  the  country’s  anti-money  laundering  control  mechanism.  We  have  included  a 
critical  analysis of the laws and regulations and the duties and responsibilities of the law 
enforcement and financial agencies that perform different tasks within the existing structure. 
Although, the federal government of the UAE has joined the international community in its 
fight  against  money  laundering  by criminalizing  money  laundering  and  the  financing  of 
terrorism and has ratified all the international and regional treaties concerned with the control 
of  organised  crime and money laundering,  there  are  still  many problems that  hinder  the 
progress of the Emirates in their efforts to meet their international obligations with regard to 
the control of money laundering.
The  events  of  September  11th,  2001  are  often  said  to  be  the  main  impetus  that 
triggered the need for introducing anti-money laundering and terrorist financing rules and 
regulations in the UAE. In this respect, money laundering and the financing of terrorism were 
criminalised  in  2002 and 2004 respectively.  Since then,  the Anti-Money Laundering  and 
Suspicious Cases Unit (the AMLSCU) has been playing the leading role in the fight against 
money  laundering  in  Dubai.  Other  departments  include  the  Dubai  Police,  the  Custom 
Authorities, the Public Prosecutor, the Attorney General and the Courts.  
This research has been able to establish that the role of the Dubai Police in the anti-
money laundering set-up has been tokenistic. The key decisions are taken by the AMLSCU. 
Also,  this  research has  shown that  the relationship  between the  AMLSCU and the  Anti-
Organized Crime Department (AOCD) of the Dubai Police is not one of equal partners in the 
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fight against money laundering. This was shown to be particularly the case with regard to the 
sharing of intelligence/information about suspected money launderers generally in possession 
of  the  AMLSCU.  In  contrast,  the  UK  and  other  developed  countries  have  adopted  an 
intelligence-led and partnership approach in their efforts to control money laundering in their 
countries. 
Partnership,  according  to  Ekblom  (2004),  is  an  institutional  arrangement  that 
enhances the ability to tackle problems by the division of labour. The agents of partnership 
may come with competing or conflicting interests. However, they all work together for the 
solution of a particular problem, without losing their particular identity.  It is important to 
mention that the concept of partnership is always directed towards a specific goal – usually 
the prevention of crime. This approach seeks to identify a specific criminal problem and to 
coordinate  the partnership’s activities in order to tackle that problem. Responsibilities  are 
acknowledged  and  shared  among  the  partners  with  regard  to  the  achievement  of  crime 
control, and mutual support and solidarity is always encouraged among the partners in this 
respect (Ekblom, 2004).  
Unfortunately, the approach taken towards organised crime control in Dubai is totally 
devoid of partnership. The CML 2002 simply sets out a hierarchy of authorities, with the 
AMLSCU literally at the top. There is no provision in law with regard to how the agencies 
should work together other than which agency has what authority and what the functions of 
the agencies are within the legal process. 
This thesis has shown that this approach to money laundering control in Dubai has 
created an atmosphere of mistrust between officials of the AMLSCU and the AOCD of the 
Dubai Police, in which accusations of a lack of transparency and accountability are made by 
police  officers.   The  police  officers  interviewed  felt  that  their  investigation  of  suspected 
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money laundering crimes was being hindered by the AMLSCU’s often unreasonable,  but 
legal,  control  over  sensitive  financial  information  which  the  Unit  has  the  power  not  to 
disclose to the other agencies if they so wish.  In contrast, disclosure is a key feature of the  
British  Criminal  Justice  System  (see  Criminal  Justice  Act,  2003).  All  agencies  and 
professionals involved in the prosecution or defence of a criminal charge, must disclose or 
share information with each other, if it is considered vital for the prosecution or the defence. 
Information or data (financial or otherwise) linked to the commission of an offence, do not 
come under the heading of “sensitive personal data” for the purpose of the Data Protection 
Act, 1998 (British Data Protection Act, 1998, s. 2).  
The  Dubai  situation  has  created  rivalry  and jealousy  between the  officials  of  the 
AMLSCU and the police officers in the AOCD. The responses of the interviewees from both 
agencies show that there are two sides to a story. The AMLSCU officials are right in arguing 
that AOCD officials are not trained in the analysis of complicated financial data (this is not to 
say that the AMLSCU officials themselves are!). OACD officers are also right in arguing that 
the failure of the AMLSCU to disclose vital financial information and the lack of power by 
the police to call for such information could be a serious hindrance to successful investigation 
of money laundering cases.  Whilst this raises issues about police training, it does not delimit 
the fact  that the police should have access to all  data  for a successful money laundering 
investigation to take place. 
In the USA, for example,  the FBI has been given extensive powers to access any 
financial information from financial institutions which they need for a criminal investigation. 
Such powers are strictly barred with regard to the Dubai Police. The Dubai Police have no 
right of entry into any financial institution in order to access financial information or data 
directly; it has to request permission via the AMLSCU in order to obtain such information. It 
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is  the  position  of  this  thesis  that  the  ‘wait  and see’  approach has  seriously  hindered the 
progress of the Dubai Police in tackling money laundering cases effectively. 
With respect to the investigation of money laundering cases in Dubai, the police are 
seated at the back, waiting to get orders from the Attorney General, the AMLSCU and the 
Public Prosecutor’s Office before they can take action. In this situation where police authority 
is pushed behind the scene, one cannot expect the Dubai Police to produce significant results 
with respect to tackling money laundering cases. The Dubai Police would only be able to 
demonstrate progress in tackling money laundering cases effectively, when it is given due 
power and authority that would enable the force to have unrestricted access to information 
that would help them in their investigation process. 
The limitations of the Dubai Police does not pertain to their restrictive role alone; 
there  are  other  inter-departmental  problems  that  also  affect  the  investigation  of  money 
laundering cases in Dubai. For example, there are no legal provisions that allow the two main 
pillars of the anti-money laundering control mechanism in Dubai – the AMLSCU and the 
Dubai Police – to have direct contact with each other.  To discuss any money laundering 
issues, the AMLSCU and/or the Dubai Police need the permission of the Attorney General. 
It is a theoretically feasible argument that the effective control of any crime cannot 
take place without the acquisition, analysis and dissemination of intelligence. In this process, 
there  should  be  transparency  and  mechanisms  in  place  for  accountability;  otherwise,  the 
system is vulnerable to corruption and manipulation.  Within the current structure, there is no 
way of finding out whether the AMLSCU has been fair and sincere in its analysis of STRs 
and their decision to put a case forward for investigation or not.  Giving the police direct 
access to all STRs and CTRs (where it is considered necessary) would greatly enhance the 
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Dubai Police’s efforts in the investigation and policing of money laundering cases in the 
country. 
The main arguments of this thesis are:
Dubai has the potential to have effective money laundering control system, having complied 
with international and regional directives on money laundering control. 
But, the thrusting of power to make decisions in money laundering cases exclusively into the 
hands of a non-independent  FIU (the UAE Central  Bank) and the marginalization  of the 
police in the access to vital financial data held by the banks,  have led to accusations that the 
current system is not entirely transparent or sufficiently accountable.
This thesis’s position is that effective control of any crime can only occur where the police 
work as equal partners with other agencies in a formal arrangement for controlling crime that 
is accountable and transparent. Isolating the police, especially with regard to access to vital 
information or intelligence, can only lead to ineffective policing.  It is therefore suggested 
that an intelligence-led information-sharing model, if established, would make a significant 
difference in the control of money laundering in Dubai.   
Suggestions for Change and Recommendations
1. There  is  no  national  database  for  keeping  details  of  Currency  Transactions  Reports 
(CTRs)  and  Suspicious  Transaction  Reports  (STRs).  CTRs  are  maintained  and  kept 
within the financial  institutions  concerned (e.g. banks) and shared with the AMLSCU 
only when requested. STRs are also kept by the AMLSCU and not shared with other 
organisations such as the Dubai Police. It is therefore recommended that there should be a 
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national  database  for  CTRs  and  STRs  and  that  such  information  should  be  readily 
available  to  the Dubai  Police  so as  to  assist  them in their  investigation  of  suspected 
money laundering cases. 
2. The AMLSCU has the dominant role in deciding which cases should go to court and 
which should not. There is no mechanism in place to ensure that THE AMLSCU is held 
accountable for their actions. It is therefore recommended that measures should be taken 
to make sure that the AMLSCU should be held accountable for their decisions regarding 
putting a case forward for investigation, as well as their decisions on the disclosure of 
information to the police. This accountability should be formalised in law. 
3. The procedure whereby the Dubai Police cannot access any information from financial 
institutions  directly,  but  have  to  go  through  the  AMLSCU,  is  one  that  needs  to  be 
reviewed.  In  practice,  the  Dubai  Police  have  to  comply  with  a  long  bureaucratic 
procedure imposed by the AMLSCU before access is granted. The fact that direct access 
to the financial institutions is strictly prohibited for the Dubai Police is problematic. This 
situation  delays the investigations  of the Dubai  Police,  thus giving more time for the 
money  launderers  to  accelerate  their  money  laundering  activities.  It  is  therefore 
recommended that such barriers be removed and that the Dubai Police should be given 
the power and the authority in law to access any information from financial institutions 
when needed for investigation purposes. 
4. The  lack  of  know-how with  regard  to  the  financial  aspect  of  the  crime  used by the 
interviewed AMLSCU officials to justify not allowing police officers access to financial 
data,  as  noted  above,  raises  important  questions  about  police  training.  It  is  therefore 
recommended that the government should initiate training programmes for police officers 
on the handling of the financial  aspects of money laundering. Such training is needed 
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because  of  the  changing  nature  of  money  laundering  techniques  such  as  laundering 
through the internet.
5. Because  the  AMLSCU  and  the  AOCD  are  the  two  main  pillars  of  the  anti-money 
laundering regime in Dubai, it is imperative that they meet regularly in order to discuss 
various issues pertaining to investigating money laundering cases. The requirement that 
permission ought to be obtained from the Attorney General before any meeting can take 
place,  should  be  removed.   The  AMLSCU  and  the  AOCD  should  meet  whenever 
necessary, not only when the Attorney General asks them to meet.
6. Because money laundering and financing terrorism is a global issue, those working in the 
investigation of money laundering cases require full knowledge of the problem, not only 
at the local and regional levels, but on a global scale as well. Law enforcement officials 
can  effectively  deal  with  money  laundering  cases  only  when  they  have  a  full 
understanding of the scale, intensity and impact of the problem on the economy and on 
society. Therefore, it is recommended that the government should introduce and provide 
full academic courses dealing with money laundering and terrorist financing to all the 
police officers, judges and prosecutors. Such courses should be offered in all the three 
police academies in Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah, and the two judicial institutions in 
Abu Dhabi and Dubai
7. The  anti-money  laundering  regulations  of  2002  have  provided  strict  legislation  to 
scrutinize  the  legality  of  any  proceeds  entering  into  the  Emirates.  This  legislation 
however ignores the scrutiny of the legality of currency leaving the UAE, which could 
result from domestic crime. Article 6 of the 2002 law does not require a declaration with 
regard to a threshold relating to cash carried by passengers leaving the UAE through any 
border points, in contrast to the declaration requirement imposed on passengers entering 
the country. Therefore, it is recommended that the threshold currency declaration should 
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be implemented with regard to passengers both entering and leaving the UAE, in order to 
fight domestic crime as effectively as international crime. 
8. The absence of an income tax system for both individuals and corporations in the UAE 
could, no doubt, increase the difficulties of the investigative powers when it comes to 
investigating domestic money laundering crimes, especially in an economy based hugely 
on  cash  dealings,  since  any cash  spending by criminals  is  not  likely  to  attract  much 
attention. Conversely, to the situation that exists in non-cash based economies, a criminal 
will think twice about how to safely infiltrate criminal proceeds into the financial system. 
In UAE, it is extremely difficult to keep a proper record of the economic aspect of every 
citizen  in  a  cash-based  economy  and  in  the  absence  of  any  income  tax  system.  In 
developed countries, for example, it is easy to track down the financial aspect of every 
citizen  due  to  the  availability  of  the  relevant  data,  whereas  such  information  is  not 
available in the UAE. This situation benefits the money launderers who can easily make 
huge profits  from organized  crime and can hide the criminal  proceeds  easily  without 
raising the suspicion of the law enforcement authorities. It is therefore recommended that 
a system be introduced by which the UAE government should know where an individual 
obtained his money, and whether or not the money is the proceeds of crime. 
9. The  anti-money  laundering  legislation  and  mechanisms  in  the  UAE are  still  in  their 
infancy  and  need  to  be  reformed  and  updated.  So  far,  none  of  the  2002  and  2004 
legislation has been upgraded. There are many loopholes in the anti-money laundering 
law of 2002, and the  government needs to discuss it and make necessary changes in order 
to help the law enforcement authorities to effectively deal with money laundering cases.   
10. The main deficiency in the UAE money laundering legislation is the absence of any civil 
confiscation  or  forfeiture  legislation.  The civil  forfeiture,  which  is  increasingly  being 
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implemented in many developed countries, has been found to be a new and particularly 
effective  way  of  controlling  organized  money  laundering  and  terrorist  financing  by 
targeting the proceeds of crime. It is believed that organized crime and money laundering 
can be effectively controlled if the UAE government changes its crime control strategy, 
and introduces new legislation that will facilitate the confiscation of the criminal proceeds 
derived from organized crime through civil confiscation. At the time of the publication of 
this thesis (2010) the UAE does not have any legal provision with regard to forfeiture or 
confiscation based on the civil standard of proof as does the USA and the UK. The only 
legal provision in the UAE with respect to the civil  confiscation of criminal proceeds 
relates only to drug trafficking, whereby under article 56 of the Federal Law No. 14 of 
1995,  the  court  can  order  the  confiscation  of  the  means  of  transport  used  in  the 
commission of drug trafficking. Where a person is convicted by a criminal court for a 
drug trafficking or prostitution offence, for example, the prosecutor is unable to forfeit or 
confiscate the individual’s funds unless the prosecutor is able to show beyond reasonable 
doubt that the funds are illegal and have been derived from the same crime that the court 
has convicted the offender of. It is recommended that a new civil law be introduced that 
would enable the competent authorities in the UAE to forfeit any cash or property under 
the civil standard of proof, based on probabilities. This new legislation will enable the 
legal authorities to forfeit or recover any property, as soon as it shows probability that the 
property  is  either  a  proceed  of  money  laundering,  or  is  likely  to  be  used  in  money 
laundering activities.   The burden will  shift to the owner to prove the opposite.  The 
inability of the authorities to confiscate the illegal assets of suspected money launderers 
under civil  law is  a serious omission in the fight  against  organized crime and money 
laundering  in  the  UAE.   The  confiscation  of  property  alleged  to  be  the  proceeds  of 
criminal  activity  is  given  protection  under  the  Vienna  Convention,  in  the  Palermo 
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Conventions and under Recommendation No. 3 of the FATF. The civil confiscation of 
property alleged to be the proceeds of crime is already in place in the UK, under the UK 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.  This UK law is model legislation that the UAE legislators 
could emulate.
11.  A very important side issue that is not covered in this thesis is public awareness. The 
Dubai government should make serious efforts to educate the public about the negative 
aspects of money laundering. This is an important tool in the fight against the spread of 
money laundering. Raising public awareness of the dangers of organised crime and 
money laundering will deter many from using their bank accounts for money laundering. 
The government should introduce mass awareness programmes for the public in general, 
and for the business community in particular, which could be done with the help of 
electronic and print media, posters, and newspapers.
12. As has been stated many times before, money laundering is one of the main issues facing 
Dubai today. Although the government has introduced anti-money laundering rules and 
regulations and has also created the infrastructure to deal with money laundering cases, 
much more is needed in order to tackle the problem of money laundering in Dubai. In this 
respect,  it  is  recommended that  a research centre  be established that  should focus on 
studying different  categories  of  organised crime in Dubai.  The centre  should conduct 
various studies on money laundering and should publish reports regularly, along with its 
recommendations  for  the  improvement  of  the  anti-money  laundering  mechanism  in 
Dubai. This Centre would also be responsible for providing up-to-date information about 
the  anti-money laundering  efforts  being undertaken globally  as  a  means of  providing 
examples of good practice and lessons that the Dubai government could learn from. 
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13. The government should establish financial awards for those who inform the police about 
known or suspected money laundering operations, in order to encourage the public and 
bank staff to notify the police with such information/intelligence
In a nutshell, there is strong political will on the part of the UAE authorities to achieve the 
highest degree of integrity in its financial sector.  This can be seen by the introduction of laws 
criminalizing money laundering and the financing of terrorism. In addition, the government 
of the UAE is a signatory of all UN resolutions against money laundering and the financing 
of terrorism, and is also a signatory of other regional treaties. The UAE has cooperated with 
other countries in disseminating information and investigating cases of money laundering. 
However, I must admit that the efforts against money laundering in the UAE are still in their  
infancy, and much more needs to be done in order to control the crime. I am hopeful that this 
study will play its part in shaping anti-money laundering efforts in the UAE in the years to 
come.
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